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ABSTRACT 
Medical Care is a Public Trust. Americans expect that hospitals and healthcare 
providers will be available and prepared to care for their every medical need. Yet the 
medical community is severely challenged daily to care for the influx of patients to its 
Emergency Departments with current resources. Healthcare is ill-prepared to meet 
community needs in the event of a mass casualty event from a terrorist attack using 
weapons of mass destruction.  
This research explores the premise that clinicians have skills either current or 
remote that can be renewed and enhanced to provide an immediate life-saving response 
team in the event of explosive or chemical events.  The research identified that the 
medical community has the building blocks available awaiting the guidance, organization 
and direction to orient them into a disaster medical capability that will improve 
preparedness and response. This thesis proposes a strategy to leverage the clinician 
personnel assets already in place to improve preparedness.  
A transformational approach is necessary to insure healthcare preparedness.  
Government planners must understand the challenges and current limitations of 
emergency medical response and partner with the healthcare to enhance preparedness. 
The United States medical community must understand the realities of terrorism and war 
at home.  
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Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your 
country.1 
The new millennium dawned spectacular and bright as the world watched the 
excited throngs of people celebrating at fireworks displays at major monuments in Paris, 
Australia and New York.  Less than two years later, the world watched horrified at 
another spectacular blaze at a major monument. The world changed dramatically on 
September 11, 2001. Suddenly, the world looked very different. Terrorism had moved to 
our shores and our heartland. We had to refocus. 
As the nation has successfully strategized and taken action to prevent other 
spectacular events, terrorists search for simpler, more accessible means and targets to 
strike fear in the citizens. As Thomas Friedman wrote in his best-seller The World is Flat, 
the Internet has allowed small, well-positioned attacks to instill fear in the hearts and 
minds of millions throughout the world.2  It has opened possibilities and technical 
information to the devious and disaffected around the world.  
The 9/11 Commission concluded, “…a rededication to preparedness is perhaps 
the best way to honor the memories of those we lost that day.”3 
This thesis offers a challenge to the healthcare community to rededicate 
themselves to their Hippocratic Oath and to the people of the United States. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Hospitals and physicians share a public trust with the community to care for the 
citizens in their time of need. Fulfilling this function requires that hospitals and 
physicians create a surge capacity (a term used in Homeland Security and healthcare that 
                                                 
1 John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 35th President of the United States, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1960. 
2 Thomas Friedman, The World Is Flat, Farrar (Straus and Giroux, New York 2006), 430. 
3 The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States (WW Norton and Company: New York), 323. 
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means to improve and expand resources in the event of a major healthcare crisis). Much 
has been written and plans have been developed for improving surge capacity by 
hospitals and public health in the event of a bioterrorism event such as smallpox or 
pandemic flu. In these scenarios, the surge capacity can be developed over hours to days. 
However, little has been written and less has been studied on improving surge 
capacity in the event of a chemical or explosive event in which many victims may require 
immediate life saving or limb-sparing medical care within the “Golden Hour” (defined by 
the American College of Surgeons as the critical time in which intervention and 
stabilization will significantly impact a patient’s outcome4) long before the Disaster 
Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) or Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) will arrive. 
The Institute of Medicine concludes that Emergency Departments are not 
prepared to handle surges from terrorist and other events.5 The public is indicating 
concern about the preparedness of healthcare.6 
Advances have been made in trauma management and lessons have been learned 
from the United States Military Medical Departments as well as Israeli military and 
medical units and from professionals from other countries from battles or attacks fought 
abroad. Few of these advances have yet to be translated to civilian medicine because the 
possibility is remote and the challenge is great. Most U.S physicians have received little 
training to prepare them to manage victims of terrorist weapons such as explosive or 
chemical agents especially under mass casualty scenarios. 
                                                 
4 L. S. McGinnis, and B. Cebuhar, “The Quality Imperative, New Tools and Expanded 
Responsibilities of Surgeons,” Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons 88, no. 3 (March 2003): 1. 
5 Institute of Medicine, Hospital-Based Emergency Care, At the Breaking Point, Future of Emergency 
Care Series, Report of the Committee on the Future of Emergency Care in the United States (Institute of 
Medicine of the National Academies, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, June 2006), 
Executive Summary, 6-7. 
6 I. Redlener, MD, R. Grant. D. A. Berman, D. Johnson, and D. Abramson, Annual Survey of the 
American Public by the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University, Mailman 
School of Public Health and The Children’s Health Fund, “Where the American Public Stands on 
Terrorism, Security and Disaster Preparedness, Five Years after September 11, One-Year after Hurricane 
Katrina,” September 2006, 2-5, http://www.ncdmailman.columbia.edu/files/2006_white_paper.pdf 
(accessed May 19, 2007). 
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The threats are now on our shores and are predicted to continue for many years. 
Strengthening the national preparedness and response capability requires that the major 
Homeland Security agencies, especially the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), look carefully at the 
scenarios they have defined7 and examine carefully the timeline for adequate response. 
They need to strategize collaboratively with the medical community and the hospital 
community to improve local preparedness and response capability to maximize the care 
given to the largest number of victims in a time appropriate to the injury. 
DHHS calls for preemptive action. It emphasizes that health care and public 
health systems, individual hospitals and health care personnel must collaborate to ensure 
that plans are in place to effectively receive, evaluate and treat large numbers of injured 
patients, to rapidly identify and stabilize the most critically injured, to evaluate those 
efforts and to strategically plan for future incidents.8 Medical communities must develop 
and implement new strategies in the medical communities to maximize the medical 
response and to minimize the morbidity and mortality within the walls of the hospital. 
B. ARGUMENT 
1. Main Claim 
Current preparedness plans do not adequately address the scenarios of explosive 
and chemical events in which the timeline for effective response requires immediate 
intervention. Most hospitals would be severely challenged to provide several response 
teams in the immediate timeframe. Physicians expect that response will be the 
responsibility of the emergency physician, the trauma surgeon, the Disaster Medical 
Assistance Teams (DMAT) or the federal government. Yet Emergency Department 
                                                 
7 The United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Fact Sheet, Homeland Security, 
“A Nation Prepared, The Target Capabilities List,” 
www.ojusdoj.gov/odp/docs/Target_Capabilities_List_041405.pdf (accessed February 7, 2008), 1.  
8 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury Prevention, National Center for Injury 
Prevention and Control, “A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings,” Atlanta, Georgia, 
(April 2007): 2- 3. 
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physicians are struggling with the overcrowding crisis and the number of trauma 
surgeons is diminishing evidenced by the fact that only 58% of trauma fellowships were 
filled in 2002.9 Since they are engaged in their own specialty, other physicians do not 
really think about their participation in a response effort. Many physicians who 
participated in the research for this thesis expressed surprise that they were being 
included. Clinicians do not cross-political barriers of specialty credentialing and, even 
more importantly, no one has asked them to participate and prepare. Many expect that 
someone else is coming to assist in the response.   
Governmental agencies have focused attention on building federal DMAT teams, 
adding local Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) teams and credentialing more physicians to 
respond from afar but these resources have limitations. At the end of the day, hospitals 
will have to respond from within due to the urgency of these scenarios.  Instead of 
building more of the same, which will not address the scenarios, an alternative solution is 
sought. The best value-added approach may be to invest scarce resources in educating 
and training all physicians so that hospitals can develop internal response teams and 
regional teams that work together, practice together and are available to respond together. 
This research seeks to determine if hospitals can effectively maximize the 
emergent clinical care, they provide utilizing the clinician resources present within their 
facility at the moment a time-sensitive mass casualty event occurs. Optimizing the 
clinical resources immediately present in the hospital will provide victims, the best 
chance of a successful outcome. The research of this thesis explores the premise that 
clinicians have knowledge or skills either current or remote that can be leveraged and 
enhanced to provide an immediate life-saving response team in the event of explosive or 
chemical events.  
The reality is that hospitals must improve preparedness. More clinicians 
(Physicians, Physician Assistants or Nurse Practitioners) must prepare and train to a level 
sufficient to intervene initially. Training a wider community of physicians strengthens 
hospital response.  They would be available in-hospital during chemical, biological, 
                                                 
9 Joshua Brown, “The Need for Transformation: A Challenge for Trauma Surgery,” Journal of the 
University of Rochester 3, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 19. 
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radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) events. Teaming together in a tiered-
response model under the expertise and supervision of an ED or trauma physician, they 
might be the professional support needed immediately to provide an expanded response 
capability at any hospital in the nation in the “Golden Hour.”  
Clinical skills that a physician might not routinely employ in an elective situation 
might be sufficient and life saving in a disaster situation. Physicians and other medical 
personnel have training, whether recent or remote, that allows them to manage such 
victims. They have training and skills that might be expanded to strengthen their ability 
to function in a tiered-response model. The advantage of such a team is that they are used 
to working together utilizing hospital policies and systems, and they have professional 
relationships and trust. Organizing the medical response system into a coordinated, 
integrated, cooperative structure that can interact effectively and operate efficiently will 
leverage response and save lives and help minimize damage. 
The United States medical community has the intelligence and expertise to 
improve its ability to prepare for and respond to all nature of mass casualty events. 
Engaging physicians educated in relevant principles throughout their training can 
accomplish this goal.  These physicians are present in every hospital in the United States.  
When a disaster occurs in a region, and Hospital Emergency Incident Command 
System (HEICS) is implemented, all elective Operating Room (OR) cases are cancelled, 
freeing up scheduled surgeons.10 Those surgically-trained physicians, such as general 
surgeons, orthopedists, plastic surgeons, Obstetrician-Gynecologists and other surgical 
sub-specialists, are immediately available within the hospital to provide care that could 
potentially be life or limb sparing. Other, non-surgical physicians potentially have skills 
and abilities that might enhance a timely and effective response.  While non-ED and non-
Trauma physicians are even included in some hospital response plans, most are not 
specifically educated or trained for this response. In real emergencies, many clinicians do 
respond. It would be most effective if they were trained. 
                                                 
10 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury Prevention, National Center for Injury 
Prevention and Control, “A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings,” Atlanta, Georgia, 
(April 2007): 11.  
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Traditionally, physicians have trained under a model of graduated responsibility 
whereby a resident in Postgraduate Year I (PGY I) is supervised by a more senior, more 
experienced PGY II or PGY III who answers to the responsible attending physician. 
Physicians are familiar and comfortable with this model. Its success could apply to a 
disaster response model. The Emergency Medicine Attending and/or the Trauma Surgeon 
directs, supervises, guides and supports several other clinicians as they assess and 
stabilize victims. This model provides a force multiplier such that those clinicians with 
the most clinical experience and judgment can direct the care while others with technical 
skills but less clinical acumen and experience can provide the care.  
Whether more clinicians can train to adequate levels, whether they are willing to 
be trained, whether the regulators will allow them to function outside of their specialty, 
whether their already-trained colleagues believe in the value of training more clinicians, 
is all open to speculation and study. 
2. Warrants 
Intuitively, many readers will assume that all physicians have the ability to 
intervene to save lives and no new approaches are necessary.  
However, many physicians completed medical school years before terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction, and they were not formally taught these topics. Traditional 
medical school teaching with some relevance to CBRNE agents includes courses in 
patho-physiology, toxicology, infectious disease, emergency preparedness/disaster 
response, biostatistics, and epidemiology. However, the context was different and the 
importance attached to the learning was in a different framework. The CBRNE agents 
were discussed as rare agents and dismissed as having little day-to-day relevance.  Agents 
of mass destruction are weapons precisely because they are not part of everyday life. 
Physicians who will be directly involved with physically injured or exposed must have 
more information and knowledge of treatment protocols.  
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Many have specialized to such a significant degree that they are far removed from 
their Emergency Medicine or general surgery/trauma rotations in medical school. The 
Emergency Medicine and Trauma disciplines have evolved as well, making many 
physicians uncomfortable with their training of many years ago.  
Some physicians will not accept the need for a new approach. They believe they 
already have the skills. Some will assert that they are already trained by virtue of their 
license or board certification status.  They will not look for any additional educational 
requirements or opportunities. 
Some physicians will reject the need for a new approach since they deny any risk 
in their community. Some will be concerned for their own well-being. Some will say that 
response is not their responsibility. Some will be concerned about the costs in terms of 
time and cost of training. Some will raise a valid question about liability insurance 
coverage should they respond. The respondents in this research raised all these points. 
Some officials may reject the need for a new approach since there are federal 
teams in place and governmental plans verify credentials of other clinicians. However, no 
external response will be rapid enough to have an impact. Little hard evidence suggests 
that these clinicians are adequately trained in CBRNE agents or response to make a 
difference despite their willingness. 
Physician certification boards might reject the need for a new approach as they 
see an expanded, multi-specialty physician response as encroaching on their professional 
domain and a threat to their autonomy. The pressure to breach specialty walls may be 
viewed as unneeded competition that threatens financial viability. These specialty 
barriers can be serious impediments to physician response. Other barriers are hospital 
delineation of medical privileges, medical staff rules, and liability coverage terms that 
limit a physician’s scope of practice to that defined by the specialty board. Response 
could be improved if specialty Boards each included relevant CBRNE response 




disaster response. However, the discipline of disaster medicine must be more clearly 
defined and the American Board of Medical Specialties must encourage their members to 
examine their role in a disaster response. 
3. Evidence that the Proposal would be Effective 
Despite all of the challenges, the majority of physicians go into medicine for 
altruistic reasons. If given the proper tools that expand on their already solid medical 
knowledge and technical skills, many more will accept the challenge and responsibility to 
improve preparedness. 
For years, the United States military has trained many types of physicians to 
respond to trauma injuries on the battlefield.11  Physician teams include career surgeons, 
as well as physicians at various levels of training and from multiple specialties, who are 
trained and practice together to make a comprehensive response team. This blended 
medical response crosses all the services and all specialties. 
The New York University School of Medicine and its College of Dentistry, as 
part of a Department of Homeland Security grant, preliminarily explored the potential 
role of dentists in a disaster response. The study developed a summary expert/ leadership 
report on an expansion of role of dentists for the enhancement of medical surge response 
by conducting a survey of experts including Deans of Medical Schools, Deans of Dental 
Schools, Presidents of State Dental and Medical Societies.12 In a report to the Department 
of Justice, the survey concludes that the medical and dental academic community and the 
dental profession’s organized leadership envision a response role and perhaps an 
obligation for dentists to meet surge manpower requirements in response to catastrophic 
events. They assert that dental training and skills provide solid background for response.  
                                                 
11 Joseph DeFeo, Joint Medical Readiness, Are We Ready to Answer the WMD Threat? (U.S. Army 
War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 2006), 3.  
12 W. Psoter, and D. Glotzer, Enhancing Medical and Public Health Capabilities during Times of 
Crisis: A Summary Report on the Expansion of the Role of Dentists and Their Enhancement of the Medical 
Surge Response, A Report to the Department of Justice (New York: New York University School of 
Medicine, New York University School of Dentistry, 2002), 2. 
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It was agreed that this role required additional training.13 Research aimed to explore the 
development of training and training content for dentists and other possible responders. 
They heightened their knowledge of WMD and other catastrophic events and explored 
their potential roles in events such as complementing emergency department staff, in the 
areas of triage, certain basic hands-on skills and possibly decontamination. As result of 
heightened awareness and new needs assessment associated with emergency response, 
new requirements have been proposed for the dental profession to help meet the special 
needs of society in the event of a disaster.14  However, the survey did not query potential 
participants and no strong consensus that dentists are receptive to additional training, that 
medical professionals would recommend training, or be receptive to assistance by 
dentists during a surge environment. This may suggest the existence of real political and 
professional pressures that would proscribe involvement of others in response to a 
catastrophic event. The authors conclude that it is early in surge response development 
and planning and that the healthcare infrastructure has not yet envisioned that the 
response systems could utilize this potential manpower pool.15  
Researchers are now examining practitioner willingness and barriers to response. 
Qureshi et al. studied the ability of the health care system to meet surge capacity needs at 
47 centers. The investigators looked at the physical ability and willingness of healthcare 
workers to respond in several scenarios. They identified barriers to response including 
fear, concern for family and self and personal health issues. Respondents were most able 
to respond for a multi-casualty incident and least able for an infectious outbreak or a 
snowstorm. They were most willing to respond for a snowstorm or Mass Casualty Event 
but least willing for a biological or chemical event. Physicians represented 10% of the 
                                                 
13 W. Psoter, and D. Glotzer, Enhancing Medical and Public Health Capabilities during Times of 
Crisis: A Summary Report on the Expansion of the Role of Dentists and Their Enhancement of the Medical 
Surge Response, A Report to the Department of Justice (New York: New York University School of 
Medicine, New York University School of Dentistry, 2002), 11. 
14 Ibid., 1. 
15 Ibid., 10. 
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study sample.16  Schechter looked at the willingness and barriers to response for a county 
volunteer Medical Reserve Corps, including a wide spectrum of professionals, and 
concluded that volunteers may have more motivational intent, but barriers to response 
such as primary job commitment (34.5%) and lack of training (42.4%) still remain.17 
This study suggests the need for a more robust strategy for hospital preparedness. 
Evidence for consensus on the appropriate education and training of clinicians is 
weak. The AHRQ promotes training clinicians for Public Health events relevant to 
bioterrorism preparedness.18,19  AHRQ found only modest evidence about effective ways 
to train clinicians to detect and manage an infectious disease outbreak. Very little 
evidence exists about how to train clinicians effectively to respond to other types of 
public health events deemed relevant to bioterrorism preparedness such as explosive or 
chemical events. Development of the curriculum, the courses, and the competencies is at 
an early stage as different organizations try different approaches. Some institutions do 
nothing as they await the consensus. AHRQ found that almost no evidence exists on 
training clinicians in aspects of response such as using central information resources, 
communicating with other professionals and reporting events to a central agency. They 
conclude that this lack of evidence demands an increased commitment to developing and 
evaluating educational programs relevant to Bio Terrorism preparedness.20  
                                                 
16 K. Qureshi, R. R. M. Gershon, M. F. Sherman, T. Straub, E. Gebbie, M. McCollum, M. J. Erwin, 
and S. S. Morse, “Health Care Worker’s Ability and Willingness to Report to Duty during Catastrophic 
Disasters,” Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, Oxford University 
Press (2005): 6. 
17 S. Schechter, Medical Reserve Corps Volunteers’ Ability and Willingness to Report to Work for the 
Department of Health during Catastrophic Disasters (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, March 2007), 45. 
18 “AHRQ Training Clinicians for Public Health Events Relevant to Bioterrorism Preparedness,” 
www.ahrq.gov/clinic/tp/biotrthtm (accessed May 19, 2007), 1. 
19 “AHRQ Disaster Plannings Drills and Readiness Assessment, Bioterrorism and Health System 
Preparedness,” Issue Paper # 2, http://www.ahrq.gov/news/ulp/btbriefs/btbrief2.htm#training (accessed 
May 19, 2007), 1. 
20 Training of Clinicians for Public Health Events Relevant to Bioterrorism Preparedness, Prepared by 
Johns Hopkins Evidence-Based Practice Center, Christina Catlett, MD et al., Prepared for AHRQ, DHHS, 
SPHS, Rockville, MD AHRQ Evidence Reports and Summaries No 51, Publication No 02-E011, January 
2002, 4, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/bv.fcgi?rid=hstat1.chapter.76478 (accessed May 30, 2007).  
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Other studies point to weak clinician preparation. One review reveals that three-
quarters of hospitals have disaster plans that address explosives but only one-fifth have 
conducted drills involving the imagined use of explosives. Many problematic areas stand 
between the current reality of emergency care in the United States and effective 
management of a Madrid-like event.21  Hospitals with The Joint Commission (TJC) 
accreditation are more likely to provide terrorism preparedness training to all types of 
clinical staff. Teaching hospitals that are medical school affiliated as well as hospitals 
with larger bed capacity and an urban location are also likely to provide CBRNE training 
for staff physicians, residents, NP and PAs.22 In the National Hospital Ambulatory 
Medical Care Survey conducted by CDC, 88.4% of nurses, 75.1% of attending physicians 
and 39.3% of residents reported receiving training in terrorism response,23 although it is 
unclear if this training is didactics or disaster drill practice. There is a distinct difference.  
Preparing clinicians to strategize and adapt may be as important as didactics and 
more important than traditional disaster drill practice. Burstein wrote of the “Five Myths 
of Disaster Education.”  The myths are, “…people need to know special things;” that 
“…professionals are smart and hearing the information once is enough;” “…a drill now 
and then is enough;” “…the government will take care of it” and finally, “…it is 
impossible to be prepared.” He wrote that with all the money and effort spent to date, it is 
not clear that we have achieved an appropriate benefit in disaster readiness. He 
encourages teaching professionals how to think, communicate and coordinate. He 
promotes local training, frequents drills and incorporating realistic disaster training into 
residency and medical and nursing school curriculum, and incorporating it into daily 
life.24  
                                                 
21 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury Prevention, National Center for Injury 
Prevention and Control, “A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings,” Atlanta, Georgia, 
(April 2007): 2- 3. 
22 Richard Niska, MD and Catharine Burt, EdD, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Training for Terrorism-Related Conditions in Hospitals: 
United States, 2003-04,” Advance Data from Vital and Health Statistics no. 380 (December 11, 2006): 3. 
23 Ibid., 2-3. 
24 Jonathan Burstein, “The Myths of Disaster Education,” Ann Emerg Med 47 (2006): 50-52. 
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No study has evaluated whether non-ED or non-Trauma physicians or physician 
assistants believe they are qualified and competent or could be sufficiently trained to 
assist ED or Trauma physicians in the critical “Golden Hour” of assessment and 
resuscitation.  
4. Challenges 
Since 2001, considerable effort has been made to assess the capabilities of 
systems and individuals that are expected to prevent, detect and respond to terror 
incidents involving WMD. However, challenges still exist in defining a clear operational 
structure, a relevant curriculum, educational methods and competencies for physicians 
and mobilizing experienced faculty and integration across the continuum of healthcare. A 
consistent vision of where healthcare needs to move and how it will get there has not 
been articulated. First, the response and educational structure must be developed. Then 
the discussion about dissolving operational barriers, including specialty certification, 
credential and licensure restrictions and liability limitations can ensue. 
Issues regarding physician understanding of their professional obligation to treat; 
their right to protect their personal safety; their responsibility and rights as a volunteer; 
and the professional liability issues in the context of a WMD event are other challenges 
that merit further discussion and resolution.  
Additional challenges to insuring a robust physician response include integrating 
specialty divisions despite conflicting professional, financial and political constraints. 
Appropriate training that engages the participant in a relevant way must be developed. It 
must be easily accessible and affordable, and respect physician time. Credible faculty 
must be identified. Consideration must be given to augmenting knowledge retention.  
Another challenge in response is accepting the concept of minimally acceptable 
care. One author has commented that the concept of minimally acceptable care is the key 
to a staged management approach during a mass-casualty incident.25 Concerns about 
                                                 
25 A. Hirshberg, J. B. Holcomb, and K. L. Mattox, “Hospital Trauma Care in Multiple Casualty 
Incidents: A Critical Review,” Ann Emerg Med 37 (June 2001): 647-652. 
 13
declaring and delivering altered standards of care for patients in a mass casualty situation 
in order to provide basic care to the most patients rather than highly specialized care to a 
few has yet to be fully examined or addressed. This ethical issue requires discussion both 
within as well as beyond the discipline of medicine.  
Significant concerns exist about liability coverage since some physician liability 
coverage ceases if the physician acts outside of their specialty, outside of their hospital, 
their state or their usual scope of practice, or when employing altered standards of care 
such as might occur during a disaster. Indemnity under Good Samaritan Acts varies by 
state. The Federal Government does not indemnify for liability unless the clinician is 
federalized such as when a DMAT team is activated or for a federal employee.26   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis aims to identify a superior strategy to insure preparedness and 
adequate immediate response, to assess the preparedness and willingness of physicians to 
participate in a response team, to stimulate discussion and to challenge the medical 
community to improve and maximize preparedness. 
The research question studied is whether professional personnel resources already 
exist, such that when configured differently, could improve medical response to victims 
of chemical or blast events. The research conducted for this thesis aims to understand the 
perceived current preparedness of medical professionals and their ability to be part of the 
response team for explosive as well as chemical events. The timeframe of response for 
these two scenarios will require hospitals to look to other clinicians immediately 
available in the hospital during the event in addition to their Emergency Medicine and 
Trauma physicians.  
 
 
                                                 
26 G. L. Foltin, C. Lucky, I. Portelli, L.R. Goldfrank, B. S. Fertel, B. Lackey, M. Marr, and B. P. 
Dreyer, “Overcoming Legal Obstacles Involving the Voluntary Care of Children who are Separated from 
their Legal Guardians during a Disaster,” Pediatric Emergency Care 24, no. 6 (June 2008): 392-398. 
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The thesis explores the following. 
 What is the perception by the physician of their own qualifications and 
competencies to assess and stabilize victims of a chemical or explosive 
event? 
 What is the ability of the physician community to participate within their 
own hospital in the evaluation and management of patients involved in a 
chemical or explosive event? 
 What types of steps do hospitals and others need to develop and strengthen 
clinician surge capability? 
 How should a hospital medical staff best prepare to play an integral role in 
increasing a hospital’s surge capacity and how is this best accomplished? 
This thesis tests several hypotheses. 
 Non-ED or Trauma physicians have an ability to participate (and their 
level of ability). 
 Non-ED or Trauma physicians know and can indicate what is necessary to 
allow them to become part of a hospital response team. 
 Non-ED and non-Trauma physicians reject the belief that they have no 
ability and responsibility in a catastrophic event.  
D.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RESEARCH FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
The significance of this research is crucial to understand the current limitations of 
the healthcare community in this age of clinician specialization and tight healthcare 
dollars. It is meant to establish a baseline from which the hospitals and the medical 
community can strive to improve their preparedness. It is intended to determine the 
preparedness and willingness of clinicians to participate in a patient evaluation and 
resuscitation effort. It is intended to explore the potential for alternative models of 
response to meet the requirements of new world scenarios. It is intended to open a 
dialogue within the healthcare and homeland security community to realize that much 
remains to be done to achieve medical preparedness. Strategies and incentives to leverage 




This research also has significance for the following. 
 The Literature - Little has been written about developing surge capacity 
for the specific scenarios of explosive and chemical exposures. This 
research opens a discussion about the potential role of all physicians and 
physician assistants in these scenarios and whether non-EM or Trauma 
physicians could or would be willing and able to train and participate. The 
thesis aims to cause professionals to examine this important topic separate 
from surge capacity for biologic events. Using regression analysis, the 
thesis offers a model of characteristic findings for clinicians who perceive 
themselves qualified and competent for these scenarios. 
 Public Policy - It generates a discussion and challenges diverse agencies 
and disciplines with laws, policies and guidelines to envision the 
possibilities for crafting a new strategy and paradigm. It should cause 
Homeland Security agencies to analyze current preparedness for the 
explosive and chemical scenarios. It also raises the discussion level in 
Homeland Security and Health and Human Services and perhaps among 
the public to realize the limitations of the Emergency Department.   
 Emergency Medicine - It gives ED physicians a voice to support the 
Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) finding that Emergency Medicine is not 
prepared to handle surges from terrorist and other events.27 Some have 
asserted this view before, but it is not in other physicians’ day to day 
interest to extend their scope of practice and training for skills they may 
never use, will not be compensated, and could jeopardize their health and 
safety.  
 Medicine - The House of Medicine must examine its rules, regulations, 
traditions and practice barriers with the goal of increasing the integration 
of specialties, departments and practitioners to improve medical surge 
capability. This thesis supports and encourages developing a new 
discipline of disaster medicine. 
E.  THE IMMEDIATE CONSUMER  
The immediate audience for this thesis is those professionals responsible for 
providing medical care to the public, including the following. 
 The Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and 
Human Services and its Centers for Disease Control as well as the state 
and local commissioners of health; 
                                                 
27 Institute of Medicine, Hospital-Based Emergency Care, At the Breaking Point, Future of 
Emergency Care Series, Report of the Committee on the Future of Emergency Care in the United States 
(Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, June 
2006), Executive Summary, 6-7. 
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 ED physicians, trauma surgeons, other physicians and physician assistants, 
hospital administrators, and the organizations that represent them such as 
the American College of Emergency Physicians, the American College of 
Surgeons and the American Hospital Association, and local leaders such 
as the Greater New York Hospital Association; 
 The American Association of Medical Colleges (medical student training), 
The American College of Graduate Medical Education (resident physician 
and fellow training) and the American Board of Medical Specialties 
(attending physician board certification, recertification and credentialing) 
as well as hospital accreditation agencies such as The Joint Commission. 
These agencies may have to change first to address the basic structural 
issues associated with response.  
 The Institute of Medicine (part of the National Academy of Medicine) and 
other think tanks as well as researchers at the U.S. Schools of Public 
Health who are studying these issues in Homeland Security; 
 Homeland Security Practitioners and Government and political leaders 
nationally.  
As studies since 9/11 conducted by the Mailman School of Public Health at 
Columbia University with the Marist Poll reveal, the public is more acutely aware that 
healthcare is not prepared for a major event.28 Homeland Security leaders as well as 
national, state and local leaders are at risk if they fail to provide for the public. 
                                                 
28 I. Redlener, MD, R. Grant. D. A. Berman, D. Johnson, and D. Abramson, Annual Survey of the 
American Public by the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University, Mailman 
School of Public Health and The Children’s Health Fund, “Where the American Public Stands on 
Terrorism, Security and Disaster Preparedness, Five Years after September 11, One-Year after Hurricane 
Katrina,” September 2006, 2-5, http://www.ncdmailman.columbia.edu/files/2006_white_paper.pdf 
(accessed May 19, 2007). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A.  HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
1. Background 
Terrorism is the war of the new millennium. The media and the Internet have 
vastly increased the ability of terrorists to recruit members and extend fear throughout the 
world. Non-state actors, attempting to engender fear, intimidation and perhaps coercion 
as they seek to promote political, religious or ideological goals through violence or the 
threat of violence, use traditional or non-traditional weapons of mass destruction.  
A Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) is defined as any explosive, incendiary or 
poison gas, bomb, grenade or rocket having a propellant charge of more than 4 ounces, or 
a missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, as 
well as any mine or device similar to the above; any weapon involving a disease 
organism; or any weapon designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level 
dangerous to human life.29  
Experience in the U.S. with these agents is unknown to most physicians. Yet 
terrorist bombings in the U.S. would be a foreseeable disruption. Despite the potential for 
biological, chemical or radiological threats, bombings using conventional explosives 
remain the terrorists’ method of choice. They can inflict multi-system injuries on 
numerous patients. Recent patterns of terrorist activity have demonstrated the devastating 
civilian casualties from explosives. Terrorist bombings in Egypt, Iraq, India, Israel, 
Mumbai (2006 and 2008), Spain (2004) and the United Kingdom (2005) highlight that 
bombing civilian populations are an ever-present danger worldwide.30 
                                                 
29 U.S. Code 18, Section 2332a, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=browse_usc&docid=Cite:+18USC2332a (accessed July 31, 2008), 1.  
30 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury Prevention, National Center for Injury 
Prevention and Control, “A Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings,” Atlanta, Georgia, 
(April 2007): 1. 
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A critical step in understanding terrorism and its implications is to identify 
potential terrorist scenarios and the “Magnitude of Impact.”31 This planning concept 
permits analysis of a potential terrorist incident by applying knowledge of the different 
agents, their characteristics, their behaviors and the timeline for inflicting injury and 
response. 
2. Status of Current Disaster Response 
Disaster response in America traditionally has been the responsibility of state and 
local governments with the federal government playing a supportive role. State and local 
governments know the unique requirements of their citizens and their geography. As 
such, they are best positioned to respond to incidents in their own jurisdictions and will 
always play a large role in disaster response.32  
The background for disaster response is supported by several directives and laws 
and more recently the National Strategy for Homeland Security.33 
The centerpiece legislation for providing federal aid in disasters, The Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act34 of 1974, establishes a process 
and structure for the systematic coordinated and effective delivery of assistance to 
address the consequences of any major disaster or emergency declared under the act. It 
reinforces the principal that response efforts should first utilize state and local resources. 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, issued in June 1995, establishes the 
national framework on federal response to WMD terrorism. The framework provides for 
military assistance to civilian health and medical personnel. Congress passed Public Law 
                                                 
31 Robert Bass, and Georges C. Benjamin, “The Maryland Strategic Plan to Improve the Health and 
Medical Response to Terrorism,” Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems (MIEMSS) 
and Maryland Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (February 23, 2000): 5.  
32 Office of the President of the United States, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned (Washington, DC, February 2006), 11. 
33 United States Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 41. 
34 Office of the President of the United States, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned (Washington, DC, February 2006), 13. 
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104-20135 in 1997 establishing mechanisms and policies known as the Domestic 
Preparedness Program in Defense against WMD and outlining the status of programs and 
initiatives to enhance federal, state and local capabilities. In 1998, President Clinton 
issued two additional directives, PDD-62 and PDD-63, to improve coordination of 
Federal WMD counterterrorism and WMD response respectively.36 
In the post 9/11 United States, strengthening preparedness took on heightened 
significance. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security was issued in July 2002. One of the 
strategic objectives is to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. 
One of the six critical mission areas within that objective is emergency preparedness and 
response. The stated initiatives under this critical mission area include preparing for 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear decontamination, as well as preparing 
health care providers for catastrophic terrorism.37 It also calls for strengthening the 
protection of critical infrastructure,38 which includes healthcare facilities.  
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for a major initiative to build a 
national system for incident management and to integrate separate federal response plans 
into a single all-discipline incident management plan. In creating the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in November 2002, Congress included this initiative as one of 
the responsibilities of the Secretary of DHS.  
To improve response, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive (HSPD) #5, “Management of Domestic Incidents,” in February 2003.39 He 
directed the Secretary of DHS to create the National Incident Management System 
                                                 
35 U.S. Public Law 104-201, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1997, Title XIV, Section 
1416, September 23, 1996, 301. 
36 Robert Bass, and Georges C. Benjamin, “The Maryland Strategic Plan to Improve the Health and 
Medical Response to Terrorism,” Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems (MIEMSS) 
and Maryland Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (February 23, 2000): 1. 
37 United States Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), vii-x. 
38 Ibid., 32. 
39 The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html (accessed 
June 6, 2008), 1. 
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(NIMS) to provide a consistent nationwide approach to work effectively to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from disasters.  In addition, DHS had to use NIMS to develop 
and administer an integrated National Response Plan (NRP) to provide structure and 
mechanisms for national level policy and operational direction for federal support to state 
and local incident managers.40  
In December 2004, the NRP issued an all-hazards plan that establishes a single 
comprehensive framework for managing domestic incidents across all levels of 
government and across a spectrum of activities that include prevention, preparedness 
response and recovery. The NRP defines a catastrophic incident as any natural or man-
made incident including terrorism that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, 
damage or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, 
economy, and national morale and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could 
result in a sustained national impact over a prolonged period of time.41  
While it is built on the premise that incidents are generally handled at the lowest 
jurisdictional level possible,42 the National Response Plan organizes the type of Federal 
response assistance into 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF), each with a primary 
agency. Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 of the NRP addresses Public Health and 
Medical Services. According to this function, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) is the operational leadership. The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, manages 
operational response. FEMA has operational teams including the Metropolitan Medical 
Response System (MMRS) and the Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), 
consisting of state and local first responders who volunteer to be activated, deployed and 
reimbursed. FEMA reinforces standards, certifications and qualification for participation 
in such programs and provides funding for equipment and training.43  
                                                 
40 Office of the President of the United States, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned (Washington, DC, February 2006), 12. 
41 Ibid., 18. 
42 Ibid., 14. 
43 Ibid., 17. 
 21
The National Response Framework issued in March 2008 is a more advanced 
iteration of the NRP that takes the integration of all levels of government in a common 
incident management framework to a new level. It presents the key response principles, 
participants, roles and structures that guide the nation’s operational response. The NRF 
establishes mechanisms for improved delivery of federal preparedness assistance to state 
and local governments and outlines actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of 
federal, states and local entities.44 The goal is to align the right people with the right 
training and the right equipment and supplies at the right place at the right time to ensure 
an effective response.45 
To build a vision for the future, President Bush issued Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) #8, National Preparedness, in December 2003. This 
directive establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the U.S. to prevent and 
respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters and other 
emergencies. HSPD-8 directs the development of a national domestic all-hazards 
preparedness goal establishing measurable priorities and balancing the potential threat 
and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies with the 
resources required to respond to and recover from them.46  
The Interim National Preparedness Goal issued in 200547 strives to establish a 
common, consistent approach to developing needed capabilities identified in the Target 
Capabilities List (TCL) and to perform functions identified in the Universal Task List 
(UTL) that link strategies to prevention, protection, response and recovery tasks for the 
National Planning Scenarios.48 The Universal Task List as it relates to response for health 
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care includes Coordination of Public Health and Medical Services.  Medical Surge 
capacity is one of 37 topics on the Target Capabilities List (TCL) of the National 
Preparedness Guidelines.49 National surge targets include surge guidelines of 500 
beds/million residents for Infectious Disease outbreaks; 50 beds/million residents for 
noninfectious injury such as chemical or explosive events.50 
Capability, as defined in the TCL, is the ability to prioritize needs, update 
preparedness strategies, allocate resources and deliver preparedness programs that help 
entities develop resiliency. Performance as defined in the UTL and the Homeland 
Security Exercise Evaluation Program aims to evaluate operations, training and exercises, 
identify lessons learned, share best practices and update improvement plans. 51 It 
provides common planning factors in terms of potential scope, magnitude and complexity 
of major events that will help to determine the target levels of capability required and 
apportion responsibility among all potential partners. Development of appropriate 
capabilities to address these scenarios is designed to prepare the nation for terrorist 
attacks, major disasters and other emergencies.52 
The National Planning Scenarios, the TCL and the UTL, revisited and revised 
after Hurricane Katrina, were released by DHS as part of the National Preparedness 
Guidelines in September 2007 fulfilling components of HSPD # 8 and the National 
Preparedness Goal.53  The National Planning Scenarios include five that address 
explosive and chemical events. These scenarios form the focus of this thesis.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive #21, issued in 2007, establishes a 
National Strategy for Public Health and Medical Preparedness to transform our national 
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approach to protecting the health of the American people against all disasters. It calls for 
an end-to-end system redesign through a critical and formal process in which public 
health and medical preparedness and response are integrated vertically through all levels 
of government and horizontally across all sectors of the community. It engages the 
private sector, academia and other non-governmental entities in preparedness and 
response efforts. Toward that end it calls for the nation to collectively support and 
facilitate the establishment of a discipline of disaster medicine, providing a foundation 
for doctrine, education, training and research and integrating preparedness into public 
health and medical communities. It calls for development of a robust disaster health 
capability that requires development of an operational concept for medical response to 
catastrophic events that is substantively distinct from and broader than that which guides 
day to day operations.54 
3. Conclusions on Status of Current Response 
Current health care response is based upon providing care to individual patients 
with management oriented to caring for one patient at a time. Thus, it cannot be assumed 
that the health and medical system can effectively handle even small mass casualty 
events of 25 or fewer victims. In the Topoff II 2003 drill, the ED staff rapidly became 
overwhelmed and many people died.55 The drill was designed to exercise and test the 
coordination of public health and medical response to multiple geographically dispersed 
disaster events including a radiological dispersion in Seattle and a biological event in 
Chicago. It demonstratess that a significant deficiency in public health and medical 
response to catastrophes persisted. Performance prompted the White House to direct 
DHHS to develop a strategy for improving the nation’s medical and public health surge 
capacity to deal with the medical consequences of a terrorist attack. This directive 
supports the need for a more comprehensive approach. The DHHS strategy to improve 
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this national health surge capacity consists of five priorities including identifying ways to 
augment hospital bed capacity; assuring a sufficient number of trained medical personnel 
to support a crisis; ensuring the availability of pharmaceuticals and supplies; evaluating 
and expanding the NDMS capabilities; and using models to set surge requirements.56 
Current strategies do not adequately address the ability of the medical community 
to respond effectively to victims of chemical or explosive events when the response 
timeline is short. Most surge literature does not address where to obtain trained personnel 
in the immediate time frame.  
Positively impacting a victim’s chance of survival depends on mobilizing trained 
clinicians–MDs, PAs and others within moments of hospital notification of an event. The 
more knowledgeable and trained clinicians that hospitals can mobilize from within their 
staff can determine the success of the response to the mass-casualty incident. This 
strategy is expected to translate into improved outcome for the greatest number of 
patients. Yet physicians and physician assistants may have little, if any, formal training 
either in professional school or during the postgraduate period, in the mechanism of 
action of the CBRNE weapons and management of the victims of terrorism. Thankfully, 
most have no real world experience. 
The current healthcare strategy presupposes a preparedness that is not real for 
explosive and chemical events and jeopardizes the nation’s ability to provide timely 
emergency medical care in response to a major mass casualty disaster.  
4.  What to Expect in a Mass Casualty Event 
A mass/multi casualty incident has two distinct stages. The first phase is while the 
event is still evolving, casualties are still arriving and information is incomplete. The  
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second phase is when the patient volume, scope and severity are completely defined. 
Only during the second phase can the event be appropriately staged and resources 
appropriately distributed to victims. 
Blast victims would require emergent intervention because of the potential for 
serious injury and would necessitate a trauma team. Inhalation victims would be 
emergent as well under ACLS and ATLS guidelines since airways could be rapidly 
compromised and would demand a resuscitation team. Both imply the availability of 
certain personnel resources.  
Explosive events such as occurred in London or Madrid or chemical events such 
as occurred in Tokyo caused a surge that is dramatically different from an outbreak of an 
infectious disease in which the patient population increases slowly as the outbreak 
spreads and then gradually decreases over days to weeks. Until all the victims are 
identified and medically assessed in an explosive or chemical mass casualty event, it is 
very difficult and challenging to comprehend the scope of the disaster and the necessary 
response and to pair the victims and the corresponding resources appropriately. Injuries 
or exposure of response workers add to a second surge. The worried well add a third 
surge. 
Careful analysis of the agents, of the potential scenarios and of the impact of a 
potential terrorist attack on a community and healthcare facilities requires the 
professional to delineate further the tasks to be accomplished. There are low probability 
and high probability events, resulting in low multi-casualty (< 25 victims), mass casualty 
(26-hundreds of victims), or catastrophic casualty (>1000 victims) events.57  
A multi casualty incident that taxes a department or community resources must be 
distinguished from a major medical disaster or mass casualty incident that destroys 
organized community support mechanisms and results in overwhelming numbers of 
casualties. Complicating the situation, patients requiring immediate care present 
simultaneously with a mix of other patients or may present after non-urgent arrivals since 
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it is often easier to move less urgent patients or they get to the hospital on their own. It is 
vital to rapidly sort out or triage those patients who will most benefit from optimal 
immediate care. In a mass casualty event, the ability to assemble an effective medical 
response is crucial to insure that care for the severely ill or injured is not jeopardized. In a 
mass casualty situation, conventional standards of medical care may not reach all 
casualties. In reality, the quality of trauma care in mass casualty events is inversely 
proportional to the caseload simply because the number of trauma trained staff and 
trauma related resources are limited.58 
In a typical mass casualty event in which all injuries are simultaneous, the 
principles of trauma indicate that 10 to 15% of survivors are severely injured and 
necessitate immediate assessment and care.59  The rest have mild to moderate trauma that 
can safely wait some time or be moved out of the ED for treatment.  Therefore, using the 
data as a model and extrapolating backwards, if a trauma center could immediately 
assemble 4 trauma teams, consisting of a trauma or ED attending physician and a critical 
care nurse and others, to work simultaneously to assess and stabilize patients determined 
at triage to be severely injured and those four severely injured patients comprise 10-15% 
of the casualty load, then a realistic estimate of ED capacity over the immediate 1-2 hours 
during a typical urban mass casualty event would be 25-40 patients with 3-4 of them 
being severely injured. Beyond that number, the quality of care suffers because 
experienced trauma care providers and critical resources are not immediately available. 
Hirshberg posits that even in a large urban trauma center, staff could respond to only 
three or four severely injured patients arriving simultaneously.60  After the Madrid 
bombings, one hospital received 272 victims in 2.5 hours. Of the total 243, seriously 
injured patients received, 91 were admitted and 29 were admitted to critical care for a 
critical care rate of 12%, a number consistent with previously published data.61 
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Experience in London, Madrid, Tokyo and Oklahoma City shows hospitals receive far 
more than the number of injured patients able to be treated in the model and not all 
hospitals would be able to assemble multiple trauma teams concurrently. Conversely, 
during the Tokyo sarin release, a non trauma chemical event, one hospital describes 
receiving 640 victims of which of which one died on arrival, 0.62% were critical, 16.7% 
were moderately affected and 82.5% had mild symptoms. The outcome of the other 
3000+ victims is less clear.62  
The timeline of patient arrival to the hospital may also impact the numbers of 
severely ill who can be treated by one facility. The remote location, the difficulty 
extricating victims and poor weather that did initially not allow for helicopter transport 
following the Avianca plane crash in suburban Long Island, NY in 1990 allowed for a 
controlled arrival at the hospital. These circumstances allowed the hospitals to prepare 
and clinician staff to respond. However, the effort did not meet the guideline of medical 
care within the “Golden Hour” in all cases. In summary, while a hospital may be able to 
provide a surge capacity of many beds for severely injured victims, they do not currently 
have sufficient trained physician staff or surge capability immediately available to assess 
and stabilize the patients upon arrival.63 Clinical staff that are not emergency medicine or 
trauma specialists but who have significant patient assessment and technical skills could 
be extremely useful.  
5.  Surge  
Hospitals must be able to increase their ability to care for the additional critical 
patients as well as their regular patients in the immediate time frame. This concept 
defines surge capacity. 
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Catastrophic disasters create surge capacity needs for the health care system. This 
scenario is especially true in urban areas because of high population density and reliance 
on complex and concentrated urban infrastructure (mass transit, tunnels and bridges and 
high rise buildings). Large numbers of victims could adversely affect the ability of a 
hospital to meet surge capacity needs. A surge manpower capacity must be built drawing 
on and training other professionals to complement the traditional medical and public 
health workforce. 
As defined by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 
Bioterrorism and Health System Preparedness division, surge capacity is a health care 
system’s ability to expand quickly beyond normal services to meet an increased demand 
for medical care in the event of bioterrorism or other large-scale public health 
emergency.”64  The American College of Emergency Physician (ACEP) Policy Statement 
on Health Care System Surge Capacity Recognition, Preparedness and Response states, 
“…surge capacity is a measurable representation of a health system’s ability to manage 
sudden or rapidly progressive influx of patients within the currently available resources at 
a given point in time.”65  
Surge involves an increased volume of patients over the usual baseline census 
over a defined time course. Surge capacity involves space, beds, staff and supplies. A 
newer concept is surge response capability which is the extent to which surge capacity 
can accommodate the surge and respond effectively.66  Extraordinary surge is also 
described as critical event surge, catastrophic surge and disaster surge.67  
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Surge response capability is affected by many variables including: the type of 
injury; the severity of injuries; the number of injuries; the rate at which patients arrive to 
the hospital; the need for decontamination; and the number of hospitals in the immediate 
area to which the victims can be distributed.  These variables all impact the ability of a 
facility or community to adequately respond. Also of importance is the census of the ED 
and inpatient services at the time of the event as well as the hour of the day since patient 
loads vary over a 24-hour cycle and hospitals staff to their usual volumes.  
Many agencies have addressed the issue of surge capacity for events such as 
biological attacks, pandemics or natural events. For example, in the event of biologic 
events, such as pandemic influenza, policies address the establishment of alternative care 
sites both in hospitals and in other community locations that encourage the diversion of 
the walking wounded to other parts of the hospital. These protocols and locations would 
not be adequate for critically injured victims of blast or chemical agent injuries who 
require immediate medical intervention, advanced interventions, trained professionals 
and specific equipment and monitoring.  
TJC’s “Surge Hospitals Providing Safe Care in Emergencies” highlights the types 
of surge hospitals and staffing of these hospitals used during Hurricane Katrina.68 This 
example is a different problem. While the hospitals had days to prepare, the review of 
what happened in New Orleans gives a glimpse of what happens when the entire 
community, including the hospital and its clinicians, are the victims of the disaster, and 
the facility has sustained too much damage to be able to surge in place and may have to 
relocate. Supplies may take hours to days to obtain. Clinicians may not be able to 
physically get to the hospital and for disasters that last days, clinicians will need 
replacements and a place to rest and reinvigorate.  
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has written resource guides for 
Emergency Medicine whose purpose is to promote activation of additional emergency 
department resources needed within four hours of an explosion. According to the 
guidelines, the resources should be capable of triaging, registering, evaluating and 
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treating up to 300 patients in the first four hours after an event and includes mobilization 
of additional staff, equipment, supplies and beds. The CDC specifically says that Federal 
Resources (including personnel) should be expected no sooner than 72 hours from the 
event.  Hence hospitals must become self-sufficient. The CDC recommends that hospitals 
identify potential institutional surge staffing from employees with clinical training but not 
currently tasked with clinical responsibility.69  Available staff will vary by facility and 
time of day. 
a. Current State of Surge Response 
One identified challenge for healthcare to provide adequate capacity 
requires identification of necessary treatment space, equipment including beds, monitors 
and ventilators, supplies and medication. Emergency Preparedness planners should not 
pre-suppose, however, that beds are the solution. Equipment is useless if there is 
insufficient trained staff to use it. Data published on twelve terrorist bombing incidents in 
Israel showed that the capacity of a hospital was determined by the number of surgeons 
and the number of resuscitation rooms and CT availability—not the number of beds or 
operating rooms.70  
The far more crucial challenge for healthcare is to provide adequate 
capability to provide a seamless response to escalating health care demands for surge 
capacity. This task requires development of the vision and strategies that support 
response and, most importantly, provide appropriately trained staff in adequate numbers 
in the appropriate time frame. Once the structure is in place, it can be solidified by 
developing the policies to coordinate and operationalize the process. The structure can 
balance activity across all domains, training and educating to standards and seamlessly 
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responding to escalating health care demands for surge capacity.71 Yet current emergency 
preparedness and response plans do not adequately address immediate physician 
response. Plans that do not address the immediate time frame of response and response 
options may not be realistic.  
Typical clinician response options include many organized and 
unorganized teams and responders, some trained, some not.  They include the federal 
DMAT and MMRS volunteer teams, the federally employed teams including the U.S. 
Public Health Service (USPHS), the Veteran’s Administration, and the military. In 
addition, the local volunteer MRC and the state sponsored program for licensed 
practitioners Emergency System for Advanced Registration of Volunteer Health 
Professionals (ESAR-VHP) offer some potential help. However, each of these options 
has limitations or challenges. These teams will not activate in the “Golden Hour.”  As a 
result, these options may not be solutions at all in light of the need for immediate 
qualified response.  
Sources of Federal support include the National Disaster Medical System 
(NDMS), which was formed in 1984 as part of the Public Health Service and is currently 
part of DHHS. Its original mission was to support state and local health agencies during 
natural disasters and to provide backup support to the Department of Defense and 
Veterans Administration medical systems during times of overseas conflicts. In recent 
years its mission has expanded to include providing the national medical response to a 
terrorist attack and pre-staging for National Security Special Events such as political 
party conventions and the Olympics. It is a partnership between federal, state and local 
governments and health care providers. It has the primary responsibility for providing 
emergency medical care after a national disaster. At the core of NDMS are the Disaster 
Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)  that are regional teams of approximately 7,000 
doctors, nurses and other health professionals sponsored by local entities such as 
hospitals and universities. They are paid by the federal government and are covered for 
liability during the time they are federally deployed, but they must find their own funding 
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to train, prepare, purchase and store equipment as well as maintain readiness. According 
to testimony before Congress, the NDMS cannot respond rapidly or effectively to major 
disasters as currently constituted. In 2002, a DHHS report estimated that of the 70 
DMATs nationwide, only 29 were found operational. Only 16 could supply a fully 
staffed and equipped team.72 Their level of training is not defined. 
Current response and preparedness capabilities at the regional and national 
level involve a medical response that includes the Metropolitan Medical Response 
System (MMRS). MMRS is a division of FEMA and is located in 124 major cities as of 
FY 2003.73  Other potential medical resources to homeland emergencies include the U.S. 
Public Health Service Commissioned Corps. The U.S. Surgeon General heads this service 
that currently has approximately 6000 members. The Department of Veteran’s Affairs 
and ultimately the military (NORTHCOM),74 are the ultimate resources, depending on 
the need. These intermediate term solutions will take 36-96 hours or more to be fully 
operational. They will not respond to civilian hospitals in a timeframe realistic to manage 
and resuscitate these blast or chemical victims.  Practically, all disasters are local and in 
the case of chemical and explosive devices, the personnel response must be local and 
immediate to be effective and real.  
One source of local professional response is the Medical Reserve Corps 
(MRC), founded by President Bush in 2002 in cooperation with the USA Freedom Corps, 
to identify, train and organize volunteers throughout the United States. Currently, 27,000 
practicing and retired physicians, nurses and other professionals plus ordinary citizens 
participate in teams organized within localities.75 While they are willing volunteers, 
many have primary responsibility at their place of employment and may not be available. 
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Literature has borne out other challenges to their response.76 Most have no recent 
emergency experience.77 Their clinical expertise is not verified and there is no current 
integration of these professionals into hospitals. The premise is based on protocols and 
just-in-time training making them very useful for mass immunization and prophylaxis in 
pandemic scenarios but less useful when patient assessment and management is required. 
The concept of and plans for rapid mobilization of community volunteer 
physicians may not be realistic for explosive and chemical events. The Joint Commission 
(TJC) (formerly the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations) 
is a private organization that hospitals use most often to accredit their facilities and 
programs in order to maintain their Medicare provider status. TJC requires accredited 
hospitals to have a surge capacity protocol78 and a method to credential licensed 
independent health care providers to work within the hospital in an emergency 
situation.79 State authorized Emergency Systems for Advanced Registration of Volunteer 
Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP) reflects TJC’s requirements and provides a 
standardized set of verified credentials for volunteers who may be called upon to assist 
hospitals during emergency situations.80 Challenges to this plan for response could be 
clinician unavailability due to responsibility at their primary place of employment, delay 
in arrival to the hospital due to travel time, closed roads or transportation or other barriers 
to participation.  
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These credentialing plans and proposals are resource intensive and time 
consuming for the hospital. They detract from the response effort and will not rapidly 
provide trained clinicians who are oriented to all the intricacies and systems of a 
particular institution, rendering them less effective. Upon arrival to the hospital, the 
clinician would still have to be registered and verified, assigned to a responsibility and 
guided about how to get things done at that hospital. In 2008, volunteer clinicians may 
require password access to enter orders for pain medication, prescribe modalities, write 
prescriptions, order and review laboratory and radiology tests and document care using 
electronic medical record systems.81 All these challenges add up to a time delay before 
being fully operational. This plan has not been established at most hospitals and is not as 
simple as suggested.  
The ACEP Policy Statement on Hospital Disaster Privileging states that all 
hospitals should have a process in place that allows for emergency privileging of 
additional physician staff in the event of activation of the hospital disaster plan. 
Privileges requested should be consistent with those currently in place at the appropriate 
department and specialty in the physician’s home hospital. This policy does not address 
where to obtain these trained professionals in the immediate time frame. It also calls for 
all hospitals to provide professional liability coverage for those physicians providing 
assistance during the disaster.82  
The challenge for healthcare remains putting the trained clinicians in the 
ED within minutes of activation with the right skills and equipment to insure an effective 
response for the victims of explosive and chemical scenarios. 
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b. Scenarios  
Patients exposed to biological agents, whether of natural or terrorist 
etiology such as anthrax or pandemic influenza, will evolve symptoms for the most part 
over hours to days as the infection spreads throughout the community. Radiological 
injuries also develop over hours to weeks. The symptoms may be slow to be recognized 
initially and the presentation will depend on the scope and nature of the exposure. 
Hospital Emergency Departments (ED) will receive and evaluate patient victims for days 
to months. In this scenario, hospitals will have time to mobilize resources including 
professional personnel to manage those patients. Just-in-time training will improve 
response in these scenarios. Surge plans for such a scenario often involve alternate care 
sites, Points of Distribution (POD), use of Medical Reserve Corps or other volunteers 
utilizing alternate credentialing. They are all useful for the protracted health crisis when 
time to mobilize is not a significant issue. Current surge plans may work well here. 
Additionally, treatment for many victims of these scenarios will be simply supportive, not 
requiring specialty staff or equipment. 
On the other end of the spectrum, concern exists about chemical weapons 
and conventional weapons such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) of the suicide or 
other bomber. These agents impact the victim immediately and over the ensuing several 
minutes and hours. Experiences in London and Madrid bombings support the urgency of 
required response. Survival outcomes depend on prompt medical intervention and 
stabilization. Hospitals must be able to respond within seconds to minutes. Response may 
also involve deploying and suiting up a decontamination team and certainly providing 
sufficient trained staff in the ED to care for large numbers of patients. 
(1) The Clinical Scenarios.  Two scenarios should cause particular 
concern in the medical community. The scenarios of an explosive event from an 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) of a suicide bomber or a toxic chemical release in a 
public place may be the most likely method of terrorists in view of recent efforts to 
harden much of the rest of the nation’s major critical infrastructure. These events may be  
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the most challenging to manage. For explosive and chemical events, many patients will 
require more rapid intervention and stabilization to prevent death or significant morbidity 
than is currently planned.  
(2)  Explosive Devices.  The FBI confirmed 324 incidents of terrorist 
bombings in the U.S. between 1980 and 2001.83 Recent events in Egypt, India, Iraq, 
Israel, Spain and the United Kingdom indicate that bombing civilian populations is an 
ever present danger. Bombings with conventional explosives remain the terrorists’ 
method of choice. Explosions, particularly in confined spaces, can inflict multi-system 
injuries on numerous patients and produce unique management challenges to health care 
providers. They can rapidly overwhelm hospital resources and may limit the ability to 
care for large numbers of critically injured victims 
Explosives from a suicide bomber on a train or other confined space as in 
the 2004 Madrid or 2005 London bombings84 or from a carefully positioned car or truck 
bomb such as occurred in Oklahoma City or the Khyber Towers bombings in 199685 
caused massive injuries resulting from the blast effect, from fire, from smoke or toxic 
chemicals that are inhaled, from falling debris or from shrapnel. The bombing of the USS 
Cole in Yemen points to terrorist determination. The potential for multi-organ or multi-
system injury is greater the closer the victim is to the epicenter of the explosion or if the 
device is detonated in a closed-space environment.86  
Critical to victim survival in explosive events is immediate medical 
attention including assessment, resuscitation and stabilization. The timeline to stabilize 
such victims is short. Upwards of ninety percent of those killed in a suicide attack 
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typically die immediately.87  Studies have shown a 5.3% death rate in hospital for victims 
of explosive events.88 Survival of the remaining victims is absolutely dependent upon the 
wounded receiving medical attention within minutes of their injuries, being stabilized (air 
passages opened, bleeding controlled, vital signs maintained) and then being moved to a 
hospital immediately. 
(3)  The Chemical Agents.  Chemical agents include the toxic nerve agents 
such as Sarin, Tabun and VX, and chlorine or phosgene gas among other agents. 
The nerve agents are readily inhaled as well as absorbed through the skin. 
They are acetylcholinesterase inhibitors. Acetylcholine is the most common 
neurotransmitter in the body. Acetylcholinesterase is the enzyme that degrades the 
acetylcholine after it has attached to the post-synaptic receptor at the neuromuscular 
junction and an impulse has been generated. Acetylcholinesterase removes the 
acetylcholine, thus ending the impulse. The nerve agents inhibit that enzyme so the 
acetylcholine continues to fire nerve impulses causing seizures and producing hyper-
secretions, including excess bronchial secretions that threaten a patient’s airway or ability 
to breathe. Patients may require immediate airway intubation and use of a ventilator as 
well as continuous monitoring, frequent suctioning and timely dosing of medications to 
control seizures and reduce secretions. Response must be immediate to stabilize the 
patient. 
Chlorine and Phosgene are pulmonary asphyxiates that cause irritation, 
increase secretions and bronchospasm of the airways. They interfere with a victim’s 
ability to obtain oxygen. Immediate stabilization of the airway is necessary with these 
agents as well. 
The significance of these agents is that they can be weaponized, and are 
easily transported and surreptitiously released. 
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(4) Scenario Conclusion. Hospital preparedness and response for a low 
probability, high consequence event such as a chemical or explosive release where time is 
of the essence depend on efficient and effective coordination, planning, exercises and 
practice.89 Preparedness and response cannot be merely thought of as expanding capacity 
of the existing system for handling non-terrorist multi casualty incidents. Preparedness 
and response for terrorist events may well depend on the development of new strategies 
to increase capability.  
A paradigm shift in healthcare may be required to establish the sources 
and potential roles for a reserve pool of catastrophic event responders. Identifying a 
source of immediately available, trained professionals capable of providing patient care 
requires some familiarity with health and public health principles and practice. A broad 
consensus must be established on the utility of the concept of non-traditional medical and 
public health professions as a surge manpower resource.90 Models of graduated 
responsibility within a department exist in current physician residency training. A senior 
physician supervises a junior physician. Models across specialties are less common, 
although trauma teams consisting of trauma and EM physicians are successful. 
Expanding on such models requires altered delineation of privileges, challenging 
traditional board certification, licensing, hospital credentialing requirements, and liability 
coverage issues as well as legal and medical staff policies that define current activity. 
c. Discipline Specific Challenges for Surge 
When the continuum of care reaches the hospital entrance, the assumption 
is that doctors and hospitals are prepared to assume the care of these victims and that all 
resources are available and will be mobilized for the care of each patient as an individual. 
However, in many of these catastrophic events, the emergency medical system itself may 
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be overwhelmed and/or totally crippled. Many uncontrolled or difficult-to-predict 
elements may have substantial effects on true hospital surge capacity. 
(1) Pre-Hospital Care.  Current preparedness and response plans may 
not be consistent with reality. In a typical multi-casualty incident involving several 
victims from the same event, the pre-hospital Emergency Medical Response personnel 
will assess the scene, prioritize the most injured and distribute the victims to several 
neighboring hospitals, with the most injured victims transported to the regional Level I 
Trauma Center.  
By contrast, mass casualty management is more complicated than multi-
casualty management, which a physician might handle during a multi-car accident or a 
bus accident. The concept of diverting critically injured patients to a Trauma Center may 
be lost in the time of a mass casualty event as has been demonstrated in previous 
international terrorist events.91 In a mass casualty event, it would be difficult to prioritize 
all patients at the scene. It may be impossible to transport many critical victims to a Level 
I Trauma center for lack of sufficient EMS teams and ambulances and for fear of 
overwhelming those centers. Even hospitals without trauma designation may be forced to 
participate in a community response.  
Experience in Madrid and Tokyo has shown that patient distribution was 
independent of plans and best judgment.92  The experience after the Sarin nerve agent 
release by Aum Shrinkyo on the Tokyo subway in 1995 reveals that the pre-hospital 
providers or Emergency Medical System (EMS) were overwhelmed and many victims 
self- selected themselves to the nearest hospital via cars (13.5%), taxi (24%) and on foot 
(35%) adding chaos to attempts to organize the response at the scene. Only 11% of the 
4000 victims were transported via EMS.93 Of the 7,364 patients treated at hospitals after 
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the 2001 terrorist attack at the World Trade Center in New York City, only 6.8% were 
transported by ambulance.94 This data emphasizes the inability to conduct field triage and 
the inability to control the distribution of patients during a disaster.  
In the Virginia Tech Massacre in April 2007, the closest Level I trauma 
center was 42 miles from Blacksburg. The next closest was 149 miles away, and weather 
precluded air transport. All patients went to level III or non classified EDs.95 
(2) Emergency Department Response.  The ED is the front door to 
most hospitals. Emergency medical care is provided at most of the nation’s hospitals. 
Emergency Medicine is a relatively new specialty that first offered formal training and 
certification in 1975. Currently about 60% of the 32,000 physicians employed in the ED 
are Emergency Medicine Specialists. The other physicians are for the most part trained 
and certified in Internal Medicine (28%), Surgery, Pediatrics and Family Practice 
(32%).96 EM physicians are largely represented by the trade group The American College 
of Emergency Physicians. The American Board of Emergency Medicine, a member of 
the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS), certifies them. Physicians are 
licensed by the state in which they work. Employment arrangements vary. They can be 
hospital employees, or employees of affiliated medical schools. They can be licensed 
independent practitioners who contract with the hospital independently or through a 
recruitment firm or large independent group. They can be part of a small Professional 
Corporation or a large EM staffing group. 
Some EDs, especially in rural areas, evaluate small numbers of patients 
each year and are staffed by only one physician at a time. Other EDs at larger tertiary 
hospitals or university centers with or without residency training programs may have 
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many more physicians present at any time in the ED. Emergency Departments staff their 
physician and nursing shifts according to the usual volume at any hour based on years of 
historical data. 
Immediately after an attack, initial information will be shared by EMS, 
law enforcement and Emergency Management. The quality, quantity and timing of the 
information are crucial for determining a successful response.  
Response algorithms may change throughout the course of the incident 
and must remain fluid throughout.  Preliminary decisions will be made about appropriate 
institutional response based on imperfect information. Predicting resource needs can be 
difficult. Despite the magnitude of the 9/11 terrorist attack, relatively few wounded 
people presented to hospitals. Other less overpowering disasters result in surges of the 
worried well. The expected implications for victims as well as the ED are based on 
characteristics of the event including proximity, closed space or open space, smoke or 
fume release and complicating multi-trauma from structural collapse.97 Response will 
also vary depending on the time of day or the day of the week. 
To mobilize for a disaster, hospitals develop policies, procedures and 
protocols to reduce routine hospital activities rapidly in a safe, sensible, ethical manner to 
maximize resources. Upon activating the hospital wide disaster plan, the ED will either 
admit or discharge all current patients to free up beds and ED staff for arriving victims. 
The hospital may initiate diversion; cancel elective surgeries, procedures and clinics; call 
in backup staff; lock down the facility; and/or mobilize the decontamination team and 
equipment. Disaster carts with extra procedure sets are brought to the ED.  Certain 
clinical staff such as surgeons and anesthesiologists may be assigned to the ED. A staging 
plan specific for the described event will be drawn up by senior ED leadership present at 
the moment and shared with all ED and related staff such as registration, security, social 
work, and housekeeping. All departmental needs will be communicated to the hospital 
incident command center, which is located apart from the ED. 
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In a large-scale event, each hospital must have the capability to increase 
staffing, rapidly assess its available bed status and make occupied beds available in the 
ED, Operating Rooms (OR), and Intensive Care Units (ICU). This task may require 
discharge or transfer of patients or the opening of alternative care sites. All of these 
activities take time and engage valuable personnel resources that detract from the 
response. None of these decisions are taken lightly since the impact on a hospital to 
mobilize or not can be financially and operationally devastating. The impact of these 
decisions was evident several days into the SARS event in Toronto when, as a result of 
curtailment of services and fear, hospitalization rates decreased by 12 percent.98  
To complicate matters, experience has shown that the walking wounded 
often arrive at the hospital even before the critically ill.99 This practice creates a logistical 
and resource allocation problem for hospitals that initially rely on incomplete verbal 
reports to visualize and understand the scope of the disaster. Initially hospital staff may 
assign resources to the patients with minor injuries, only to find that they have to reassign 
resources when the critical patient arrives. 
Over-assessing a patient’s condition and under-assessing a patient’s 
condition upon arrival, known as over-triage or under-triage, has been reported in the 
trauma literature by Askenazi100 and Frykberg.101 Mis-triage causes a patient/resource 
mismatch, complicates the ED response and jeopardizes patient care. Hence in a disaster, 
triage is often done by an experienced surgeon who can estimate the ultimate 
management plan for each patient. The critical mortality rate or the mortality rate in 
critical patients is the barometer of comparison so that the mortality rate is not diluted by 
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large numbers of minor injuries. In the Virginia Tech shootings, the critical mortality rate 
was 20%, which was higher than the London bombing (15%) but lower than several other 
traumatic mass casualty events, which were about 30%.  An elevated critical mortality 
rate is associated with over-triage, but the Virginia Tech over-triage rate was 69%, 
slightly lower than other traumatic mass casualty events.102 This difference may explain 
the lower critical mortality rate. 
(3) Trauma Surgery.  Multiple factors affect the preparedness and 
response of hospitals to a bombing event. Immediate availability of a surgeon can be 
crucial. The realistic admitting capacity of the hospital is determined primarily by the 
number of trauma teams that the hospital can recruit. A trauma team consists of a 
surgeon, an ED physician, a critical care nurse and others, including perhaps an 
anesthesiologist. Trauma surgeons train as general surgeons and then specialize. They are 
certified by the American Board of Surgery, also a member of the ABMS and are 
represented by the American College of Surgeons. Others involved in trauma surgery 
include orthopedists, neurosurgeons, pediatric surgeons, anesthesiologists, and critical 
care intensivists. Other specialists may be consulted after initial assessment and 
stabilization of the patient. 
Yet hospitals that are not designated Level I Trauma centers have no 
requirement to have a surgeon in-house around the clock. Alternatively, a surgeon could 
be in the OR committed to another patient. Trauma knowledge base and skills set are 
concentrated at fewer hospitals because of the trauma designations. The recent increased 
interest in disaster response capabilities is in contrast to the general surgery community’s 
decreased interest in managing emergency surgery.103 Many trauma fellowship positions 
go unfilled. In the past decade, physicians, particularly surgeons and surgical sub-
specialists, have refused to participate in hospital on-call lists due to the decreased 
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number of practitioners available to share on-call responsibilities, the increased litigation 
costs, and Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) requirements which 
may result in no reimbursement. Additional challenges to hospital response are the fact 
that some hospital ORs are not routinely staffed at night and ICU beds are limited and not 
easily vacated.  
Many trauma care providers view disaster preparedness as a field in which 
they are obliged to take part but that they do not find very stimulating. Some perceive a 
mass casualty event primarily as a logistical and organizational problem rather than a 
trauma care problem. The prevalent view is, “…good standards of medical care are the 
best guidelines in responding to disasters.”104 This view implies that trauma care remains 
essentially similar to normal daily practice and is therefore not an issue. From a current 
trauma care perspective, the goal of the hospital emergency plan is to provide severely 
injured patients with a level of care that approximates the care given to a similar single 
patient under normal conditions. However, experiences from an increasing number of 
incidents in recent years have shown that this complacency is ill-advised.105 The delivery 
of quality trauma care during mass casualty event events differs in many respects from 
the daily routine. During a mass casualty event, the volume and severity of casualties and 
their erratic flow into the ED adversely affect the quality of trauma care given to 
individual patients. Effective triage of these casualties is often not straightforward.  
d. What Professionals Say about Healthcare Preparedness and 
Current U.S. Medical Surge 
(1) View from the Executive Level.  The Advisory Panel to Assess 
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
also known as the Gilmore Commission, was legislated in 1998.  In its first report in 
1999, the commission concluded that a terrorist attack was likely and that it was not 
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possible to describe the type of attack or the agent most likely to be used. They warned 
that the nation must be prepared for the entire spectrum of potential terrorist threats.106  
In its second report in 2000, they found major weaknesses in response capabilities.107 
The third report in 2001 includes a brief review of the nation’s health and medical 
systems, which were found to be under-prepared to address the full scope of potential 
terrorist attacks. They list several recommendations involving training and exercises, 
planning, public health infrastructure support programs, investing and evaluation of 
appropriate stockpiles.108 The fifth and final report in 2003 notes that states and local 
entities are not tightly linked with the federal government, they lack coordination in their 
planning, and are frustrated about response planning.109  
The 9/11 Commission states that the nation must manage risk by 
developing capabilities that are suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards while 
working within an economic framework that necessitates prioritization and choice.110 
In his book, Americans at Risk, Irwin Redlener, M.D., concludes, “…the 
nation remains decidedly unprepared,” and he challenges the reader to look at response 
capabilities of countries such as Cuba, Canada, China and Israel, which he reports have 
all done a better job than the U.S. in similar situations.111 
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In a consensus panel convened by Academic Emergency Medicine, the 
Journal of the Society of Academic Emergency Medicine, in November 2006, then 
United States Surgeon General, Vice Admiral Richard H. Carmona, MD, MPH of the 
U.S. Public Health Service, notes, “There is a vital need to assess critically the current 
state of surge capacity and develop methods to study and augment it to improve our 
nation’s all-hazard preparedness.112  
DHHS asks, “Can hospitals meet the challenge?”  The current health 
system, especially the emergency care system, is already severely strained by its routine 
volume of daily care and the financial strains on the hospital system. Health care and 
public health specialists anticipate profound problems in adequately caring for a surge of 
victims. The Health Care System, EDs, and Intensive Care Units (ICUs) of acute care 
hospitals are chronically overcrowded and are resource constrained. Each hospital and 
unit differs substantially in capacity, training and level of coordination.113  
An Institute of Medicine report released in June 2006 identifies the lack of 
surge capacity as a “…major challenge for the future of emergency care.”114 The Institute 
of Medicine argues that EMS and Emergency Medicine are very poorly prepared to 
handle natural disasters, a disease outbreak or a terrorist attack.115 It called on Congress 
to increase funding in FY 2007 for hospital emergency preparedness in specific areas. 
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They include strengthening and sustaining trauma care systems, enhancing ED trauma 
center and inpatient surge capacity, improving EMS response to explosives and designing 
evidence-based training programs.  
In accordance with recommendations in the Institute of Medicine’s  
“Future of Emergency Care” report series, “…all health profession schools, institutions 
and entities responsible for the training, continuing education, credentialing and 
certification of healthcare professionals should define and incorporate adult and pediatric 
domestic preparedness and emergency care competencies into discipline specific 
educational curriculum and competency criteria.”116  
The National Report Card issued by the American College of Emergency 
Physicians in 2006 gave the nation’s EDs an overall score of C- on issues not specifically 
related to preparedness for terrorist or natural disasters but related to overcrowding, 
staffing, etc., yet issues that affect the ability to surge. No state received an A or an F but 
some populous states received poor scores. New York received a C-. More than 80% of 
states received poor or near failing grades of C- to D.117 The most recent 2009 edition of 
the National Report Card gives the nation’s emergency care system an overall grade of   
C-, unchanged from 2006 on issues such as Access, Quality and Patient Safety 
Environment, Medical Liability Environment, Public Health and Injury Prevention and 
Disaster Preparedness. The 2009 national grade for Disaster Preparedness is C+.118  
In their publication, “Ambulances to Nowhere,” Barbera and Macintyre 
call for a public policy debate at the local, state and national level “…to 
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establish…remedies to resolve this critical healthcare funding issue.” Without prompt 
action, the nation faces the risk that victims of mass casualty disasters might end up in 
“ambulances to nowhere.”119  
Governmental agencies have also identified the need to improve surge 
capability.  The General Accounting Office released a report in August 2003 titled 
“Hospital Preparedness: Must Urban Hospitals Have Emergency Plans but Lack Certain 
Capacities for Bioterrorism Response,” documenting that most hospitals have emergency 
plans but they do not work. The written preparedness plans provide a false sense of 
security. Few have integrated community plans.120 Few hospitals have actual experience. 
A CDC survey shows that only 46% of hospitals have Memoranda of Understanding with 
other hospitals in the community for sharing resources.121 
In a 2005 DHS internal report on medical readiness, Dr. Jeffrey Lowell, 
the senior medical advisor to former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge, evaluates medical 
preparedness within the DHS and focuses specifically on NDMS. He found that the 
national medical leadership works in isolation; its medical response capability is 
fragmented and ill-prepared to deal with a mass-casualty event; and DHS lacks an 
adequate medical support capability for its field operating units. He calls for a “radical 
transformation” of NDMS, including the immediate appointment of strong medical 
leadership, development of clear mission objectives and substantial investment in the 
medical resources.122 A second 2005 report prepared by DHHS concludes that NDMS 
suffers from poor coordination with other federal agencies. It concludes that the U.S. 
does not have an effective national capacity to provide emergency medical services after 
a major disaster. Both agencies have recognized the need for fundamental reforms, 
                                                 
119 J. Barbera, A. Macintyre, and C. DeAtley, Ambulances to Nowhere: America’s Critical Shortfall in 
Medical Preparedness for Catastrophic Terrorism, BCSIA Discussion Paper 2001-15, ESDP Discussion 
Paper ESDP2001-07 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 14. 
120 United States General Accounting Office, Hospital Preparedness: Most Urban Hospitals Have 
Emergency Plans but Lack Certain Capacities for Bioterrorism Response, GAO 03-924 (Washington, DC: 
GAO, 2003), 13. 
121 Ibid. 
122 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform-Minority Staff, Special 
Investigations Division, “The Decline of the National Disaster Medical System,” Washington, DC, 
December 2005, 10.  
 49
including an increase in funding, establishment of strong medical leadership and clear 
internal control over assets.123 Evidence for these reports was that NDMS had trouble 
responding to the Florida hurricanes in 2004 and had major lapses in response to 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.124 When housed in DHHS, NDMS was headed by an 
Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness. In DHS, it was part of 
FEMA and as such its lead official is four levels below the Secretary, making it more 
difficult to be heard. The report quotes an unnamed DHS person as saying that most of 
DHS is law enforcement. “The right thing to do for medical support and operations is not 
understood. It is just lost.”125  Subsequently, NDMS has been returned to DHHS. The 
continual shifting of responsible agencies detracts from the development of a coherent 
response. 
Several professional study groups have examined surge capability and 
made recommendations.  
The American College of Emergency Physicians’ position is that every 
healthcare worker should be able to respond to acts of terror.126  The Committee on 
Trauma of the American College of Surgery outlines similar advice to their members.127 
The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) Task Force on Terror aims to help prepare 
practitioners for disaster response. They note that these physicians should adopt a life-
long learning perspective with regard to this subject.128 
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In February 2006, recognizing that the American College of Emergency 
Physicians must play a leadership role in obtaining government funding and do the 
necessary analysis and training to prepare our nation’s frontline EM personnel to respond 
to a disaster, David Seaberg, MD, a member of the Board of Directors of ACEP, outlined 
a 10-point plan before a joint hearing of subcommittees of the U.S. House Committee on 
Homeland Security to increase capacity, alleviate overcrowding and improve surge 
capacity at the nation’s emergency departments.  It lists a wide range of initiatives to 
improve preparedness and calls for Congressional funding for them.  None of its 
proposals directly addresses increasing the pool of trained clinicians.129 While he called 
for funding for hospitals and EDs to compensate for non-reimbursed care and to bring 
physicians and nurses into any first responder funding, the plan did not call for 
strengthening the clinician participation in hospital response.130  
Among its goals, the ACEP Strategic Plan for FY 2006-07 aimed to work 
to eliminate ED crowding and boarding of patients, achieve meaningful medical liability 
reform and promote emergency medical preparedness for disasters.  They sought to 
prepare frontline EM personnel for disasters through specialized conferences, curriculum 
and training. They sought grant funding to subsidize National Disaster Life Support 
(NDLS) courses, to offer disaster preparedness courses at ACEP educational meetings 
and to create core competencies for healthcare workers (HCW) involved in disasters and 
to fund them. They aimed to aggressively seek grants and promote research funding in an 
effort to identify and promote solutions to ensure adequate U.S. healthcare response and 
surge capacity during disasters. They requested and were awarded an Executive DHS 
grant.  With that grant, they surveyed and trained hospital staff in 18 states in disaster 
preparedness; and supported and assisted up to 10 of 53 state and affiliated chapters in 
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organizing and hosting town hall meetings to attract the attention of the media to increase 
public awareness of the role of Emergency Physicians in responding to disasters and 
mobilize support for the need for adequate surge capacity. They advanced a research 
agenda and increased the overall availability of research funding for Emergency 
Medicine Disaster Preparedness.131  
Acknowledging the terrorist threat to the United States and the potential 
weapons which present relatively new challenges to the U.S., the CDC’s National Center 
for Injury Prevention and Control convened an expert panel in October 2005 and January 
2006 to identify creative strategies that could be adopted in a timely manner to address 
surge issues from terrorism and recommend strategies for rapid management of a large 
number of bombing casualties. Objectives were to increase collaboration between the 
CDC and federal agencies, external partners and other experts on issues of surge capacity 
for injuries from conventional weapons and WMD. They examined the related challenges 
that would confront not only the general emergency medical response of the healthcare 
system but would affect select medical disciplines. Their conclusions, released in April 
2007, notes that without immediate federal assistance, many if not most communities 
would have difficulty caring for a surge of victims because each hospital and EMS 
system differs dramatically in capacity, training and level of coordination. The CDC cites 
several surge capacity challenges.132 Crowded Emergency Departments, increased 
volume, frequent diversion, and hospital closures are identified as some of the many 
problematic areas that stand between the current reality of emergency care in the United 
States and the effective management of a Madrid-like event. Other CDC-identified 
challenges and conclusions facing health care facilities and providers include: 
 Organization and leadership—effective preparedness and response 
demand an established functional leadership structure with clear 
organizational responsibilities. Such preparation has not occurred, 
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particularly at the local operational level. Consequently, confusion and 
redundant efforts and gaps exist.  
 Education—disaster preparedness and response education is not included 
in most medical or nursing school curricula. With the exception of EM, it 
is not a requirement in residency training programs. Thus, most health 
care providers are unprepared to provide the clinical care required during a 
disaster.  
 Infrastructure and Capacity—patients may seek care at facilities not part 
of the existing response plans so all hospitals must prepare and drill.  
 Hospital capabilities and staffing offer significant challenges—shortages 
of nurses and specialized technicians exist every day. This situation could 
be catastrophic during a mass casualty event due to the large number of 
patients, or the hesitation of staff to report to work for fear for their own 
health and safety or that of their own families. Estimating available staff 
may be difficult since many clinicians work at multiple facilities and may 
be over-counted. Conversely, screening, managing and credentialing well-
intentioned volunteers can be challenging if not impossible during a 
disaster.133 
 Information Technology, cost and interoperability offer other challenges. 
 Potential bottlenecks include triage, the response and capability of 
Radiology, limited critical care beds and limited transportation. Many 
hospitals have adopted just-in-time inventory for supplies and equipment 
including ventilators and pharmaceuticals. Many rely on the same regional 
suppliers who may be unable to surge these items to several hospitals in a 
timely way.  Access for delivery may be blocked.  
 Legal Issues.  
 Alteration in Standard of Medical Care. Altering or reducing the 
standard of care provided to do the greatest good for the 
community is a concept that is fraught with ethical, societal and 
legal issues making it difficult to surmount. It will require public 
discussion and legislation to support a protocol for determining 
who will have the authority to order the transition from usual to 
altered standard of care and when it will occur.134  
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 Verification of volunteer providers’ identity and credentialing, 
standards for clinical documentation, liability, EMTALA, HIPAA 
and CLIA.135 
In 2003, TJC issued a white paper. Its intent was to frame the issues that 
must be addressed in developing community-wide preparedness and to delineate federal 
and state responsibilities for eliminating barriers and for facilitating and sustaining 
community-based preparedness across the United States through leadership and 
funding.136 While it does demand that direct medical caregivers be given the highest 
priority for training and receipt of equipment, vaccinations, antidotes and other protective 
measures, it does not call upon the medical community itself to organize to prepare nor 
does it call upon the hospital community to take a leadership role. It calls on the federal 
and state governments. It prescribes a top down approach from agencies that may not 
appreciate all the issues at the lowest level. While it has been a force for change in the 
past, it is often reticent to tell hospitals how to do certain things. Several years ago, TJC 
retracted under pressure some standards that would have improved patient care and ED 
organizational and logistical operations. ACEP has called for those standards to be 
reapplied.137  
The AMA, which represents roughly 244,500 of the estimated 850,000 
licensed physicians, or 28% in the United States,138 released a Policy Statement titled, 
“Physician Obligation in Disaster Preparedness and Response,” which was adopted June 
2004 and issued in December 2004. “In preparing for epidemics, terrorist attacks and 
other disasters, physicians as a profession must provide medical expertise and work with 
others to develop public health policies that are designed to improve the effectiveness and 
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availability of medical care during such events. …individual physicians should take 
appropriate advance measures to ensure their ability to provide medical services at the 
time of disasters, including the acquisition and maintenance of relevant knowledge.”139 
The Policy Statement is silent on how best to accomplish this goal. In July 2007, the 
AMA issued a statement by then AMA-President Nelson asserting that all public health 
and healthcare personnel as well as professors have a responsibility to continually prepare 
themselves to respond to the health and medical needs of the public during disasters and 
concluding that a coordinated and integrated response requires that all clinicians are 
trained in multiple disciplines.140  They offer no guidelines on physician preparation. 
However, the National Disaster Life Support Foundation, a 501C3 nonprofit foundation 
in partnership with AMA, has developed a family of courses to address the need for 
standardized disaster medicine education.141 They sponsor courses like the Core Disaster 
Life Support Course. The Basic Disaster Life Support covers traumatic and explosive 
events and chemical events over 60 minutes each. The Advanced Disaster Life Support 
covers the basic disaster paradigm, mass triage, medical decontamination, legal issues of 
disaster response, media and communications, healthcare facility and community disaster 
Planning and Mass Fatality management. It does not specifically cover the medical 
response.142  
In a report by the National Health Policy Forum (NHPF) titled Medical 
Response for Terrorism and Public Health Threats: One Region’s Experience, the 
authors summarize the comments from emergency preparedness and medical specialists 
resulting from a site visit to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 2003. Feedback from these 
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meetings, along with guidance from the Forum’s Bioterrorism Preparedness Workgroup 
and Steering Committee, suggests that NHPF should focus more explicitly on how 
hospitals and other health care providers were preparing for mass casualty events. The 
Pittsburgh visit revealed that planning was bottom up and had a long ramp-up phase. 
Some participants questioned whether designated federal and state agencies had the 
resident substantive expertise to oversee medical and hospital preparedness efforts. They 
criticized the limited regional preparedness efforts, adding that hospitals and hospital 
systems plan independently. Planning is often not guided by threat assessments. 
Individual hospital systems have attempted to define their own preparedness needs. 
Confounding the problem, these activities appear to have been conducted in isolation 
with little or no consideration of regional plans or priorities.143  
(2) The View at Street Level-Public Expectations.  Health Care is a 
public trust. The general public, segments of the emergency response community and 
policy makers demonstrate a limited understanding of mass casualty medical care issues 
faced by hospitals. Data on ED visits shows that one in seven Americans are patients in 
an ED each year, but since some patients with acute exacerbations of chronic diseases 
visit more frequently, many Americans have no concept of the current crisis in 
emergency medicine. Everyone assumes that the ED is ready when they need it but that 
circumstance may not be always true. 
The general public expects adequate preparedness for consequence 
management by the emergency response community. A key component to those 
expectations is timely and appropriate medical care for victims of a mass casualty 
incident. Emergency Medicine is a major component of this trust. It is thus presumed by 
the public that even if a large number of patients are brought simultaneously to a hospital, 
they would receive the same high-quality care as the individual patient does under 
optimal hospital conditions. These assumptions about existing medical capabilities to 
treat mass casualties may not be correct in all cases.  
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Many things underlie the public’s expectation of the best care possible and 
provide the basis for this trust. The Hippocratic oath, the EMTALA law, the high esteem 
in which society holds physicians and nurses and other medical personnel, daily media 
reports of breakthroughs in research, and the severity of judicial malpractice remedies for 
breach of medical standards are all evidence of the public’s medical care expectations. 
This public trust in part results from community financing of healthcare 
from taxes and public funds; fee-for-service billing for medical care; the government 
guarantee of emergency care and stabilization under EMTALA; and the obligation of 
hospitals toward community preparedness incorporated into public policy. Title III of the 
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986144 establishes local 
Emergency Planning Committees to designate a local hospital as receiving facilities for 
hazmat events. As part of CMS’ Medicare Condition of Participation, any hospital with 
an ED must have sufficient physicians and nurses to meet patient needs. TJC 
accreditation implies certain assurances.145 
This confidence in today’s health care system, however, may, at times, be 
unfounded and may be eroding. Public surveys in 2006 by the Mailman School of Public 
Health at Columbia University reveals that just 28% of the public surveyed are confident 
that the health care system is ready to respond effectively to a biological, chemical or 
nuclear attack, a decrease from 39% in 2005 and 2004 and down from 46% in 2003 and 
53% in 2002. Less than a quarter of the American public (23%) is confident that the 
health care system is ready to respond effectively to a bird flu pandemic.146 Fewer 
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respondents expressed confidence when the survey was analyzed for New York City 
resident responses.147  
(3) The View from the Ground Floor 
 The Emergency Department Emergency Medicine and Hospital 
Landscape-Current Healthcare System Status. While the public and the 
political communities assume that the healthcare systems are adequately  
 
 
preparing for terrorism incidents that would generate catastrophic casualty 
loads, the medical community is struggling just to maintain its everyday 
operations. 
Emergency physicians recognize that if a mass casualty event happens, 
they will be rapidly overwhelmed and people will die. A survey conducted by the 
American College of Emergency Physicians of their members in October 2003 reveals 
that 80% of the respondents said their hospital emergency department does not have the 
surge capacity to handle an epidemic or act of terrorism. Barriers to surge include the 
overcrowding found in the EDs, where over 60% of the respondents work, as well as a 
shortage of on-call physicians, jeopardizing patient safety and causing delays and backup. 
Additional barriers include lack of resources and lack of political will.148  
ED physicians cannot do it all. One state chapter of ACEP, the Arizona 
College of Emergency Physicians (AzCEP) took a stand on the crisis in Emergency 
Medicine and issued a formal position statement. In December 2000, they declared that 
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has lost confidence in the emergency healthcare infrastructure in Arizona and that current 
resources supporting emergency care are inadequate to meet the needs of all patients at 
all times.”149 
A key component of consequence management is timely and appropriate 
medical care for victims of mass casualty incidents. In reality, hospital surge capacity and 
specialized medical capability across the United States has never been more restricted. 
Hospitals currently do not have enough trained staff in place at any given time to handle 
large numbers of patients with injuries from chemical or conventional weapon injuries 
such as might occur after a subway bombing or the release of chemical agents at a sports 
arena.  
Hospitals are facing severe financial challenges in 2008. Thirty percent of 
U.S. hospitals operated at a deficit in 2003.150 Those in the black have very narrow 
margins of surplus. In 2007, the Healthcare Association of New York State (HANYS) 
reported that 56% of New York State hospitals were either in the red or were operating 
with a financial margin of 1% or less.151  Hospitals are struggling daily to provide 
increasingly complex medical care to a growing and aging population with multiple 
medical problems, as well as 47 million uninsured Americans and a large illegal 
immigrant population. In addition,  professional staff personnel salaries, new and costly 
technology and equipment, pricey medications, exorbitant liability costs, costly  
regulatory compliance, and capital dollars needed for the replacement of aging physical 
plants all drive up the cost of healthcare. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997152 restricts 
access to capital dollars, making it difficult to replace outdated facilities.   
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This situation occurs at a time when reimbursement is low due to the 
failure of managed care, to reduction of payments from insurance companies, to 
reduction in payments from Medicare and Medicaid, and to the requirement to treat the 
uninsured. Hospitals are closing beds, merging into health care systems or networks and 
curtailing services where possible to control costs.153  As a result of new and safer 
technologies, new medications, advanced therapies and evidence-based medicine which 
challenges the validity of old assumptions, the paradigms of hospitals have shifted from 
large inpatient services with much supportive staff to smaller inpatient units with greater 
emphasis on same-day surgery and outpatient procedures and interventions.  The hospital 
industry has contracted its staff and downsized its operations and become more 
specialized and efficient over the past decade in order to survive in the tight financial 
markets. 
Capacity is not keeping pace with the increased demand for care, however. 
Hospital closures and bed reductions were largely a response to massive transformation 
in the delivery of patient care. Medicare’s prospective payment systems and managed 
care controls created incentives to increase efficiency by lowering length of stay. 
Hospital length of stay initially decreased over the past decade but has more recently 
flattened out as the efficiencies reach their limits. This situation occurs as baby boomers 
enter the high health care use period. The managed care backlash shows that Americans 
are unwilling to have restrictions placed on choice and access to care.  
A particular crisis exists in emergency care. The Institute of Medicine’s 
report in June 2006 titled, “Hospital-Based Emergency Care: At the Breaking Point,” 
brought this crisis to light.154  There are 4,017 EDs nationwide155 of which 1,414 are 
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certified trauma centers.156  Two thirds are urban, one-third are rural. Seven-hundred 
three hospitals and 425 Emergency Departments (14%) have closed throughout the 
country from 1993 to 2003 while the population has increased 12%. Hospital admissions 
have increased 13% despite a loss of 198,000 beds (17%) including 103,000 staffed 
medical/surgical beds and 7,800 ICU beds during the same period, accommodated largely 
through a decreased length of stay. The annual volume of ED visits has increased 26% 
from 90.3 million in 1993 to 113.9 million in 2003. By 2001, 60% of hospitals were 
operating at or over capacity.157,158  
Trend analysis from the American Hospital Association reveals that about 
1/3 of the increased demand for hospital care can be attributed to population growth. 
Two-thirds is due to increased consumption of health care services. Outpatient visits per 
thousand persons are up 61% since 1990. Health care consumes a greater portion of 
Gross Domestic Product each year, raising questions about future affordability. 
Americans spent $1.7 trillion on health care amounting to 16% of the GDP in 2007, up 
from 9% in 1980.159 The United States spends more per capita on health care than any 
other industrialized nation. The aging population is leading to increased demand for 
hospital care. The CDC found that the greatest increase in ED visits is occurring among 
those 65 and older—a trend that is likely to continue.160  Between 1990 and 2002, the 
population grew 16%. During same period, people over age 75 increased by 33%. In 
2002, people over 75 used nearly four times as many hospital days per thousand than the 
general population. The health profile of the aged and their health care needs are 
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dramatically different now than in the past. A 75-year old today has different health care 
needs than a decade ago. While advances in medicine improve longevity and the quality 
of life for the elderly population, these advances are accompanied by increased demand 
for health services. The aging of the population results in patients with chronic and acute 
serious illness requiring more time-consuming and complex workups and treatment.  
Healthcare restrictions come at a time when advances in treatment for 
once-killer diseases such as AIDSs, cancer, renal and cardiac disease result in survivors 
with serious ongoing healthcare needs. The rising burden of chronic disease is driving up 
the use of hospital services. Increased incidence of obesity, hypertension and diabetes 
contribute to costly health complications. Advances in medicine provide more treatment 
options.161  
These resource challenges impact the flow of patients from the ED to an 
inpatient bed resulting in overcrowding in many EDs. In some EDs, patients wait days for 
an inpatient bed, clogging up ED rooms and hallways and challenging the already 
overstretched staff. Consequently, 1.7% of ED patients left without being seen (LWOBS) 
and 1% left Against Medical Advice (AMA). Sixty-nine per cent of urban hospitals 
reported periods of time when they had to divert ambulances due to the lack of critical 
care beds and acute care beds, ED overcrowding and staff shortages.162  According to the 
IOM, 501,000 ambulances were diverted in 2003, an average of once every 11 
minutes.163 Redirection becomes a moot point if all hospitals in a region are on diversion 
at the same time, and patients are brought to hospitals whether they can care or not. By 
2004, the AHA reported that half of all hospitals and 70% of urban hospitals went on 
diversion.164 Georges Benjamin, MD, Executive Director American Public Health 
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Association stated, “Everyday in the hospital emergency departments around this 
country, we face a smoldering mass casualty scenario.”165 
The uninsured Americans and immigrant population may have no 
healthcare until arriving at the ED. Emergency Departments fall under the purview of the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1986,166 which requires 
hospitals to perform a medical screening examination and to provide stabilization of all 
unstable medical conditions for all patients who present to the ED requesting help 
regardless of their ability to pay. Thus, the ED becomes the health care provider of choice 
for the 47 million uninsured citizens in the United States, as well the entire immigrant 
population. Stabilization may require extensive evaluation involving costly equipment 
and procedures including CT scan, surgery and ICU care for which the hospital and 
doctor may receive no payment. 
The appeal of the modern ED is becoming problematic in terms of 
volumes, costs, staffing, facilities etc. It is all things to all people. To the uninsured, it is 
their only access to healthcare. To the community physician, it is a valuable practice 
benefit that provides coverage for patients in the off hours when the office is closed. This 
practice is especially true in the managed care era when there is little financial incentive 
to have extended hours. To the patient, it is a convenient one-stop, no appointment 
necessary, fast solution to many problems. To the hospital, the ED is an escape valve for 
a strained inpatient capacity. The result overwhelms the ED, creating a national crisis.  
As a result, Emergency Department overcrowding and diversion are realities in many 
communities on a daily basis.  
 The Healthcare Continuum-Regionalization and Community Organization 
Physician training has evolved in response to the increasing body of 
knowledge, the evolving principles of education and the changing healthcare model of 
specialization. The medical school curriculum is so voluminous that few schools train 
specifically or sufficiently for the new reality of terrorism. The agents may be covered 
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within other lectures on trauma, infectious disease and pharmacology. Students need to 
know merely the basics unless they choose to specialize in these areas. Few programs 
address these agents as weapons of terrorism.  
Postgraduate training including the Emergency Medicine residency has 
minimal, if any, requirements to study these weapons. After residency, continuing 
Medical Education (CME) offerings encourage the clinician to study changing patterns of 
disease emergence, altered response and new therapies, cutting edge advances in 
knowledge and technology, new medications and new practice guidelines. Physicians 
rarely seek out WMD training given other choices. Requirements of eight hours of 
Continuing Medical Education per year for physicians on a stroke team recently 
unleashed comments in the Emergency Medicine community that ED physicians must 
know the evaluation and management of at least 30 life-or-limb threatening emergency 
conditions. If required to have eight hours of training for each diagnosis, it would require 
six full weeks of school annually that no physician has the time, the backup physician 
coverage or the funding to complete. This training is in addition to hospital mandated 
training in infection control, child abuse, HIPPA, corporate compliance, risk 
management, customer satisfaction and computer system training etc. Additionally, 
training in WMD is not widely offered or pursued.  
Healthcare and the medical profession have been moving to physician 
specialization for the past several decades. Physician specialization is a result of the 
rapidly expanding body of knowledge in medicine. Physicians know a lot about a little 
but do not focus on community needs outside of their specialty. The general practitioner 
is a clinician of the past. The current healthcare model centers about a Primary Care 
Provider, usually an Internist, Family Practitioner or Pediatrician, who evaluates the new 
patient and then refers the complicated patient to a specialist. Fewer physicians are 
trained in the U.S. in 2008 than in decades past. 
Regionalization of certain hospital services such as trauma, stroke, cardiac 
catheterization, interventional radiology is the result of literature that supports improved 
patient outcomes in centers that deal with these problems in large numbers on a regular 
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basis. In some cases, it is also a function of centralizing costly equipment and specialists 
in one location to prevent a mismatch of resources.  
Regionalization and specialization in health care has resulted in Trauma 
Center designations. For major trauma, Emergency Medical Services (EMS) divert to the 
most highly qualified Level I hospitals in the region where Emergency Department (ED) 
physicians and trauma physicians are present around the clock and where residents are 
trained and research is conducted. The current Trauma System in place across the United 
States designates only a limited number of hospitals as Trauma Centers, with only 221 
Level I trauma centers in the U.S. In San Antonio, Texas, the single Level I Trauma 
Center covers many cities and counties and covers millions of lives. The alternatives to a 
Level I Trauma Center are a Level II center with some trauma expertise and specialists 
who can respond within 30 minutes and Level III community hospitals with limited 
expertise.  
Due to the specialization, many, if not most, hospitals would not be 
prepared to handle hundreds of victims from a bombing or chemical release at a football 
game or inside a mall in the time frame necessary to make a difference.  
During the attacks on the World Trade Center Twin Towers in 2001, the 
trauma system in New York City was never tested. The borough of Manhattan is the hub 
of New York City. It is home to 1.53 million residents (2000 census)167 and on 
weekdays, 581,000 additional people work in this borough (2004 data).168 It is home to 
much critical infrastructure. As the recognized financial capital of the world, it is a prime 
target of terrorists. Particularly vulnerable are the trains, buses and tunnels that residents 
and workers use to enter and exit the city, as well as the tall office towers in which they 
work. An explosive event or the release of a nerve agent or other chemical agent could 
generate large numbers of victims requiring immediate medical attention. Manhattan is 
the site of four designated Level I Trauma Centers. In the first hour of a response effort, 
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each patient requires significant resources including nurses, physicians, consultant 
physicians, space, supplies and equipment, and radiology capability. After initial 
evaluation and stabilization they would be moved to the Operating Room or an ICU.  
Critical patients each take an attending physician from 10 minutes to over one hour to 
evaluate and stabilize.  On average, 2-8 physicians are on duty at a Level I trauma center.  
Non Level I hospitals would have fewer trained physicians on duty and would be even 
slower in their response. This scenario is hardly strong preparedness for the country given 
its expansive health care.  
More than 60% of hospital revenues are used to pay salaries and benefits, 
and yet a serious shortage of health care workers exists. Demand for these workers 
exceeds supply, resulting in costly overtime, agency or incentive packages such as sign 
on bonus or tuition reimbursement to recruit staff. In December 2004, hospitals had an 
estimated 109,000 vacant positions for registered nurses, accounting for 8.1% of part-
time and full-time positions. Staff is aging and retiring. Other professional options for 
women in healthcare besides nursing are depleting those resources.169  HRSA now 
projects a one million RN shortage by 2020 and predicts that only 64% of positions will 
be filled.170 
Equally worrisome is that hospital personnel often have simultaneous 
commitments to multiple hospitals in any individual region resulting in over-estimation 
of available resources. This shortage could result in a serious shortfall of professional 
staff when surge capacity is needed in a region. 
Due to the tight healthcare financial picture, dedicated hospital personnel 
resources needed to strategize and plan for disaster preparedness both within the hospital 
and within the regional emergency preparedness community rarely exist. Planning is 
often done by interested professionals who have other primary responsibilities. While 
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they are able to draft the required response plans and complete the deliverables for HRSA 
grants or regulatory agencies, hospitals often do not have the resources to bring the 
necessary didactic or practical training to the entire staff.171 Nor do they have the time or 
personnel to coordinate a regional, scenario-based response. The calculations of hospital 
reimbursement do not include reimbursement for domestic preparedness or to maintain 
surge capacity.  
Since 2002, the U.S. government has distributed more than $7 billion to 
prepare for all types of disasters. Much of the money has gone to state and local health 
departments, emergency first responders, and hospitals. However, the distribution 
includes funds for decontamination showers and medication stockpiles but does not 
systematically address the lack of emergency and inpatient capacity. In addition, dollars 
are decreasing from $516 million in 2004 to $423 million for FY 2007 and projected to 
be $361 million for FY 2009.172 While pre-hospital providers have received grants for 
preparedness including equipment and training, hospitals struggle with unfunded 
mandates. Individual hospital grants from HRSA in 2002 Round 1 fell between $10,000 
and $40,000, depending on location. This amount is insufficient to equip one critical care 
room. Round II HRSA grants in 2003 ranged from $22,900 to $35,700. The Greater New 
York Hospital Association survey of hospital preparedness expenditures shows that NYC 
hospitals spent over $3 million on average for preparedness in 2003.173 
Couple the troubled healthcare environment with the threat of terrorism on 
our shores and it is rapidly apparent that a new paradigm of hospital preparedness and 
response is necessary. The potential global threat of terrorism and the recent dramatic 
demonstrations of terrorist attacks in major European cities and natural disasters in the 
United States and their impact on healthcare have continued to stimulate much thought 
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about available resources within the medical and public health communities. Designated 
dollars need to be carefully targeted to improve capability with the greatest return on 
investment. 
Researching and modeling surge capacity reveals some interesting and 
disturbing findings but is helping discern the issues and debunking the old impressions. 
Hospital inpatient census data can give a misleading picture of a hospital’s surge 
capability. While clearly the number of available beds is only one measure of capacity 
and it is no measure of surge capability, it does give some indirect insight into the 
challenges facing hospitals today. In a study published in October 2006, DeLia evaluates 
the annual bed statistics in New Jersey in 2003. When using licensed beds as the 
denominator, the occupancy across the state varied from 60-68%, with zero days above 
the threshold occupancy rate of 85% (a rate associated with delayed inpatient bed 
availability). A 90% occupancy rate represents a bed crisis. When using average daily 
maintained beds (i.e., set up and staffed) instead of licensed beds as the denominator, 
58% of the time the state in-patient census was above the threshold occupancy rate of 
85%. One-quarter of the time, the state in-patient census is over 90%. About 75% of the 
time, bed availability decreased below the federal standard of 500 unoccupied beds 
available per million residents in the event of a mass casualty event.174  
An editorial175 accompanying the DeLia article takes the question beyond 
beds and asks whether one could get what is really needed i.e., personnel, treatment 
space, operating rooms, sophisticated equipment and supplies. 
A study in Maryland shows that entire state total available surge capacity 
would be 1299 beds in the fourth quarter of 1998. This statistic includes a 20% increase 
above the average daily census of acute care hospitals. Most hospitals are not trauma 
receiving hospitals. The estimated ambulance capacity was 246 ambulances as of March 
1999.  This number is for a population of 5,219,125 (projected for 2000 by the Maryland 
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Office of Planning.)176 This study determined that there was no hospital ED in Maryland 
or any grouping of hospitals that could handle a Mass Casualty Incident with a patient 
casualty surge in the hundreds. Most hospitals would try to go on diversion with a 
relatively small surge expanding the stress on other facilities.177 Diversion may be 
unrealistic in a disaster. As of 2000 when the State of Maryland released its “Strategic 
Plan to Improve the Health and Medical Response to Bioterrorism,” the authors conclude 
that no Emergency Department in Maryland had the available surge capacity to handle a 
Mass Casualty Incident involving hundreds of victims.178 
The U.S. House of Representatives Chairman of the Committee on 
Oversight and Governmental Reform, Rep. Henry A. Waxman, held a hearing on “The 
Lack of Hospital Emergency Surge Capacity” and the impact of Medicaid Regulations on 
surge capacity on May 5 and 6, 2008. He concluded that the emergency care systems 
were stretched to the breaking point and had no capacity to respond to a surge of 
victims.179 In preparation for the hearing, the committee staffers conducted a one-point-
in-time survey on Tuesday, March 25, 2008 at 4:30 PM.  The result is a paper, “Hospital 
Emergency Surge Capacity: Not Ready for the “Predictable Surprise.” Surveyors 
contacted 34 Level I Trauma Centers in seven cities—New York City, Los Angeles, 
Denver, Washington, DC, Houston, Chicago and Minneapolis.  They found that three of 
the five Level I Trauma Centers in Los Angeles were on diversion. Los Angeles and 
Washington DC had no available space in their EDs and patients were being treated in 
hallways and waiting rooms. One facility in Washington was operating at 286% capacity. 
In NYC, the site of previous terror attacks, ten of the 16 trauma centers surveyed had no 
available treatment spaces in their EDs. The other six facilities had a total of 56 available 
spaces. On the day of the Madrid bombing, 966 casualties were taken to hospitals, more 
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than eight times the total number of standard treatment spaces available in all 34 
surveyed Level I trauma centers in seven cities. Fifty-nine percent of the 34 centers were 
operating over capacity and the average ED was operating at 115% capacity. None of the 
hospitals had enough critical care beds to handle a Madrid-like event. In Madrid, 29 
patients arriving at one hospital required ICU care. On average, the trauma centers had 
only five intensive care beds available and six hospitals (18%) had no available ICU 
beds. None of the Level I centers surveyed had sufficient inpatient bed capacity to absorb 
casualties from a Madrid-like event. In Madrid, one hospital received 89 patients 
requiring admission. No Level I Trauma center had this bed availability. On average the 
Level I trauma centers had only 24 beds available.180 While beds are not the sole limiting 
factor for response for a disaster, hospitals staff for the usual volume and staff would be 
stretched thin for this excess volume. The time to move these patients out of the ED to 
prepare for the sudden influx of victims when the pre-event volume is so high and the 
inpatient and ICU beds are so limited portends a major bottleneck. Having trained staff to 
absorb this volume is crucial. 
 Conclusion on Current Healthcare State  
Emergency Medicine Physicians have concerns that if a mass casualty 
event happens, they will be rapidly overwhelmed. Many are overwhelmed on a daily 
basis. Study group reports on surge illustrate no consensus on improving surge capability. 
Some talk of needing more beds. Some talk of clinician responses from afar; some cannot 
get past hospital financial constraints to preparedness. While some agencies understand 
part of the challenge, they still come up short on the solution. 
Increased efforts are needed at the highest level of medicine to establish 
and promulgate a baseline set of knowledge and competencies complemented with 
discipline and specialty specific targeted training modules.  Jerome Hauer, the former 
Acting Assistant Secretary of Public Health Emergency Preparedness at DHHS, 
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testifying before Congress concluded, “At the end of the day, it is medical care that will 
be needed.”181  
6. Healthcare Participation—What Has Been Done to Date 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), is a division of the 
Department of Health and Human Services. One of its top strategic imperatives is to 
build a competent and sustainable public health workforce that can respond to 
bioterrorism events or other public health emergencies. They aim to improve education 
and training in a three-pronged attack. They have mandated education and training at the 
state and local level through the Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR). They 
have entered into partnerships with agencies to disseminate information through the 
Centers for Public Health Preparedness Program (CPHP). Finally, they have their own 
direct providers of education and training within their Office of Terrorism Preparedness 
and Emergency Preparedness.182 
The CDC has established cooperative agreements on Public Health Preparedness 
and Response for Bioterrorism at the state and local levels. Grants have been funded to 
conduct needs assessment, to develop training plans, and to maintain data on who has 
been trained.  
The CDC has also partnered with the Center for Public Health Preparedness 
(CPHP), including 23 schools of Public Health, 13 specialty centers including Schools of 
Medicine, Nursing, Veterinary Medicine, and independent laboratories to identify 
community needs and strategize for solutions. The CPHP is part of a national system of 
Academic Centers for Public Health Preparedness created by the CDC. It is a unique 
partnership between public health, medical and dental schools and state and local health 
departments. Its mission is to prepare and strengthen frontline public health, health 
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professionals and first responders. The Center for Public Health Preparedness (CPHP) 
has taken leadership in addressing the complex public health threats posed by terrorism. 
It designs and implements bioterrorism response programs for its diverse public health 
partners and conducts competency based training of the public health workforce.  The 
Center for Public Health Preparedness aims to facilitate faculty development by 
establishing month long faculty-in-residence programs that allow faculty to observe and 
study at institutions with a robust WMD curriculum.183 It seeks to establish year-long 
fellowship programs in WMD preparedness and response for faculty. It offers a free 
emergency preparedness and response National Public Health Preparedness Referral 
Center to match preparedness needs of state and local health agencies and national 
organizations and available expertise, trainings and other services.184  It has received 
grant funding to measure medical response preparedness. It does not define who will 
respond.185 Despite all of this apparent activity, most hospitals and clinicians have not 
heard of this center. 
Additionally, the CDC has established relationships with the Association of 
American Medical Colleges (AAMC) and eight of the 30 medical specialty societies.186 
They are working collaboratively to develop relevant information for the 300,000 
clinicians and health care professionals who are represented by these organizations.  In 
April 2003, Jordan Cohen, MD, President of the Association of American Medical 
Colleges (AAMC), testified before Congress that 23 of the 126 medical schools had 
identifiable courses or sessions directly related to the potential effects of biological, 
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chemical or radiological agents. This number had increased from 10 schools just two 
years before.187 This increase seems underwhelming in light of the events of 9/11 more 
than 18 months before. The cause of the slow response is open to speculation. Curriculum 
changes and development are slow, faculty may not be available, the expanding body of 
medical knowledge is difficult to compress into four years. Perhaps there is myopia when 
evaluating how a particular specialty can contribute to preparedness for a variety of 
reasons. For example, the Uniformed Services University Health School offered 28 hours 
of training in 2003 for its medical students over four years.188 The Medical College of 
Ohio offered an eight-hour Basic Anti-Terrorism Emergency Life saving skills course for 
their students.189    
In its Health Systems Preparedness writings, the National Center for Disaster 
Preparedness (NCDP) at the Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University 
reports that in order to bolster the medical and public health preparedness of the nation’s 
healthcare delivery systems, clinicians and health professionals need to be trained to 
function across their traditional professional roles. To promote a multi-disciplinary 
approach to the medical management of a disaster or public health emergency, NCDP is 
working to ensure that core topics related to disaster preparedness including bioterrorism 
become an integral part of the basic and continuing education of all health care 
professionals. The initiative includes the HRSA Bioterrorism Training and Curriculum 
Development Program (BTCDP). NCDP is reviewing the graduate health curricula at 
each Columbia University School, including the College of Physicians and Surgeons, the 
Mailman School of Public Health, and the Schools of Dentistry and Nursing. They are 
creating disaster-related content and competencies that are essential for all graduating 
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health care professionals. Future anticipated training includes distance-based learning, 
online interactive simulations and creation of a clinical hands-on learning lab for clinical 
and public health students.190 
Besides the CDC, other agencies of DHHS such as Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) and HRSA are involved in preparedness and response as 
well. 
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the measurement arm 
of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), is the lead federal agency 
charged with supporting research designed to improve the quality of health care, reduce 
its cost, address patient safety and medical errors and broaden access to essential 
services. It is charged with preparing models and promoting practices including 
competency based drills that enhance the national, state and local preparedness through 
the development and assessment of alternative measures that ensure health surge capacity 
for mass casualty events. AHRQ has outlined four strategic objectives, which fit into the 
DHHS department-wide strategic plan for bioterrorism and public health emergency 
preparedness. These strategic objectives are to develop and assess (1) alternative 
approaches to ensuring healthcare surge capacity; (2) models that address training and 
information needs; (3) alternative uses of information technology and electronic 
communication networks; (4) protocols and technologies to enhance interoperability 
among healthcare systems.191  
The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), also an agency of 
DHHS, has developed a National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program, NBHPP. 
This program readies hospitals and supporting health care systems to deliver coordinated 
and effective care to victims of terrorism and other public health emergencies. Through a 
grants process, hospitals determine the training with strong emphasis on competency-
based training rather than content. Progress has been slow for a variety of reasons. 
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States have been encouraged to develop initiatives and imperatives to improve 
healthcare preparedness that engage practitioners, hospitals and all stakeholders using 
federally supported grants and local monies. The Maryland Strategic Plan examines the 
current response and preparedness. It defines some strategic priorities that include 
improving awareness within the health and medical community with regard to terrorism 
and the potential impacts of explosives chemical, biological and radiological agents; 
improving surveillance; improving the response to all Mass Casualty Incidents by 
building on the response capability and improving coordination along the continuum of 
care from EMS, Public Health, Office of Emergency Management, law enforcement and 
public safety and health and medical resources in preparation for a WMD event; and 
improving coordination to assure adequate levels of preparation and readiness for an 
incident.192 They establish priorities for investment of time, money and energies and 
identify a process of engagement of stakeholders to assure that priority goals are 
achieved. They improve existing Mass Casualty Disaster Plans to handle a WMD Mass 
casualty event numbering in the hundreds of victims and a WMD Catastrophic Mass 
Casualty Incident at the 1000 live victim level.193  It concludes that awareness and 
education of health and medical communities are essential if improved preparedness, 
knowledge and response are to be achieved. A new understanding of terrorism, its 
weapons, its motivations, strategies, implications are necessary to develop responsible, 
measured and effective plans and responses.194  
7. Importance of Problem for Homeland Security 
A terrorist attack in the United States would be one example of a “predictable 
surprise” as characterized by Bazerman and Watkins. A characteristic of predictable 
surprises is that leaders know a problem or threat exists and that the problem will not 
solve itself. Resolving the problem would incur significant costs in the present, while the 
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benefits of action would be delayed and ambiguous. Limited resources and pressure for 
near term results challenge the leader in view of competing needs. The natural tendency 
is to maintain the status quo. Some may actually benefit from inaction and will be 
motivated to subvert the actions of leaders. Leaders can expect little credit for prevention 
of predictable surprises.195   
While relying on traditional disaster management and trauma life support training 
is far easier and less expensive than learning and practicing new skills, planners cannot 
assume that we can provide the usual standard of care for large numbers of victims from 
terrorist bombings as we do for victims of a smaller multi-casualty event.196 Successful 
models have been developed from the military in Iraq and the Israeli experience.197 
Concerning improving surge and preparedness, many disciplines and agencies 
have opinions and goals, but a long road still stretches ahead to achieve preparedness. 
The progress to develop a model for healthcare that increases the number of clinicians 
available for surge capability for a WMD catastrophic mass casualty event is exquisitely 
slow due to competing interests, differing priorities, limited resources and, most 
importantly, lack of vision and clear, mutually agreed upon goals. Information from 
military and international colleagues shows that we cannot just provide more of the same.  
A strategy that aligns the goals and objectives of all who are charged with 
protecting the health of people with the realities of healthcare capabilities requires 
stakeholders to zoom out and take a look at the problem from the 40,000 foot level. The 
executive level and the ground level are far apart and the public is in the middle, 
expressing their lack of confidence and at risk. 
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B. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS STEMMING FROM THE EXPERIENCE 
OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES MILITARY  
1. Learning from Others 
From 2001 to 2003, more than 500 international terrorist bombings caused more 
than 4600 deaths. In 2005 alone, according to the Terrorist Attack Archives Terrorism 
Research center, there were 741 terrorist events in 45 countries and more than half were 
bombings. There were 8015 victims resulting in 3049 deaths. September 11 was an 
example of flying bombs that killed over 3000 victims.198 The threat continues. 
Experience in other countries gives a glimpse of what U.S. healthcare can expect 
should there be more on-shore terrorist attacks. Experience from other countries has 
shown that other constructs in the delivery of trauma care have produced consistent or 
improved outcomes. This knowledge can provide a basis on which to plan and train for 
these new realities and to incorporate lessons learned and best practices in our plans. 
New practice models need to challenge traditional trauma teaching and integrate 
newer methodologies to address newer threats. As the U.S. healthcare industry develops 
its plans, it would be wise to study and consider the operational aspects of other systems 
and review the clinical results in an effort to improve patient outcomes. It is a 
misconception that disaster management is just managing more patients in the usual way. 
We have learned from experiences of the U.S. and Israeli military and international 
colleagues in London and Madrid that clinical management of casualties from terrorist 
bombings differs considerably from that seen daily in trauma centers.199  Successful 
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models have developed from the U.S. military in Iraq and the Israeli experience.200 
Tokyo gave us a glimpse of chemical events with secondary casualties in EMS and 
hospital workers.201 
a. Israel 
Israel has had a long, violent history during its existence. The response to 
that violence gives the U.S. a preview of what healthcare should expect in the future. 
Particularly interesting is their real world experience with the limited pre-hospital control 
of the distribution of patients resulting in the participation of all hospitals in the response 
effort; their military experience with implementation of the evacuation hospital concept; 
their commitment of personnel; their evaluation of triage; and their clinical findings. 
In Israel, preparedness is ensured by central governance. It is 
recommended that all hospitals achieve an appropriate degree of surgical capability, be 
well-disciplined in trauma care and that all personnel (medical, nursing, and ancillary) 
participate in periodic training programs and hospital drills.  
The Israeli experience traditionally adheres to Pre Hospital Trauma Life 
Support and Advanced Trauma Life Support guidelines, which deal with the single 
patient. Israel has a system that tightly integrates the EMS system, hospitals, civilian and 
military agencies at the state level. In the recent terror related mass casualty incidents, 
Einav and colleagues determine that during recent bombings the integration came 
undone. The Emergency Medical Service in Israel (MDA) is a nationwide network with a 
central command allowing for a coordinated, centralized on-scene organization. The 
choice of hospital is made by the most senior medical personnel accompanying the victim 
in consultation with central control. In this study, the tremendous speed with which the 
Israeli EMS system responded to an urban mass casualty event virtually precluded central 
control of the EMS response. By the time the system was activated in several bombings, 
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all casualties had already been transported to hospitals. Consequently, many wounded 
patients ended up in hospitals that routinely see little or no trauma but were close to the 
bombing site.202  Hirshberg, in an editorial accompanying a series of disaster response 
articles in the Annals of Surgery, concludes, “The lesson is clear: if a hospital happens to 
be located in proximity of a Mass Casualty Event, lack of trauma designation or 
experience will not shield it from incoming casualties.”203 
All Israeli EDs are required to prepare for casualties numbering 15-20% of 
the total number of beds in their hospital. In a study by Einav, a review of mass casualty 
events yields data on casualties from September 2000 to September 2002. In the 33 
incidents, 230 died at the scene and a total of 1156 injured were evacuated to hospitals, 
providing a dead to wounded ratio of 1:5. This number corresponds to the ratio typical for 
military combat in conventional wars.204 Trauma victims were taken to hospitals near 
mass casualty events whether the hospitals were designated as trauma facilities or not. In 
large urban areas with rapid access to trauma centers, only 48% of urgent/emergent 
victims went to trauma centers. The numbers were 9% and 34% respectively for urban 
and rural areas. The remaining victims went to local hospitals. Twenty-seven patients 
who were taken to local hospitals were then transferred to trauma centers within two 
hours of the event. Thus, the author concludes that all hospitals should be included in 
contingency planning for mass casualty events.205  
In the Israel emergency response, the concept of “minimally acceptable 
care” is applied in the initial phase until all patients have arrived at the hospital and have 
                                                 
202 S. Einav, Z. Feigenberg, C. Weissman, D. Zolchik, G. Caspi, D. Kotler, and H. Feund, “Evacuation 
Priorities in Multi-casualty Terror Related Events, Implication for Contingency Planning,” Annals of 
Surgery 239, no. 3 (March 2004): 306. 
203 A. Hirshberg, MD, “Multiple-casualty Incidents Lessons from the Front Line,” Editorial, Annals of 
Surgery 239, no. 3 (March 2004): 322. 
204 S. Einav, Z. Feigenberg, C. Weissman, D. Zaichik, G. Caspi, D. Kotler, and H. Freund, 
“Evacuation Priorities in Multi-casualty Terror-Related Events, Implication for Contingency Planning,” 
Annals of Surgery 239, no. 3 (March 2004): 306.  
205 Ibid. 
 79
been preliminarily screened and initially stabilized.206 At this point, the determination of 
the total scope of the hospital challenge will be known and resources can be assigned 
appropriately. There were 315 mass casualty events in Israel that utilized minimal 
acceptable care, yet it has never been formally adopted by civilian hospitals for a mass 
casualty event. Currently, no guidelines exist as to what exactly constitutes minimally 
acceptable trauma care at a hospital during a mass casualty event.  
An article by Almogy et al. describes a large Israeli university teaching 
hospital coping with the consequences of a bombing incident. In Israel, all hospital staff 
demonstrates a total commitment to the Mass Casualty Event. Every hospital employee is 
mobilized for the hospital effort. They have pre-defined roles and regularly participate in 
disaster drills. Israeli medical students are trained and are part of the response efforts of 
their affiliated hospitals.207 
Hirshberg claims that in North America despite 9/11, emergency 
preparedness is not engrained in hospital culture and remains the province of a select 
group of dedicated health care providers and administrators. The major obstacle in 
preparing for large scale or WMD is this institutional culture of selective participation, 
not the lack of sophisticated protective gear or decontamination equipment. He notes that 
such a posture will never be good enough for a large-scale event. He concludes that 
commitment, not technology, is the key to a robust emergency response.208 
Hirshberg suggests that we should practice discrete event simulation.209  
Hirshberg encourages that discrete event simulation be used to study the emergency plans 
of a large university hospital. Plans can be analyzed and optimized based on a casualty 
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profile from a real life urban terrorist bombing.210 Handling a mass casualty event 
demands different organization of the hospital and response to prevent bottlenecks caused 
by scarce resources including personnel, radiology, ICU beds and operating rooms. 211 
Physicians will be increasingly required to treat victims of mass casualty incidents 
requiring a broadening of their existing skills and knowledge of various mechanisms of 
injuries.212  
Hirshberg suggests that emergency plans be made more relevant by 
designating a core of critical decision makers. While the ED is full of health care 
providers, only 3-4 senior clinicians should be making decisions: the triage officer, 
surgeon-in-charge and the charge nurse. He says the North American experience trains 
providers where to go, not how to think and strategize especially when their decisions are 
crucial. He says the crux of a successful mass casualty event is to separate the severely ill 
but salvageable patients from those who need minimally acceptable care and can wait for 
definitive procedures.213 This viewpoint supports the concept of evacuation hospitals. 
While most studies describe injury patterns and casualty profiles, a few 
look at the quality of care, which can have serious implications for disaster planning in 
the United States. Effective triage contributes greatly to the success of a mass casualty 
event resulting in quick pairings of patients in need and appropriate resources. Many 
authors emphasize the importance of triage by an experienced trauma surgeon. Mis-triage 
presents its own set of problems, including misappropriation of scarce resources and 
patient death. A study of terrorist bombings in Israel reports that as many as 53% of the 
severely injured victims were under-triaged by experienced trauma surgeons.214 In a 
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review article by Frykberg and Tepas of 220 incidents worldwide, the authors conclude 
that 59% of the patients were over-triaged.215 Over-triage is considered by some to be 
merely an administrative problem. Yet the inundation of hospitals with large numbers of 
non-critical casualties may very well interfere with the capability of limited medical 
resources. In fact, the authors use linear regression to show a direct linear relationship 
between over-triage and increased mortality.216  
Either way, any mis-triage complicates the ED response and negatively 
impacts the care of the patient by the misallocation of scarce resources including 
clinicians and space. Assets may be wasted on the wrong patients and may be exhausted 
by the time a real patient in need presents.  
Terrorist bombings bring with them a host of new clinical problems. The 
Israeli experience with civilian bombings provides a glimpse of what clinical challenges 
other nations, including the United States, may face. Authorities can use each event or 
attack to prepare for the different clinical outcomes.  
Israel has 23 Trauma Centers of which six are major Level I trauma 
centers. Clinical data obtained from the review of the Israeli trauma registry data from 
2000 to 2002 reveals 1033 victims of penetrating injury, of which 60.3% were victims of 
explosions and 62% of those explosive victims had injuries to multiple body regions. Of 
all the explosion victims, 9.1% had an Injury Severity Score greater than 16, which is 
associated with severe injury, and an additional 17.3% had Injury Severity Scores (ISS) 
greater than 25.  Patients with an ISS greater than 16 rose to 63%, and those with an ISS 
greater than 25 rose to 46.4% respectively if the patient had internal injuries which would 
be more likely with closed space explosions or secondary injuries. Forty-six percent of 
the explosive victims underwent surgery. Of the explosive victims, 53.6% required ICU 
care and 14.9% of those with internal injuries died. All 5.3% of explosive victims died 
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after hospitalization.  Of these, 58% died within one day of the explosion.217 This data 
has tremendous implications for planning because U.S. physicians will use the lessons 
learned to guide patient assessment and management. The significant experience will also 
guide staffing arrangements. 
Another author reviewed several real Israeli scenarios. In one closed space 
event with 52 injured survivors, 42% of the patients were intubated and 19% received 
chest tube thoracostomies. In an open-air attack with 190 survivors, only 7% were 
intubated and only 3% received a chest tube thoracostomy.218 Those findings are in 
comparison to the Oklahoma City bombing with its structural collapse where only 2% of 
388 survivors sent to 13 EDs underwent endotracheal intubation; one received a surgical 
airway; and 1% received a chest tube thoracostomy.219  A major trauma center may not 
be overly taxed with an average of six intubations and three chest thoracostomies as 
suggested by the Oklahoma data, but patients are not distributed equitably and many 
community or rural hospitals would be challenged to provide that level of care in a short 
time span.  Therefore, an attack that targets the individual instead of the infrastructure, 
whether in an enclosed or open environment, can have a noticeably different medical 
needs profile. 
The challenges posed by terror-induced mass casualty events require 
consideration of a major reorganization of trauma care from the trauma center concept to 
preparing all hospitals to be the evaluation/evacuation hospital. Research on the 
implications of evacuating the most severely injured victims to the nearest hospital is 
needed. However, real experience in Israel and Iraq support the concept. The evacuation 
hospital concept has emerged from accumulated experience of Israeli Defense Force 
Medical Corps during combat and has been highly successful in the American Military 
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experience in Iraq as well. In this model, a Front Line Medical Facility performs primary 
triage and resuscitation and prompt life and limb saving surgery. Victims are later 
evacuated to appropriate civilian medical centers. Evacuation of the critically injured to 
the nearest hospital is predicated on that facility possessing the means to deal with such a 
situation. Military experience in the 1973 War in Sinai Peninsula and the 1982 conflict in 
Lebanon suggested that civilians should follow this model. Initial civilian implementation 
of this study in Israel began in the early 1990s with a wave of terrorist bombings against 
public transportation buses as suicide bombings or automatic weapons fired into crowds 
became more frequent and occurred on a large scale. Scoop and run to an evacuation 
hospital became the model. Bi-directional secondary wave coordination followed.220 The 
Surgeons of the International Committee of the Red Cross triage according to immediate 
or delayed operative intervention, also supporting the concept of the evacuation 
hospital.221 
In an editorial in the Annals of Surgery, Frykberg states, it is “…past time 
that we begin taking to heart the critical need to learn the basic principles of mass 
casualty management from terrorist disasters from decades of published experiences.  We 
must develop the necessary expertise that we now tend to lack in the history of explosive 
injury and the unique principles of mass casualty management that are so different from 
our routine approaches to trauma.”222 
Mass casualty disasters require a major paradigm change from our routine 
approach to ED care. We have the opportunity to review the experiences of those 
unfortunate enough to have experience with terrorist events and open a dialogue that will 
allow the United States to review and decide how best to respond to these events when so 
much is out of our control. 
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b. European and Other Experience 
Explosive devices and high velocity firearms are the terrorists’ weapons of 
choice. Bombings and shootings are the most common forms of terrorist violence and the 
easiest and least costly methods of achieving the terrorist goals of large scale casualties. 
This reality explains why surgeons and other acute care trauma specialists must be 
integrally involved as leaders in the field of disaster management and in local hospital 
and community disaster planning.223 
Devastation in two European capitals demonstrates the impact of 
detonating explosives among densely packed civilians. Terrorist weapons can wreak 
havoc, producing numerous casualties with complex, technically challenging injuries. 
Hospitals can expect to receive a large influx of surge of victims after a terrorist attack. 
The rapid surge of victims typically occurs over minutes, reaching a peak and then 
decreasing over a few hours.224  
In the Madrid 2004 and London 2005 bombings, many patients self-
evacuated from the scene. Analysis of the response to the Madrid subway bombings in 
March 2004 provides a real life scenario of what U.S. hospitals and physicians must 
prepare to handle. The ten bombs killed 177 people and injured more than 2000, with 
over 300 going to the nearest hospital. Of those victims, 272 arrived in the first 2.5 hours 
creating a massive surge.225 The others were distributed to 15 public community 
hospitals.226 The multiple logistical and operational challenges included field triage and 
transportation of injured persons from the scene of the event; hospital discharge of 
inpatients where possible; transfer of the current ED and ICU patients to prepare for 
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arrival of victims; and facilitation of multiple surgical procedures and tests, including 
hundreds of radiographs, CTs and ultrasounds.227  
The experience in Istanbul, Turkey in November 2003 with two truck 
bombings of city synagogues228  resulted in 30 deaths and 300 survivors who were 
reportedly maldistributed to 16 medical facilities. Thirteen percent of the survivors were 
admitted. Five days later, simultaneous bombings in Istanbul at the British Consulate and 
Hong Kong Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC) headquarters resulted in 33 deaths and 
an estimated 450 injured, leading to 15% admissions.229  In both events, the authors posit 
that the maldistribution to 16 hospitals was a function of proximity to the bombing site, 
the type of medical facility (government versus private) and the personal preference of 
survivors. However, EMS experienced difficulty coordinating the scene, resulting in little 
field triage and communication with the hospitals. The police lacked control at the scene. 
A March 2004 bombing of a religious procession in Quetta, Pakistan, 
attacked in three phases. Three hand grenades were thrown into the crowd, followed by 
automatic rifle fire on the crowd, followed by suicide by explosion by all the attackers. 
The mass casualty event involved 161 casualties taken to one hospital, including 20 dead 
on arrival. Priority I cases accounted for 22.7% of the total. Priority II cases accounted 
for 14.72%, Priority III accounted for 50.31% and Priority IV accounted for 12.27%. 
Four percent died after initial hospital survival. The maximum number of cases had 
arrived by two hours. The response involved 31 doctors and 135 paramedical staff. One 
hundred forty-five surgical procedures were performed within two days.230 This example 
provides evidence for rural U.S. hospitals that are the only resource in town and supports 
the concept of evacuation hospitals.  
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c. The U.S. Military Experience 
Military literature abounds with articles praising as well as criticizing the 
logistics of surge capacity in the theater of combat from the Civil War, through Vietnam 
to Iraq. Push packs of supplies and mobile hospitals are all part of their current surge 
plan.231 More recent experiences in other countries, both in the civilian and military 
sectors, have given evidence to potential strategies to improve U.S. hospital preparedness 
and response. The U.S. military in Iraq has successfully demonstrated concepts in 
surgical surge capacity management that should be assessed for adoption by civilian 
medicine. Several aspects of current military experience should be of particular interest to 
the civilian U.S. medical community as they analyze and strive to improve their ability to 
provide a successful response. They include the concept of the Forward Resuscitative 
Surgical Systems, with its reported improved outcomes, as well as the ongoing training of 
teams who will be deployed together. The principles are universal and concepts can be 
abstracted by civilian medicine to meet surge capacity demands and improve disaster 
response.  
The initial, dynamic combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom employed 
the Forward Resuscitative Surgical System (FRSS) in close proximity to the site of battle. 
The ability to provide stabilizing emergency surgery has shown that more patient lives 
can be saved through temporizing surgery and transfer than if the patient received time-
consuming definitive surgery at the initial receiving hospital.232 The initial experience of 
the U.S. Marine Corps FRSS during Operation Iraqi Freedom prevented delays in 
surgical intervention of USMC combat casualties with beneficial effects on patient 
outcomes.233  Tactical surgical intervention consisted of selectively applied damage 
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control or definitive trauma surgical procedures.234 In a study of 90 combat casualties 
with 170 injuries requiring 149 procedures by six FRSS teams, the authors contend that at 
least eight critically injured soldiers survived as a result of the FRSS. They doubtfully 
would have survived the longer transport time to surgery in the older model. The killed-
in-action (KIA) rate of 13.5% and Died of Wounds (DOW) rate of 0.8% compares 
favorably to 20% KIA for the wars in the 20th century and 8% DOW in World War I and 
3% DOW in Vietnam. Additionally, the infection rate for patients with severe extremity 
injury including open fractures and amputation was 9%, which compares favorably to the 
20-40% reported during the Vietnam War and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.235 While a 
small sample, this data provides support to the success of the concept of FRSS and 
suggests that there might be a small percentage of those who would have died in the past 
who could have been saved if they had received immediate, stabilizing treatment.  
For civilian medical agencies, the results support the concept of regional 
hospital preparation, whereby all hospitals prepare to do the initial resuscitation, 
stabilization and temporizing and life saving surgery. Then patients could be secondarily 
transferred to other more appropriate facilities for definitive surgery. In fact, this process 
happens daily when a trauma patient inadvertently arrives at a non-trauma facility. They 
are stabilized and transferred. This military model shows that the concept works and is 
advantageous in large-scale events. 
Training military and the reserves in combat medicine is difficult in time 
of peace since most stateside military hospitals are not trauma facilities. At the outbreak 
of war, relatively few active duty military personnel are prepared for managing combat 
casualties. Reservists working in the civilian sector may have more recent trauma 
experience. The need to provide sources of qualified military medical corps personnel in 
times of conflict or natural disasters to meet surge demands is challenging. To offset this 
severe limitation in trauma exposure, FRSS teams train at the Navy Trauma Training 
Center at Los Angeles County Medical Center. FRSS members attend retraining every 1-
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2 years including an intensive 29-day inner-city experience and tactical combat casualty 
care instruction.236  Frequent and extensive refresher courses and simulations retrain and 
update military professionals and active-duty and reserve surgeons in the care of injured. 
Military clinicians are deployed to civilian trauma centers for experience and retraining. 
Similar rotations for the Army at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio and the 
Air Force at Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services in Baltimore train both 
active-duty military, reserves and pre-assembled trauma teams. The military has also 
expanded forward shock and resuscitation training to include the use of PAs and 
nurses.237  
The military has identified the need for immediately available 
appropriately trained clinicians. The military has called for a Joint Training requirement 
to be established across the services so that all medical personnel can carry out any 
mission handed to them on any platform in DOD and in any location.238 The blending of 
the services for integrated medical response is believed to be cost effective and necessary 
in this time of an all-volunteer service. One author states, “…the unique physical, 
toxicological, destructive and other properties of each type of CBRNE threat requires that 
operational and technological responses be tailored to the threat,” and he defines medical 
readiness using the five Rs of readiness: having the right people with the right training in 
the right place at the right time with the right equipment and supplies. The author points 
out that the critical specialists that would be needed to treat injuries from a WMD attack 
are sorely lacking from current military medical units.239   
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C. ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT POLICY OPTION 
The preparedness of the United States for time sensitive mass casualty scenarios 
such as explosive and chemical events requires an intensification of discussion and a 
strategy to align goals. The planners, the public, and the healthcare industry are planning 
along three skew lines, and they are not meeting the objective. Resources are expended 
but do not meet their intended goal to provide surge capability. The healthcare 
community must lead the discussion with the planners listening and trying to facilitate 
solutions to the roadblocks. The trauma experts, in consultation with the military, must 
build a response model for these events. Then the Boards of Medical Specialties, the 
AAMC, and the ACGME must take the lead to build a training model to prepare all 
physicians. Hospitals, together with their licensing and regulatory agencies, as well as 
DHS and DHHS, must integrate these trained physicians into a local response model. 
DHS and DHHS must address some of the critical issues facing physicians such as 
altered standards of care and liability coverage. DHS and DHHS should promote 
technological development of computer simulations to allow physicians to learn 
procedures as well as event simulation to practice how to respond and how to think about 
the response scenario. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODS AND RESULTS CHAPTER 
A. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research assesses the availability of physician resources in the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster and determines ways to improve hospital preparedness and the 
number of physician responders.  To situate this research, preliminary interviews were 
conducted with one Emergency Department physician chairman, one physician trauma 
director and one hospital association professional working in the field of bioterrorism. 
Interviews focused on determining their perception of hospital preparedness and their 
thoughts on developing and implementing improved preparedness to understand what 
they believe are the best ways to improve preparedness. The interview questions include 
whether they believe strengthening preparedness can or should be done; where they 
would like to see the policy implementation for the program; what barriers to 
implementation they would predict both from within and from outside the medical 
community; whether participation should be voluntary or mandated; and whether to 
include all clinicians or some. All the respondents agreed that there is a need for 
improving immediate preparedness and that preparedness can and should be improved.  
However, the hospital association representative felt that preparedness efforts should not 
be required if it becomes another unfunded mandate for hospitals since hospitals already 
operate on thin margins. 
Following these interviews, a survey was developed to explore the self-perceived 
readiness of physicians to respond to disasters.  The survey is designed to determine 
whether additional physician resources (other than Emergency Department physicians 
who are present in limited numbers at any point in time or trauma surgeons who are 
present in a limited number of designated centers) are immediately available in a hospital 
to respond to an explosive or chemical event. The survey asks hospital physicians and 
physician assistants whose primary specialty is not Emergency Medicine or Trauma to 
assess their perception of their current preparedness to participate in an explosive or  
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chemical mass casualty event during the initial hour of response; to determine their 
willingness to prepare; and to understand the type of training they would need to prepare 
and assess perceived barriers to preparedness. 
The research survey, titled “Strengthening Hospital Preparedness for Explosive 
and Chemical Mass Casualty Events,” was presented to the Institutional Review Boards 
(IRBs) of two public hospitals, one urban and one suburban. Both are Level I Trauma 
Centers in the New York Metropolitan Area, and both IRBs approved the research. 
Hospital A, is a 530-bed hospital, Level I Trauma Center located in a suburb of 
New York City. It is an academic affiliate of the State University of New York at Stony 
Brook School of Medicine.  
Hospital B is a 342-bed acute care hospital, Level I Trauma Center located in 
New York City. It is an academic affiliate of the Weill Cornell School of Medicine in 
New York City. 
These Level I Trauma Centers have large numbers of service patients cared for by 
physicians employed as faculty, rather than private physicians. Both hospitals have 
extensive graduate medical education residency training programs. At the time of the 
survey, Hospital A had 190 full-time attending physicians, 25 part-time Attending 
Physicians, 280 resident physicians and 25 Physician Assistants. Hospital B had 179 full-
time attending physicians, 47 part-time attending physicians, 201 residents and 39 
Physician Assistants. 
During disaster drills, it has been apparent that most clinicians believe that 
disaster response is the responsibility of Emergency Department and trauma physicians.  
Yet the crash response during the 1990 Avianca Plane crash in Long Island, New York, 
proved that many other clinicians were willing and able to participate in hospital 
response. Emergency Department physicians know how quickly a surge event can 
overwhelm and would welcome additional manpower resources. The survey is developed 
around two scenarios with sensitive response times. It divides the response into finite, 
scenario-relevant skills that could be leveraged under supervision by an Emergency 
Department or trauma physician to multiply the number of patients who could be cared 
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for in a short time. It seeks to determine demographic differences in ability and 
willingness to help other hospitals estimate how many of their non-trauma physicians 
might be able to respond in a disaster. In addition, it explores the clinician’s vision for 
how best to reach that level of preparedness and what incentives might encourage 
participation. Prior to distribution, several Emergency Department physicians, one 
surgeon and several nurses involved in domestic preparedness reviewed the survey.  
After obtaining approval from the departmental Chairmen, research assistants 
distributed the survey to all attending physicians, resident physicians and fellows, as well 
as physician assistants, at both hospitals from April 2007 to June 2007. An introductory 
letter regarding the purpose of the study was provided. Most surveys were distributed 
during the beginning or end of conference time. The research assistants collected the 
surveys anonymously. 
The clinicians surveyed represent the full spectrum of experience, from 
physicians in training to senior physicians, as well as many specialties including, but not 
limited to, General Surgery, Internal Medicine, Pediatrics, Anesthesiology, Plastic 
Surgery, Orthopedics, Ophthalmology, Psychiatry, Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 
Pathology, Obstetrics and Gynecology. The survey aimed to reach all physicians and 
physician assistants at both hospitals. 
B. THE SURVEY  
1. Design 
The survey (attached) seeks demographic information including sex, practice 
specialty, board certification status, year of medical school graduation and whether the 
respondent ever received additional training in Life Support or CBRNE agents. Two 
scenarios are provided. One is an explosive event, and the other is a chemical event. To 
eliminate concerns about personal safety from the responses, there is no mention of a 
dirty bomb in the explosive scenario. The chemical scenario states that decontamination 
has been completed.  
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 The first scenario describes an explosive event. Questions were posed 
about the current qualifications and competencies of the respondent to 
work alongside Emergency Department and Trauma surgeons in two types 
of circumstances. 
 The survey first questions their ability to assess and stabilize 
victims with unstable vital signs or an unstable airway. For the 
unstable patient, the survey asks about the respondent’s current 
ability to perform certain procedures such as manage an airway, 
intubate, manage resuscitation fluids, assess the need for blood 
products, transfuse packed red blood cells and control external 
hemorrhage.  
 Next, it questions their ability to assess and manage urgent but 
stable victims. For the stable but urgent patient, the survey asks 
whether the respondent can perform such potentially necessary 
skills such as triage, clean and dress a wound, repair simple 
lacerations, order and interpret x-rays and splint. 
 For those who indicate that they are not qualified and competent to 
care for the unstable or the stable victim, the survey asks the 
respondents if additional advanced training can help them learn to 
perform assessment and stabilization. The respondents are then 
questioned about what training they would require. 
 The second scenario involves a chemical event. Two questions were posed 
about the current qualifications and competencies of the respondent to 
work alongside Emergency Department and Trauma surgeons in two types 
of circumstances. 
 The survey first queries the ability to assess and stabilize victims 
with unstable vital signs or an unstable airway. For the unstable 
patient, the survey asks about the current ability to perform certain 
procedures including the ability to manage an airway, intubate, and 
manage seizures.  
 Next, it questions their ability to assess and manage urgent but 
stable victims.  
 For those who indicate that they do not think they are qualified and 
competent to care for either the unstable or the stable victim, the 
survey asks if they thought that with additional advanced training, 
they could learn to perform assessment and stabilization. The 
respondents are then questioned about what training they would 
require. 
 Finally, the clinicians are asked whether they would be willing to 
respond to a request to assess and stabilize victims with unstable 
vital signs or unstable airway. 
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The scenarios are followed by a series of statements that the respondents are 
asked to rate on a 5-point Likert scale of “strongly agree,” “agree,” “neutral,” “disagree” 
and “strongly disagree.” They include four broad categories including the role of the 
clinician in a disaster, concerns or barriers to CBRNE training, voluntary or mandatory 
conditions of participation, and which entity should offer training. 
The survey ends with a series of open-ended questions regarding training choices 
and barriers to participate in preparedness training. 
2. Response Demographics 
Four hundred twenty five (425) surveys were completed in total. Given the total 
number of 986 physicians and physician assistants at the two hospitals, the response rate 
is 43.10% for both hospitals combined. Hospital A returned 229 surveys out of 520 
Physicians/PAs for a response rate of 44.03%. Hospital B had returned 196 out of 466 
Physicians/PAs for a response rate of 42.06%. Some departments or chief residents were 
verbally contacted a second time if they had promised to collect the surveys and did not 
respond in a timely fashion. 
Some physicians were observed throwing the blank survey out immediately, 
perhaps indicating that they did not see a role for themselves in response, did not have an 
interest or were too busy to complete it. Completion was higher in Departments where 
the Chairman or Department Head upon initial contact had indicated their willingness to 
have their department participate. 
The respondents include 401 physicians and 24 Physician Assistants. Of the 401 
who indicate that they are physicians, 179 (44.63%) are attending physicians and 222 
(55.37%) are resident physicians.  Two hundred sixteen of the 401 physicians (53.86%) 
are from Hospital A including 108 attendings and 108 residents. One hundred eighty-five 
of the 401 physicians (46.13%) are from Hospital B including 71 attendings and 114 
residents. Thirteen and 11 Physician Assistants from each institution responded, 
respectively. Of the 422 who indicate their sex, 257 or 60.90% are male and 165 or 
39.10% are female.  
 96












Figure 1.   Distribution of Respondents 
 












Figure 2.   Respondents Hospital A 
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Figure 3.   Respondents Hospital B 
A primary specialty is indicated by 411 of the 425 respondents. They are 
distributed as follows. 
 
Primary specialty indicated by 
411 of 425:     
Internal Medicine 140 34.06% 
Pediatrics 46 11.19% 
General Surgery 37 9.00% 
Psychiatry 29 5.60% 
Physician Assistant 29 5.60% 
Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation 21 5.11% 
Pathology 20 4.87% 
Obstetrics and Gynecology 18 4.38% 
Ophthalmology 13 3.16% 
Radiology 12 2.92% 
Dermatology 11 2.68% 
Anesthesia 9 2.19% 
Orthopedics 8 1.95% 
Emergency Medicine 7 1.70% 
Ear, Nose, and Throat 7 1.70% 
Urology 5 1.22% 
Dental 5 1.22% 
Neurology 4 0.97% 
Podiatry 1 0.24% 
Plastic Surgery 1 0.24% 
Table 1.   Primary Specialty 
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Of the 179 attending physicians, 143 of the 179 or 79.89 % are board certified; 
the remaining 22 respondents of the 179 or 12.29 % are board eligible. Fourteen or 7.82% 
do not respond to the question.  
The disciplines of 174 attending physicians (five do not indicate) are distributed 
as follows. 
 
Disciplines indicated by 174 
Attending Physicians:     
Internal Medicine 68 39.08% 
General surgery 18 10.34% 
Psychiatry 9 5.17% 
Pediatrics 9 5.17% 
Pathology 9 5.17% 
Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation 9 5.17% 
Radiology 8 4.60% 
Dermatology 8 4.60% 
Obstetrics and Gynecology 7 4.02% 
Anesthesia 7 4.02% 
Orthopedics 7 4.02% 
Emergency Medicine 4 2.30% 
Urology 4 2.30% 
Neurology 2 1.15% 
Ear, Nose, and Throat 2 1.15% 
Ophthalmology 1 0.57% 
Podiatry 1 0.57% 
Plastic Surgery 1 0.57% 
 
Table 2.   Disciplines of Attending Physicians 
This distribution is important to preparedness research because it gives a snapshot 
of which specialties are present in a teaching hospital and allows for targeted emphasis 
for training and resource distribution. Community hospitals and tertiary care centers or 
specialty centers may have a different distribution of physician specialties and different 
number of physicians present at any given time. Preparedness implies assessing these 
resources both at the hospital and community level. The results seen in this research are 
more likely comparable to hospitals with similar demographics. 
Of the 222 residents, 213 (95.95%) indicate a discipline. Nine do not indicate. 
They are distributed as follows. 
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Of 222 Residents, 213 (95.95%) 
indicated a discipline.     
Internal Medicine 71 33.33% 
Pediatrics 37 17.37% 
General Surgery 19 8.92% 
Psychiatry 14 6.57% 
Ophthalmology 12 5.63% 
Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation 12 5.63% 
Obstetrics and Gynecology 11 5.16% 
Pathology 11 5.16% 
Ear, Nose, and Throat 5 2.35% 
Dental 5 2.35% 
Radiology 4 1.88% 
Emergency Medicine 3 1.41% 
Dermatology 3 1.41% 
Anesthesia 2 0.94% 
Neurology 2 0.94% 
Orthopedics 1 0.47% 
Urology 1 0.47% 
Table 3.   Disciplines of Resident Physicians 
It is important to understand which specialties are training at a teaching hospital 
and to understand their relative potential impact on improving surge capacity.    
I also examine medical specialties as compared to surgical specialties.  Medical 
specialties are defined as internal medicine, internal medicine specialty, psychiatry, 
pediatrics, anesthesia, radiology, pathology, physical medicine–rehabilitation, emergency 
medicine, dermatology, and neurology.  Surgical specialties are defined as general 
surgery, general surgery specialty, obstetrics-gynecology, ophthalmology, podiatry, 
plastics, orthopedics, urology, ear-nose-throat, and dentistry. A total of 293 respondents 
are identified as having medical specialties and 95 are identified as having surgical 
specialties.  The remainder are identified as physician assistants or do not provide a 
primary specialty code.  This breakdown may prove to be important as it is frequently 
hypothesized that surgical specialties would be better able to respond to disaster 
scenarios. Those professionals with surgical background have advantage in assessing and 
managing explosive trauma victims. Medical specialties may have an advantage in 
managing chemical victims since the primary complications involve airway management 
and seizure management. There may be some overlap in abilities between medical and 
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surgical specialties, especially Emergency Medicine. Some weakness in ability to 
respond may appear among those who are highly specialized. The analysis tests this 
potential.  
Medical Specialties represent 68.94% and surgical specialties represent 22.35%. 
The distribution of attendings, residents across medical and surgical specialties is not 
statistically significant at (P=0.729). 
  
 Residents   Attendings  PA Total 
Medical 156 133 1 293 
Surgical 54 4 0 95 
PA 0 0 23 23 
Missing 9 5 0 14 
Total 222 179 24 42 
Table 4.   Distribution of Attendings, Residents & PAs Across Specialties 
Three hundred forty-six indicate their year of graduation.    
 
346 indicated their year of 
graduation of Medical or PA 
School     
Past 10 years 173 50.00% 
10 - 19 years ago 78 22.54% 
20 - 29 years ago 64 18.50% 
30 - 39 years ago 23 6.65% 
40 - 49 years ago 4 1.16% 
50 - 59 years ago 4 1.16% 
Table 5.   Year of Graduation 
Fully 50% of these hospital-based clinicians trained in the past decade with an 
additional 22.54% trained in the previous decade. The falloff between the decades is the 
result of more experienced clinicians leaving the teaching setting in pursuit of private 




the field of medicine or retirement. This statistic might indicate that training should be 
focused on the beginning of a physician career such as during medical school or 
residency to successfully strengthen hospital preparedness. 
a. Characteristics of Current Position  
Physicians can be employed at a hospital in a full-time or in a part-time 
capacity.  Many of those physicians who are part-time at a hospital are likely to have 
multiple appointments in different hospitals. Since they can only respond to one hospital, 
part-time physicians may skew the numbers of physicians a hospital will rely upon to 
respond.   
 
  Part-Time Full Time Total 
Voluntary 23 13 36 
Paid 20 369 389 
Total 43 382 425 
Table 6.   Physician Distribution by Full Time, Part Time, Paid or Voluntary 
A statistically significant difference exists in this distribution between full-
time or part-time and voluntary or paid (P=0.000).  Roughly half of the part-time 
physicians are voluntary whereas only 3% of full-time physicians are voluntary.   
There is no statistical significance between full-time and part-time 
physicians and whether they indicate they have any CBRNE training (P=0.919). No 
statistical significance appears whether they are full-time or part-time and whether they 
have training in BLS (P=0.098), ACLS (P=0.111), PALS (0.504), ATLS (P=0.970). 
The time from medical school graduation shows a statistically significant 
difference whether full-time or part-time (P=0.023), with the full-time being the more 
recent graduates. This difference may represent that they are in full-time residency 
programs or in full-time hospital, academic or administrative positions. It is more likely 
that part-time clinicians work at more than one hospital and are expected to be the more 
senior physicians. 
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When asked about their extra-clinical duties, four physicians respond that 
their position is a combination of clinical, academic, and administrative roles.  Sixty-five 
have a combination of clinical and academic roles and eight have a combination of 
clinical and administrative roles.  The remaining 348 have strictly clinical roles. This data 
supports the premise that clinical resources are present in the hospital to form a response 
surge team. When assessing hospital clinical resources, it is important to delineate if 
hospitals self-report that they have 425 physicians when 77 are not purely clinical, since 
that discrepancy may affect surge capability. 
b. Comparison of Hospitals 
Hospital & Status
Hospital A Part 
Time
6.82%
Hospital A Full 
Time
47.06%Hospital B Part 
Time
3.29%
Hospital B Full 
Time
42.82%
Hospital A Part Time
Hospital A Full Time
Hospital B Part Time
Hospital B Full Time
 
Figure 4.   Hospital & Status 
Comparing hospital A and B shows that Hospital A has statistically 
significantly more surgical specialists than Hospital B (P<0.05) and Hospital A has a 
greater percentage of volunteers than Hospital B (P<0.000).  The difference between the 
percentage of residents and attendings at Hospital A and Hospital B tends toward 
statistical significance (P=0.066) with Hospital A having more attendings than Hospital 
B.  Similarly, the difference between full time and part time at Hospital A and Hospital B 
tends toward statistical significance (P=0.060) with Hospital A having higher rate of part-
time than Hospital B.  While the number of male/female physicians is not statistically 
different between the two hospitals, the age difference is statistically significantly  
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different (P<0.05) with Hospital A having a greater percentage of physicians in the 10-30 
years since graduation range and Hospital B having a greater percentage of physicians in 
the 30+ years since graduation range. 
This fact is important and interesting because part-time physicians tend to 
have responsibility at other facilities, which could impact the size of the response team. 
Attendings are farther from their training and may have less confidence with required 
procedures, yet they would have more experience and stronger clinical acumen. A larger 
surgical staff would support a response team to an explosive event. The research explores 
these differences in their ability to respond.  
c. Life Support Training 
Current Life Support certification statistics between hospitals and 
specialties vary for a number of reasons. Hospital Medical Boards differ on whether they 
require training for their Attending Physicians. For example, Hospital A does not require 
ACLS for credentialing, but Hospital B does. Where training is required for 
credentialing, clinicians are credentialed by their Medical Board as long as they are 
current with life support training requirements on the day of credentialing. However, this 
training may expire before the physician is re-credentialed, affecting the percent currently 
certified.  In addition to Medical Boards, specialties have differing training requirements. 
Emergency Medicine physicians may be required to have current certification in life 
support, but pathologists do not.  
Residents in Radiology (who administer potentially allergenic IV contrast 
dye, which can precipitate allergic reaction) and Oro-Maxillofacial Surgery (who 
administer anesthetic agents) are required by their Residency Review Committees to 
obtain ACLS certification. Internal Medicine (whose physicians compose most hospital 
cardiac arrest response teams) has no requirements. Graduate Medical Education 
requirements for residents may differ by hospital. In addition, resident physicians rotating 
from affiliated institutions may have different requirements than these two hospitals. 
Resident physicians may still have current certification from classes taken in Medical 
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School. The diversity of regulatory agencies impacting clinicians’ practice affects the mix 
of Life Support trained and certified clinicians at any institution at any point in time. 
This survey queries respondents about certification in each of four life 
support courses: Basic Life Support, Advanced Cardiac Life Support, Advanced Trauma 
Life Support, and Pediatric Advanced Life Support. 
Basic Life Support (BLS) is an American Heart Association defined and 
sponsored 4.5-hour course. It teaches the basics of recognizing cardio-respiratory 
compromise and initiating airway positioning and chest compressions or other external 
maneuvers to open an airway or provide cardiac compressions until more advanced 
practitioners arrive. Current certification requires retraining and testing biennially.  
 
BLS     
All Respondents N=425     
     Currently certified 297 69.88% 
     Previously certified 50 11.76% 
     Never certified 78 18.35% 
Attending Physicians N=179     
     Currently certified 134 74.86% 
     Previously certified 25 13.95% 
     Never certified 20 11.17% 
Resident Physicians N=222     
     Currently certified 142 63.96% 
     Previously certified 25 11.26% 
     Never certified 55 24.77% 
PAs  N=24     
     Currently certified 21 87.50% 
     Previously certified 0 0.00% 
     Never certified 3 12.50% 
Hospital A N=229     
     Currently certified 135 58.95% 
     Previously certified 45 19.65% 
     Never certified 49 21.40% 
Hospital B N=196     
     Currently certified 162 82.65% 
     Previously certified 5 2.60% 
     Never certified 29 14.80% 
Table 7.   BLS 
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It is interesting that respondents from Hospital B have a statistically 
significantly higher current certification rates in BLS than respondents from Hospital A 
(P< 0.000).  In addition, statistically significantly more Attendings are currently BLS 
certified (75%) than Residents (64%) (P<0.01).  However, no significant difference 
appears between medical and surgical specialties, paid or volunteer staff, full-time or 
part-time staff, or duration since graduation.  Hospitals and residency requirements for 
Life Support training differ. Hospital B has strict requirements for Basic Life Support 
certification for clinician credentialing. Residents may have less time and money 
available for training or may be rotating from another affiliated hospital with different 
requirements or the course may not be readily available. 
Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS) is an American Heart Association 
defined and sponsored 13.5 hour course.  It teaches an algorithmic approach to cardiac 
dysrhythmias and their treatment, advanced airway management including intubation, 
and modifications to the algorithms for special situations including trauma, drug exposure 
and others. Current certification requires retraining and testing biennially. Both hospitals 
offer regular ACLS courses on site. 
 
ACLS     
All  Respondents N=425     
     Currently certified 210 49.41% 
     Previously certified 60 14.12% 
     Never certified 155 36.47% 
Attending Physicians N=179     
     Currently certified 96 53.63% 
     Previously certified 28 15.64% 
     Never certified 55 30.73% 
Resident Physicians N=222     
     Currently certified 98 44.14% 
     Previously certified 29 13.06% 
     Never certified 95 42.79% 
PAs  N=24     
     Currently certified 15 62.50% 
     Previously certified 3 12.50% 
     Never certified 6 25.00% 
Hospital A N=229     
     Currently certified 101 44.10% 
     Previously certified 44 19.21% 
     Never certified 84 36.68% 
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ACLS     
Hospital B N=196     
     Currently certified 109 55.61% 
     Previously certified 16 8.16% 
     Never certified 71 36.22% 
Table 8.   ACLS 
It is interesting that respondents from Hospital B have a statistically 
significantly higher current certification rates in ACLS than respondents from Hospital A 
(P< 0.01).  In addition, statistically significantly more Attendings are currently ACLS 
certified (54%) than Residents (44%) and more Residents have never been certified 
(43%) than Attendings (31%) (P<0.05).  However, there is no significant difference 
between medical and surgical specialties, paid or volunteer staff, full-time or part-time 
staff, or duration since graduation. Again, different hospital medical staff requirements 
are evident here. The difference is by hospital.  Hence, there is no difference between 
specialties or full-time or part-time status. Additionally, residents may have less time to 
take training or may be rotating from hospitals that do not require Advanced Life Support 
training. 
Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS) is an American College of 
Surgery defined and sponsored 16-hour course that teaches a logical algorithmic 
approach to the assessment, stabilization and management of the trauma patient in the 
initial “Golden Hour.” It includes establishing a definitive airway, life-saving 
interventions and stabilization procedures, monitoring, fluid and blood management, etc. 
Current certification implies retraining and testing every four years. Both hospitals offer 
ATLS classes regularly on site. 
 
ATLS     
All Respondents N=425     
     Currently certified 64 15.06% 
     Previously certified 29 6.85% 
     Never certified 332 78.12% 
Attending Physicians N=179     
     Currently certified 52 29.05% 
     Previously certified 16 8.93% 
     Never certified 111 64.16% 
Resident Physicians N=222     
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ATLS     
     Currently certified 10 4.50% 
     Previously certified 11 4.95% 
     Never certified 201 90.54% 
PAs N=24     
     Currently certified 2 8.33% 
     Previously certified 2 8.33% 
     Never certified 20 83.33% 
Hospital A N=229     
     Currently certified 40 17.47% 
     Previously certified 18 7.86% 
     Never certified 171 74.67% 
Hospital B N=196     
     Currently certified 24 12.24% 
     Previously certified 11 5.61% 
     Never certified 161 82.14% 
Table 9.   ATLS 
It is interesting but not unexpected that respondents with a surgical 
specialty have a statistically significantly higher current certification rates in ATLS 
(24%) than respondents from medical specialties (12%) (P< 0.01).  In addition, 
statistically significantly more Attendings are currently ATLS certified (29%) than 
Residents (5%) (P<0.000).  Time since graduation from medical school is also 
statistically significant with physicians in the 10 to 30-year range having the highest 
ATLS certification rates (P<0.000).  However, there is no significant difference between 
the hospitals, paid or volunteer staff, or full-time or part-time staff.  
ATLS is designed for physicians who are first responders to trauma 
victims. These responders are usually attendings in surgery, trauma, and emergency 
medicine. The course is costly in both dollars and time requirements and residents might 
not have had the opportunity to take the course. Due to the money required, it is not 
widely offered. That there is no difference between hospitals is probably because the 
requirements for Life Support training are set by the State Department of Health, which 
designates trauma centers and sets requirements for Emergency Department physicians.  
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The number of clinicians currently or previously certified in ATLS is 
considerably lower than for ACLS or BLS.  ATLS is usually only taken by those 
clinicians who have primary responsibility for trauma victims such as Emergency 
Department or Surgery physicians. Overall, the requirements for ATLS in New York are 
for Emergency Department physicians who are not residency trained or Board Certified. 
A larger percentage of Emergency Department physicians in Hospital B are Emergency 
Medicine residency trained, and hence do not require ATLS. In addition, Hospital A has 
a General Surgery residency program, so the investment of time and money for these 
residents to take ATLS is sensible. Hospital B does not have a General Surgery residency 
but utilizes General Surgery residents who rotate from other centers that may not offer 
ATLS training. It is interesting that two PAs indicate that they are currently certified and 
two were previously certified since this course only certifies physicians. However, many 
courses allow PAs to audit the course, which may be the circumstance here.  
Pediatric Advanced Life Support (PALS) is an American Heart 
Association sponsored course that teaches the advanced approach to the pediatric patient. 
It considers different primary diagnoses, different normal values, different size and 
medication dosing of the pediatric population. The course is 14 hours in duration. Current 
certification implies retraining and testing on a biannual basis. Both hospitals offer PALS 
courses on site.  
 
PALS     
All Respondents N=425     
     Currently certified  89 20.94% 
     Previously certified 18 4.24% 
     Never certified 318 74.82% 
Attending Physicians N=179     
     Currently certified  53 29.61% 
     Previously certified 11 6.14% 
     Never certified 115 64.25% 
Resident Physicians N=222     
     Currently certified  33 14.86% 
     Previously certified 5 2.25% 
     Never certified 184 82.88% 
PAs N=24     
     Currently certified  3 12.50% 
     Previously certified 2 8.33% 
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PALS     
     Never certified 19 79.17% 
Hospital A N=229     
     Currently certified  41 17.90% 
     Previously certified 16 6.99% 
     Never certified 172 75.11% 
Hospital B N=196     
     Currently certified  48 24.49% 
     Previously certified 2 1.02% 
     Never certified 146 74.49% 
Table 10.   PALS 
It is interesting that respondents from Hospital B have statistically 
significantly higher current certification rates in PALS than respondents from Hospital A 
(P< 0.01).  In addition, statistically significantly more Attendings are currently PALS 
certified (30%) than Residents (15%) (P=0.000) and more Residents have never been 
certified (83%) than Attendings (64%) (P<0.000).  There is also a statistically significant 
difference in PALS certification rates between paid (22%) or volunteer (14%) staff 
(P<0.01).  Time since graduation from medical school is also statistically significant with 
physicians in the 10+ year range having approximately twice the PALS certification rates 
than those in the <10 year range (P<0.05).  However, there is no significant difference 
between medical and surgical specialties or between full-time and part-time staff.    
Both hospitals have Pediatric Emergency Departments, pediatric inpatient 
services including Neonatal Intensive Care Units (NICU) and Pediatric Intensive Care 
Units (PICU), as well as pediatric clinics. The differences may be a result of Graduate 
Medical Education and Medical Board expectations and requirements and the availability 
of courses and the financial subsidization of the course by the hospital. The number of 
clinicians currently or previously certified is also low since certification is sought 
primarily by Emergency Department physicians caring for pediatric patients and 
pediatricians. Yet, not all Emergency Department physicians care for pediatric patients. 
Neonatologists take a separate certification course for neonatal advanced life support.  
Paid physicians can often take the courses during the workday while voluntary attendings 
come to the hospital for a specific responsibility and leave to manage their practice. 
Dedicating hours to these courses may interfere with their practice and their earnings. 
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Challenges to resident training include cost and time commitments. Since attendings are 
ultimately responsible for patients, it is more likely that they will be certified. The large 
percentage of clinicians who have never been certified supports the 2006 IOM Report 
highlighting the weaknesses in Pediatric Emergency Care240 across the United States. 
d. CBRNE Training 
Neither hospital has a requirement for CBRNE training. Trauma centers 
have no requirement for specific CBRNE training. Emergency Medicine has some 
specific requirements for CBRNE training, but other residencies do not require specific 
CBRNE training. However, the residents in other programs may study penetrating or 
concussive injuries such as occur in explosive events or study airway and seizure 
management such as occur in chemical events. 
Only 181 of 425 or 42.59% respondents state that they have any training 
in CBRNE. At Hospital A, 100 of 229 or 43.67% indicate they have any CBRNE 
training. At hospital B, 81 of 196 or 41.33% say they have any CBRNE training. Eighty-
five of 179 attending physicians or 47.49% indicate that they have any CBRNE training. 
Eighty-five of 222 or 38.29% of residents indicate that they have CBRNE training. Nine 
of 24 Physician Assistants or 37.5% indicate that they have received training.  None of 
these differences is statistically significantly different. 
 
CBRNE Training # Who Received Training #Respondents % Who Received Training 
All Respondents 181 425 42.59% 
Attendings 85 179 47.49% 
Residents 85 222 38.29% 
Pas 9 24 37.50% 
Hospital A 100 229 43.67% 
Hospital B 81 196 41.33% 
Table 11.   CBRNE Training 
                                                 
240 Institute of Medicine, “The Future of Emergency Care in the United States, Emergency Care for 
Children: Growing Pains,” June 2006, 
http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/35/014/Emergency%20Care.pdf (acessed July 3, 2008), 5. 
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Examining the 181 who reported some CBRNE training in greater detail, 
only 31% have all five types of training (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and 
explosive).  Approximately 60% have three or fewer of the trainings (Table 12).  
 
CBRNE each as separate training N=181  N % of those with training 
One type of training 35 19.34% 
Two types of training 38 20.99% 
Three types of training 35 19.34% 
Four types of training 16 8.84% 
Five types of training 57 31.49% 
Table 12.   CBRNE Types of Training 
Chemical and biological training are the two most popular trainings.  
Approximately one-third of the population has each of these. There has been interest and 
education about biological agents after the anthrax incidents and concerns about smallpox 
and pandemic influenza. Chemical training is similar to managing organophosphate 
poisoning so education may have been given in other contexts.  Interestingly, only 17% 
have had explosives training even though explosives are the most likely disaster scenario. 
While experts report that explosives are a major threat, there may be less training on 
explosives since most clinicians feel the trauma team will deal with those victims and no 
new body of knowledge exists.    
 

















Table 13.   Types of Training 
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Of the 151 who have chemical agent training, 66 received it in medical 
school, 23 in residency, 10 in the military, 35 in continuing medical education classes, 18 
















Figure 5.   Chemical Training Sources 
Of the 141 who have some biological agent training, 55 trained in medical 
school, 21 in residency, 7 in military, 26 at CME, 25 at Grand Rounds, 22 at in-services 















Figure 6.   Biological Training Sources 
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Of the 104 who have radiological agent training, 45 trained in medical 
school, 23 in residency, 7 in the military, 17 through CME, 8 at Grand Rounds, 12 had in-
















Figure 7.   Radiological Training Sources 
Of the 95 who have nuclear agent training, 37 trained in medical school, 
17 in residency, 7 in the military, 15 had CME, 11 had training at Grand Rounds, 11 had 

















Figure 8.   Nuclear Training Sources 
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Of the 74 who have training to deal with explosive agents, 30 trained in 
medical school, 12 in residency, 8 in the military, 12 at CME, 6 at Grand Rounds, 8 at in-
















Figure 9.   Explosive Training Sources 
It is interesting that CBRNE training is not statistically significantly 
different between hospitals, medical or surgical specialty, residents, attendings or PAs, 
full-time and part-time staff, or paid or voluntary staff.  The time since graduation from 
medical school tends toward statistical significance (P=0.057) but demonstrates no clear 
pattern of increasing or decreasing training over the decades.  It seems counterintuitive 
that there is no statistical difference. This may be due to the total lack of designated, 
formal CBRNE training as well as a lack of trend toward increasing training options or 
requirements. There are no requirements for training by either hospital, state licensing or 
regulatory authority or specialty. For those who say they have had training, it is not clear 
how extensive that training is. It could range from reading an article, which another 
clinician who read the same article might not consider training, all the way up to 
extensive didactic and practical training in the military. The research reveals that only 
42.59% identify any training in CBRNE. Of those, approximately 40% received training 




at the entire 425 respondents only about 17% of the entire sample identify training in 
medical school and less than 8% identify training in residency. Respondents identify even 
less exposure in other choices such as in-services, Grand Rounds, or CME. 
3. Perception of Preparedness  
The survey’s main focus determines whether physicians feel qualified and 
competent to respond in an emergency situation.  Since the physicians are self-rating, it 
explores whether the physician rating matched a specific skill set needed to successfully 
respond to victims of an explosive or chemical event.  It provides an assessment of 
internal validity–so the physicians who report that they are qualified and competent have 
the needed skills. At the same time, does the physician who reports that they are not 
qualified and competent truly not possess the necessary skills?  These results are 
presented in the section on internal validity.  The results from the individual question 
analysis are then presented.  The results of the logistic regression analyses to determine 
the overall determinates of response are reported in Section 4 (Logit Analysis).   
a. Internal Validity 
To test the internal validity of the questions, the survey evaluates the 
physician’s response on whether they feel qualified and competent to respond compared 
to their ability to perform a given set of skills, which would likely be necessary to 
manage patients in the scenarios described.   
(1) Unstable Victims of Explosion.  All two-way tables comparing 
physicians’ self assessment with their skill sets are statistically significantly different 
(P<0.000), implying that the distribution among the columns is not due to randomness. 
 Manage an airway 
Table 14 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to unstable victims of an explosion and whether or not they could 
manage and airway.  
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Manage an Airway     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Manage Airway 63.25% 13.37% 
Cannot Manage Airway 2.38% 23.39% 
Table 14.   Manage an Airway 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since only 
2.38% say they are qualified and competent, yet they lack one of the most crucial abilities 
in managing these patients. Of those who say they are that they are not qualified or 
competent, 13.37% can manage an airway but they do not feel that that skill is sufficient 
to manage these patients. It has a statistical significance of (P=0.000). 
 Intubate 
Table 15 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to unstable victims of an explosion and whether or not they could 
intubate.  
 
Intubate     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Intubate 49.88% 6.92% 
Cannot Intubate 13.37% 29.38% 
Table 15.   Intubate 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of respondents judge themselves to be qualified and competent and can intubate, 
or not qualified nor competent and cannot intubate. The 13.37% who judge themselves 
qualified and competent but cannot intubate may think they can rely on an anesthesia 
consult to intubate since this service is available in-house in these two hospitals 24/7. 
Anesthesia consult is not available in many hospitals around the clock.  
 Manage resuscitation fluids 
Table 16 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to unstable victims of an explosion and whether or not they could 




Manage Resuscitation Fluids     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Manage Resuscitation Fluids 60.19% 13.19% 
Cannot Manage Resuscitation Fluids 3.18% 23.50% 
Table 16.   Manage Resuscitation Fluids 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of respondents either judge themselves qualified and competent and can manage 
resuscitation fluids or judge themselves neither qualified nor competent and cannot 
manage resuscitation fluids. The 13.19% who judge themselves neither qualified nor 
competent but can manage resuscitation fluids recognize that this knowledge alone is not 
sufficient to manage these patients.  
 Assess need for blood  
Table 17 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to unstable victims of an explosion and whether or not they could 
assess the need for blood.  
 
Assess Need For Blood     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Assess Need for Blood 61.00% 17.94% 
Cannot Assess Need for Blood 2.15% 18.66% 
Table 17.   Assess Need for Blood 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of the respondents either judge themselves qualified and competent and can 
assess the need for blood or judge themselves neither qualified nor competent and cannot 
assess the need for blood. The 17.94% who judge themselves neither qualified nor 
competent but can assess the need for blood may recognize that this ability is not 




 Transfuse Red Blood Cells (RBC) 
Table 18 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to unstable victims of an explosion and whether or not they could 
transfuse RBCs.  
 
Transfuse RBCs     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Transfuse RBCs 55.50% 12.68% 
Cannot Transfuse RBCs 7.60% 24.16% 
Table 18.   Transfuse RBCs 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of the respondents either judge themselves qualified and competent and can 
transfuse RBCs or judge themselves neither qualified nor competent and cannot transfuse 
RBCs. The 12.68% who judge themselves neither qualified nor competent but transfuse 
blood may recognize that this ability is not sufficient to manage these patients. 
 Control external hemorrhage 
Table 19 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to unstable victims of an explosion and whether or not they could 
control external hemorrhage.  
 
Control External Hemorrhage     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Control External Hemorrhage 57.66% 16.75% 
Cannot Control External Hemorrhage 5.50% 20.10% 
Table 19.   Control External Hemorrhage 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of the respondents either judge themselves qualified and competent and can 
control external hemorrhage or judge themselves neither qualified nor competent and 
cannot control external hemorrhage. The 16.75% who judge themselves neither qualified 
nor competent but can control external hemorrhage may recognize that this ability is not 
sufficient to manage these patients.  
 Overall  
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The physician’s overall skill set for managing unstable victims of an 
explosion in terms of the number of the six total vital skills they possess and how they 
self-rate their competency and qualifications are also examined.   
 
 
 Number of Skills Possessed by Physician 
Physician’s Rating 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Qualified/Competent 2 1 7 10 21 44 181 266 
Not qualified/Not competent 50 21 25 22 15 12 12 157 
Total 52 22 32 32 36 56 193 423 
Table 20.   Number of Skills Possessed by Physician for Unstable Explosive Victim 
This table shows the overall physicians self rating of qualifications and 
competency is excellent.  Of those who felt they are qualified and competent, 96% have 
three or more of the skills that are required for a response to an unstable victim. Of those 
who feel they are not qualified and competent, 75% possess only three or fewer of the 
skills that are required for a response.  Therefore, we conclude that the physician’s self-
rating is valid for this question.    
(2) Stable Victims of an Explosion.  All two-way tables comparing 
physicians’ self assessment with their skill sets are statistically significantly different 
(P<0.000) implying that the distribution among the columns is not due to randomness. 
 Triage 
Table 21 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to stable victims of an explosion and whether or not they could 
triage.  
 
Triage     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Triage 64.69% 5.43% 
Cannot Triage 13.83% 16.05% 
Table 21.   Triage 
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This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of the respondents either judge themselves qualified and competent and can 
triage or judge themselves neither qualified nor competent and cannot triage. The 13.83% 
who judge themselves qualified and competent to handle stable patients but who cannot 
triage may have no experience since this is not a traditional MD/PA role and  they have 
not been trained or they do not want to do triage.  However, they may still feel they have 
enough other skills to be helpful.  The 5.43% who judge themselves neither qualified nor 
competent but can triage may recognize that this ability is not sufficient to manage these 
patients.  
 Clean and dress a wound 
Table 22 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to stable victims of an explosion and whether or not they could 
clean and dress a wound.  
 
Clean and Dress A Wound     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Clean and Dress A Wound 77.03% 10.37% 
Cannot Clean and Dress A Wound 1.48% 11.11% 
Table 22.   Clean and Dress a Wound 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of the respondents either judge themselves qualified and competent and can 
clean and dress a wound or judge themselves neither qualified nor competent and cannot 
clean or dress a wound. The 10.37% who judge themselves neither qualified nor 
competent but can clean and dress a wound may recognize that this ability is not 
sufficient to manage these patients.  
 Repair simple lacerations 
Table 23 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to stable victims of an explosion and whether or not they could 




Repair Simple Lacerations     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Repair Simple Lacerations 65.93% 8.89% 
Cannot Repair Simple Lacerations 12.59% 12.59% 
Table 23.   Repair Simple Lacerations 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of the respondents either judge themselves qualified and competent and can 
repair simple lacerations or judge themselves neither qualified nor competent and cannot 
repair simple lacerations. The 12.59% who judge themselves qualified and competent but 
cannot repair a simple laceration may be many years away from performing these 
procedures since it is usually relegated to a junior clinician.  However, they may feel that 
their other skills will make up for this lack and they will be useful in other ways.  The 
8.89%% who judge themselves neither qualified nor competent but can repair simple 
lacerations may recognize that this ability is not sufficient to manage these patients.  
 Order and Interpret x-rays 
Table 24 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to stable victims of an explosion and whether or not they could 
order and interpret x-rays.  
 
Order and Interpret x-rays     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Order and Interpret x-rays 67.41% 6.91% 
Cannot Order and Interpret x-rays 11.11% 14.57% 
Table 24.   Order and Interpret X-rays 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of the respondents either judge themselves qualified and competent and can 
order and interpret x-rays or judge themselves neither qualified nor competent and cannot 
order and interpret x-rays. The 11.11% who cannot order and interpret x-rays but judge 
themselves qualified and competent may rely on radiologist interpretation. The 6.91% 
who judge themselves neither qualified nor competent but can order and interpret x-rays 




Table 25 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to stable victims of an explosion and whether or not they could 
splint.  
 
Splint     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Splint 52.72% 4.46% 
Cannot Splint 25.74% 17.08% 
Table 25.   Splint 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of the respondents either judge themselves qualified and competent and can 
splint or judge themselves neither qualified nor competent and cannot splint. The 25.74% 
who are qualified and competent for managing stable explosive victims but cannot splint 
may be a function of the fact that both hospitals have orthopedics consult on site 24/7 
who can splint so they feel it is unnecessary for them to possess this skill to be an asset.  
The 4.46% of the physicians who judge themselves neither qualified nor competent but 
can splint may recognize that this ability is not sufficient to manage these patients. 
 Overall  
The physician’s overall skill set for managing stable victims of an 
explosion in terms of the number of the five total vital skills they possess and how they 
self-rate their competency and qualifications is also examined.   
 
 Number of Skills Possessed by Physician 
Physician’s Rating 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Qualified/Competent 3 7 18 37 92 161 318 
Not qualified/Not competent 38 6 15 13 9 7 88 
Total 41 13 33 50 101 168 406 
Table 26.   Number of Skills Possessed by Physician for Stable Victims of Explosive 
Events 
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This table shows the overall physicians self rating of qualifications and 
competency is excellent.  Of those who feel they are qualified and competent, 91% have 
three or more of the skills that are required for a response to an unstable victim and 97% 
have two or more of the required skills.  Of those who feel they are not qualified and 
competent, 67% possess only three or fewer of the skills that are required for a response.  
Therefore, the conclusion is that the physician’s self-rating is valid for this question.    
(3) Unstable Victim of a Chemical Attack.  All two-way tables 
comparing physicians’ self assessment with their skill sets are statistically significantly 
different (P<0.000), implying that the distribution among the columns is not due to 
randomness. 
 Manage an airway 
Table 27 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to unstable victims of a chemical attack and whether or not they 
could manage and airway.  
 
Manage Airway     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Manage Airway 59.66% 14.25% 
Cannot Manage Airway 1.93% 23.91% 
Table 27.   Manage an Airway 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of the respondents either judge themselves qualified and competent and can 
manage an airway or judge themselves neither qualified nor competent and cannot 
manage an airway. The 14.25% who judge themselves neither qualified nor competent 
but can manage an airway may recognize that this ability is not sufficient to manage these 
patients.   
It is interesting to note that more clinicians are qualified and competent to 
manage an airway in an explosive victim (62.25%) than can manage an airway in a 
chemical event (59.66%), but those that judge themselves not to be qualified or 
competent and cannot manage an airway are similar in the in the explosive event 
(23.39%) and the chemical scenario (24.15%).  This difference may be a function of the 
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nature of the event since chemical implies some threat to the clinician, although the 
victims were presumed to be decontaminated. It may be a function of the knowledge of 
the extreme oropharyngeal secretions requiring medications administered in doses with 
which the clinicians may not be familiar. 
 Intubate 
Table 28 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to unstable victims of a chemical attack and whether or not they 
could intubate. 
 
Intubate     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Intubate 49.51% 6.28% 
Cannot Intubate 12.08% 31.88% 
Table 28.   Intubate 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of the respondents either judge themselves qualified and competent and can 
intubate or judge themselves neither qualified nor competent and cannot intubate.  The 
12.08% who judge themselves to be qualified and competent for unstable chemical but 
cannot intubate may believe that they can call the anesthesia consultant to intubate since 
anesthesia is available in both hospitals 24/7. Anesthesia is not available 24/7 in all 
hospitals. The 6.28% who judge themselves neither qualified nor competent but can 
intubate may recognize that this ability is not sufficient to manage these patients.  
It is interesting to note of those who judge themselves neither qualified nor 
competent, 29.38% could not intubate an unstable explosive event, and 31.88% could not 
intubate an unstable chemical victim. Intubation in a victim of an explosive event may be 
complicated by an injured airway, distortion of anatomy, swelling after inhalation of hot 
gases in a closed space or facial deformities. Airway management may require a surgical 
airway. Intubation of a victim of a chemical event can be difficult due to the copious oral-
pharyngeal secretions, which can decrease visualization and can limit oxygenation. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the results of those who can or cannot intubate in an 
explosive event differs from the results in a chemical event.  The difference may reflect 
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concern for personal safety or may be illustrative of the recognized differences in the 
clinical complications of each scenario. 
 Manage seizures 
Table 29 shows the physicians’ rating on whether they are qualified and 
competent to respond to unstable victims of a chemical attack and whether or not they 
could manage seizures. 
 
Manage Seizures     
  Qualified/Competent Not qualified/competent 
Can Manage Seizures 55.56% 11.84% 
Cannot Manage Seizures 6.04% 26.32% 
Table 29.   Manage Seizures 
This question shows physicians are self-assessing properly since the 
majority of the respondents either judge themselves qualified and competent and can 
manage seizures or judge themselves neither qualified nor competent and cannot manage 
seizures. The 11.84% who judge themselves neither qualified nor competent but can 
manage seizures may recognize that this ability is not sufficient to manage these patients.  
 Overall  
The physician’s overall skill set for managing unstable victims of a 
chemical event in terms of the number of the three total vital skills they possess and how 
they self-rate their competency and qualifications are also examined.   
 
 Number of Skills Possessed by Physician 
Physician’s Rating 0 1 2 3 Total 
Qualified/Competent 4 9 56 187 256 
Not qualified/Not competent 80 39 28 13 160 
Total 41 13 33 50 406 
Table 30.   Number of Skills Possessed by Physician for Unstable Chemical Victims 
This table shows the overall physicians self-rating of qualifications and 
competency is excellent.  Of those who feel they are qualified and competent, 95% have 




Of those who feel they are not qualified and competent, 74% possess at most one of the 
three skills that are required for a response.  Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
physician’s self-rating is valid for this question.    
A set of internal validity questions for the stable chemical patient are not 
included.  However, since the prior three questions demonstrate internal validity, there is 
no reason to presume that it suddenly would no longer hold with the fourth. The space on 
the questionnaire is used instead to ask physicians about their willingness to respond to 
an event (as distinct from the perception of whether or not they feel qualified and 
competent). 
(4) Conclusion. The internal validity analysis shows a consistency of 
response by the respondents that indicates most understand the importance of the skills 
required to manage these patients as highlighted by the associated questions in each 
scenario. Clinicians who possess the skill most often feel qualified and competent to 
manage victims of these scenarios. Clinicians who lack the skill most often judge 
themselves neither qualified nor competent to manage victims of these scenarios. A few 
have the skills but judge themselves neither qualified nor competent to manage victims of 
the scenarios. This point may be a result of having the skills but remaining insecure about 
the mechanism of the chemical or explosive agents or not understanding how the skills fit 
together in a resuscitation effort. In the end, there are a few clinicians who lack the skill 
but still feel qualified and competent to manage these victims. They may not appreciate 
that these skills may be necessary for a successful response. However, it is more likely 
the result of working in a Level I Trauma center teaching hospital where a wealth of 
resources is available around the clock. For example, while a clinician might not have the 
skill to intubate, they could call an anesthesiologist to perform that skill for their patient. 
Resources would be different in a community hospital and perhaps in a different teaching 
hospital. 
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b. Explosive Scenario Result 
(1) Unstable Patient.  In analyzing the results of the explosive 
scenario, 266 or 62.88% of 423 respondents indicate they are qualified and competent to 
initially assess and stabilize unstable victims of explosive events. This data includes 107 
of 178 or 60.11% of the attendings and 145 of 221 or 65.61% of the residents and 13 of 
24 or 54.1% of the physician assistants. At Hospital A 136/229 or 59.38% and at Hospital 
B130/194 or 67.01% indicate they are qualified and competent to handle unstable victims 
of an explosive event.  
 
Explosive Event,  
Unstable Victims       
Category #Qualified/Competent #Respondents %Qualified/competent 
Attendings 107 178 60.11% 
Residents 145 221 65.61% 
PA 13 24 54.17% 
Hospital A 136 229 59.39% 
Hospital B 130 194 67.01% 
Table 31.   Qualified/Competent for Unstable Victims of Explosive Events   
 











Figure 10.   Qualified & Competent for Unstable Explosive Victims by Title 
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Figure 11.   Qualified & Competent for Unstable Explosive Victims by Hospital  
When examining those who indicate a specialty (n=409), we see a wide 
range of percentages among the specialties who feel qualified and competent to respond 
to unstable victims of an explosive event.  However, since numerous specialties are only 
represented by a small number of physicians this result does not lend itself to robust 
statistical analysis.   
 
 #Qualified/Competent#Respondents%Competent 
Anesthesia 9 9 100.00%
EM 7 7 100.00%
GS 34 37 91.89%
Peds 33 46 71.74%
Optho 9 13 69.23%
IM 94 139 67.63%
OBGYN 11 17 64.71%
Psych 14 23 60.87%
Urology 3 5 60.00%
PA 13 23 56.52%
Ortho 4 8 50.00%
PMR 9 21 42.86%
Pathology 8 20 40.00%
ENT 2 7 28.57%
Radiology 3 12 25.00%
Neuro 1 4 25.00%
Dental 1 5 20.00%
Derm 1 11 9.09%
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 #Qualified/Competent#Respondents%Competent 
Podiatry 0 1 0.00%
Plastics 0 1 0.00%
Table 32.   Qualified/Competent for Unstable Victims of Explosive Events by Specialty 
In the explosive scenario, of those qualified and competent to assess and 
manage unstable explosive victims, there is no significant difference between attendings, 
resident or PAs (P= 0.472), nor between those identified as having a medical or surgical 
specialty (P=0.524), nor by decade from graduation (P=0.164), nor by sex (P=0.372), nor 
by paid or voluntary status (P=0.094), nor by hospital (P=0.106). There is a significant 
difference in those currently certified in BLS (P=0.000), those currently certified in 
ACLS (P=0.000), those currently certified in ATLS (P=0.000) and those who have some 
CBRNE training (P=0.000). In addition, there is a statistically significant difference 
depending on whether physicians are full-time or part-time (P=0.007).  There is no 
significant difference between the ability of a board-certified attending and other 
clinicians (P=0.433). 
Of the 105 respondents who answer “No” or do not respond to the 
question about their current qualifications and competency to care for unstable explosive 
patients, 92 or 87.62% indicate their willingness to learn. Thirteen or 12.38% indicate 
that they are unwilling to learn.  Examining respondents willingness to learn to treat 
unstable patients from an explosive event in detail, there are statistically significant 
differences by resident, attending, or PA (P=0.015), by whether or not an attending was 
board-certified (p=0.001), by decade from graduation (P = 0.005), and by part-time or 
full-time status (P=0.000).  There was no statistically significant different between 
medical or surgical specialties (P=0.475), nor by gender (P = 0.161), nor by BLS training 
(P=0.234), nor by ACLS training (P=0.854), by ATLS training (P=0.178), nor by 
CBRNE training (P=0.834), nor by paid or voluntary status (P = 0.904).  
Of the 157 who judge themselves neither qualified nor competent for 
unstable explosive victims, 92 indicate a willingness to learn to manage unstable victims 
of explosive events. Of those 92, ninety indicate a specialty (see Table 33) and there is a 
wide range of percentages among the specialties who are willing to learn.  
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Encouragingly, all specialties have at least 50% of their physicians who are willing to 
learn to care for unstable victims of an explosive scenario.  Since numerous specialties 
are only represented by a small number of physicians, this data does not lend itself to 
robust statistical analysis.   
 
Not qualified nor competent but willing to
learn to manage unstable explosive events       
Specialty #Willing #Respondents%Willing 
Podiatry 1 1 100.00% 
Radiology 4 4 100.00% 
Plastics 1 1 100.00% 
Ortho 2 2 100.00% 
Dental 3 3 100.00% 
Surgery 1 1 100.00% 
OBGYN 4 4 100.00% 
Peds 11 11 100.00% 
Ophtho 1 1 100.00% 
Internal Medicine 29 32 90.63% 
Physician Assistant 7 8 87.50% 
PMR 10 12 83.33% 
Psych 5 6 83.33% 
Pathology 6 8 75.00% 
Neuro 2 3 66.67% 
Derm 3 6 50.00% 
Table 33.   Not Qualified/Competent for Unstable Victims of Explosive Events by 
Specialty 
(2) Stable Victims of Explosive Event.  In analyzing the results 
of the explosive scenario, 318 of 406 or 78.33% respondents indicate they are qualified 
and competent to initially assess and stabilize stable victims of explosive events. This 
includes 132 of 168 or 78.57% of the attendings and 167 of 216 or 77.31% of the 
residents and 18 of 22 or 81.82 % of the physician assistants. At Hospital A 155 of 212 or 
73.11% and at Hospital B 163 of 194 or 84% indicate they are qualified and competent to 
handle stable victims of an explosive event.  This difference is statistically significant 
(P=0.008) and may be due to the fact that Hospital B (inner city) treats more penetrating 




For Explosive Event, qualified and 
competent for stable victims       
Category #qualified/competent #Respondents %Qualified/competent 
Attendings 132 168 78.57% 
Residents 167 216 77.31% 
PA 18 22 81.82% 
Hospital A 155 212 73.11% 
Hospital B 163 194 84.02% 
Table 34.   Not Qualified/Competent for Unstable Victims of Explosive Events by 
Specialty but Willing 
 















Figure 12.   Qualified & Competent for Stable Explosive Victims by Title 
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Figure 13.   Qualified & Competent for Stable Explosive Victims by Hospital 
When examining those who indicate a specialty (n=392), there is a wide 
range of percentages amongst the specialties who feel qualified and competent to respond 
to stable victims of an explosive event.  However, since numerous specialties are only 
represented by a small number of physicians, this data does not lend itself to robust 
statistical analysis.   
 
Specialty # Qualified/Competent# Respondents %Qualified/ Competent 
Plastics 1 1 100.00% 
Orthopedics 7 7 100.00% 
EM 6 6 100.00% 
Neuro 4 4 100.00% 
Anesthesia 8 8 100.00% 
Surgery 32 35 91.43% 
Peds 40 45 88.89% 
Physician Assistant 18 21 85.71% 
Internal Medicine 112 135 82.96% 
PMR 17 21 80.95% 
Psych 18 23 78.26% 
OBGYN 12 17 70.59% 
Ophtho 8 13 61.54% 
Urology 3 5 60.00% 
Radiology 6 11 54.55% 
ENT 3 6 50.00% 
Derm 5 11 45.45% 
Dental 2 5 40.00% 
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Specialty # Qualified/Competent# Respondents %Qualified/ Competent 
Pathology 6 17 35.29% 
Podiatry 0 1 0.00% 
Table 35.   Explosive Event-Comparison between Qualified & Competent for Stable & 
Unstable 
In the explosive scenario, of those qualified and competent to assess and 
manage stable victims, there is no statistically significant difference between resident, 
attending or PA (P= 0.615), nor by medical or surgical specialty (P=0.671), nor by 
gender (P=0.884), nor by paid or voluntary status (P=0.709). There is a tendency towards 
statistical significance by decade from graduation (P=0.067). There is a statistically 
significant difference between those who have BLS (P=0.000), have ACLS (P=0.000), 
have ATLS (P=0.000) and have some CBRNE training (P=0.000). In addition, there is a 
statistically significant difference depending on whether or not physicians are full-time or 
part-time (P=0.041).  There is no statistically significant difference between board 
certified and non-board certified attendings (p=0.755). 
For stable explosive patients, of the 57 who answer that they are not 
qualified or competent, 47 or 82.46% indicate a willingness to learn. Examining 
respondents’ willingness to learn to treat stable patients from an explosive event in detail, 
there are statistically significant differences by resident, attending, or PA (P=0.027), by 
whether or not an attending is board certified (P=0.012), and by decade from graduation 
(P = 0.043).  There is a tendency toward statistical significance between whether a 
physician is full-time or part-time (P=0.60).  There is no statistically significant different 
between medical or surgical specialties (P=0.809), nor by gender (P = 0.325), nor by BLS 
training (P=0.479), nor by ACLS training (P=0.344), nor by ATLS training (P=0.894), 
nor by CBRNE training (P=0.580), nor by paid or voluntary status (P = 0.219).  
Of the 47 who indicate a willingness to learn to manage stable victims of 
explosive events, 44 indicate a specialty (see Table 36), and there is a wide range of 
percentages among the specialties who are willing to learn.  Encouragingly, all specialties 
have at least 33% of their physicians who are willing to learn to care for stable victims of 
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an explosive scenario.  Since numerous specialties are only represented by a small 
number of physicians this data does not lend itself to robust statistical analysis.  
  
Specialty #Willing #Respondents %Willing 
Podiatry 1 1 100.00%
Radiology 3 3 100.00%
PMR 2 2 100.00%
Physician Assistant 2 2 100.00%
Urology 1 1 100.00%
Surgery 2 2 100.00%
Peds 5 5 100.00%
Ophtho 3 3 100.00%
Internal Medicine 16 18 88.89%
Psych 2 3 66.67%
OB-GYN 2 3 66.67%
Pathology 4 7 57.14%
Dental 1 2 50.00%
Derm 1 3 33.33%
Table 36.   Explosive Event-Not Qualified/Competent but Willing To Learn 
(3) Comparison between Stable and Unstable Explosive Patients.  
Physicians feel more qualified and competent responding to stable patients rather than to 
unstable victims of an explosive event (78% as compared to 63%).  This result is 
expected because a stable patient allows time for clinicians to assess the patient and plan 
a management strategy. An unstable patient requires rapid troubleshooting and 
intervention, and the clinician must be much sharper in their ability to assess, sort out the 
priorities and intervene. They must know indications for medication and doses, 
indications for procedures, size of tubes etc. immediately. Stable patients may allow the 



































































Figure 14.   Explosive Event-Comparison between Qualified & Competent for Stable & 
Unstable 
As is to be expected physicians feel more qualified and competent 
responding to stable patients rather than unstable patients (Table 37). The residents 
differentiate less between the stable and the unstable patients than the attendings.  The 
differences are most notable in the physician’s assistants.  Physician assistants practice 
under the oversight of an attending physician. Their ability to manage critical patients 
without oversight will be less and they will be more comfortable managing stable 
patients.  
Interestingly, respondents are more willing to learn the skills to treat the 
unstable victims than the stable victims.  This mindset speaks to an ethical quality of 
professionals in that they will do what is necessary to assist a patient when there is no one 
else to care. They may defer to other more qualified clinicians for stable patients. 
 
 136
Willingness to Learn Explosive 











Figure 15.   Explosive Event-Not Qualified/Competent but Willing To Learn 
c. Chemical Event Scenario Results 
(1) Unstable Victims.  In analyzing the results of the chemical 
scenario, 256 of 416 or 61.54% of all respondents indicate their ability to initially assess 
and stabilize unstable victims of chemical events. This includes 106 or 173 or 61.27% of 
the attendings and 137 of 220 or 62.27% of the residents and 12 of 23 or 52.17% of the 
physician assistants.  At Hospital A, 133/ 226 or 58.85% and at Hospital B, 123/190 or 
64.74% indicate they are competent to handle unstable victims of a chemical event. 
 
Qualified/Competent for 
unstable victims of Chemical 
Event        
Category #Qualified/competent #Respondents %Qualified/competent 
Attending 106 173 61.27% 
Residents 137 220 62.27% 
PAs 12 23 52.17% 
Hospital A 133 226 58.85% 
Hospital B 123 190 64.74% 
Table 37.   Qualified/Competent for Stable Victims of Explosive Events   
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Figure 16.   Chemical Event-Qualified/Competent for Unstable Victims by Category 
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Figure 17.   Chemical Events -Qualified/Competent for Unstable Victims by Hospital  
When examining those who indicate a specialty (n=402), there is a wide 
range of percentages among the specialties who feel qualified and competent to respond 
to unstable victims of a chemical event.  However, since numerous specialties are only 
represented by a small number of physicians, this data does not lend itself to robust 
statistical analysis.  
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Qualified/Competent for unstable 
victims of chemical event:       
Specialty #Qualified/competent #Respondents %Qualified/competent 
Plastics 1 1 100.00% 
Surgery 33 36 91.67% 
Anesthesia 8 9 88.89% 
EM 6 7 85.71% 
Peds 38 46 82.61% 
Ophtho 10 13 76.92% 
Ortho 5 7 71.43% 
IM 88 139 63.31% 
GU 3 5 60.00% 
PA 12 22 54.55% 
Psych 12 22 54.55% 
OBGYN 9 17 52.94% 
PMR 9 21 42.86% 
Path 6 18 33.33% 
ENT 2 7 28.57% 
Neuro 1 4 25.00% 
Dental 1 5 20.00% 
Rad 2 11 18.18% 
Derm 1 11 9.09% 
Pod 0 1 0.00% 
Table 38.   Not Qualified/Competent for Unstable Victims of Explosive Events by 
Specialty but Willing 
In the chemical scenario, of those qualified and competent to assess and 
manage unstable chemical victims, there is no significant difference between attendings, 
resident or PAs (P= 0.861), nor between those identified as having a medical or surgical 
specialty (P=0.311), nor by decade from graduation (P=0.321), nor by sex (P=0.568), nor 
by paid or voluntary status (P=0.258), nor by hospital (P=0.219). There is a significant 
difference in those currently certified in BLS (P=0.000), those currently certified in 
ACLS (P=0.000), those currently certified in ATLS (P=0.000) and those who have some 
CBRNE training (p=0.000). In addition, there is a statistically significant difference 
depending on whether physicians are full-time or part-time (P=0.032).  There is no 




For the 115 who indicate that they are not qualified or currently competent 
to manage unstable victims of chemical events, 88 or 76.52 % indicate their willingness 
to learn.  Examining respondents willingness to learn to treat unstable patients from a 
chemical event in detail, there are statistically significant differences by decade from 
graduation (P = 0.002) and by part-time or full-time status (P=0.006).  There is no 
statistically significant difference between medical or surgical specialties (P=0.315), nor 
by resident, attending, or PA (P=0.394), nor by gender (P = 0.117), nor by BLS training 
(P=0.521), nor by ACLS training (P=0.345), by ATLS training (P=0.494), nor by 
CBRNE training (P=0.463), nor by paid or voluntary status (P = 0.448), nor by whether 
or not an attending was Board Certified (P=0.251). 
Of the 88 who indicate a willingness to learn to manage unstable victims 
of chemical events, 87 indicate a specialty (see Table 38).  There is a wide range of 
percentages among the specialties who are willing to learn.  Since numerous specialties 
are only represented by a small number of physicians, this data does not lend itself to 
robust statistical analysis.  Physicians seem to be less willing to learn skills required to 
respond to a chemical event than to learn those required to respond to an explosive event.  
This research does not explain why this case may be, but numerous hypotheses are 
possible. 
 
Not Qualified nor competent but 
willing to learn to manage unstable 
chemical victims       
Specialty #Willing to Learn #Respondents %Willing to Learn 
Podiatry 1 1 100.00% 
Radiology 4 4 100.00% 
Ortho 2 2 100.00% 
EM 1 1 100.00% 
Surgery 1 1 100.00% 
Peds 7 7 100.00% 
Ophtho 1 1 100.00% 
Anesthesia 1 1 100.00% 
Internal Medicine 34 39 87.18% 
Physician Assistant 6 7 85.71% 
OBGYN 5 6 83.33% 
PMR 8 12 66.67% 
Dental 2 3 66.67% 
Psych 6 9 66.67% 
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Not Qualified nor competent but 
willing to learn to manage unstable 
chemical victims       
Pathology 5 8 62.50% 
Neuro 1 2 50.00% 
Derm 2 7 28.57% 
Urology 0 1 0.00% 
Table 39.   Not Qualified/Competent for Unstable Victims of Explosive Events by 
Specialty but Willing 
(2) Stable Chemical Victims.  In analyzing the results of the chemical 
scenario, 317 of 396 or 80.05% respondents indicate they are qualified and competent to 
initially assess and manage stable victims of chemical events. This includes 127 of 160 or 
79.38% of the attendings and 171 of 214 or 79.91% of the residents and 19 of 23 or 82.61 
% of the physician assistants. At Hospital A, 156 of 205 or 76.10% and at Hospital B, 
161 of 191 or 84.29% indicate they are qualified and competent to handle stable victims 
of a chemical event.  This difference is statistically significant (P=0.041) and may be due 
to past training, subtle differences between urban and suburban hospitals, or the fact that 
Hospital B had a higher percentage of residents. Their more recent training, while not 




for stable victims of 
Chemical Event        
Category #Qualified/competent #Respondents %Qualified/competent 
Attending 127 160 79.38% 
Residents 171 214 79.91% 
PAs 19 23 82.61% 
Hospital A 156 205 76.10% 
Hospital B 161 191 84.29% 
Table 40.   Qualified/Competent for Stable Victims of Chemical Events   
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Figure 18.   Chemical Events -Qualified/Competent for Stable Victims by Category 
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Figure 19.   Chemical Events -Qualified/Competent for Stable Victims by Hospital 
When examining those who indicate a specialty (n=382), there is a wide 
range of percentages among the specialties who feel qualified and competent to respond 
to stable victims of a chemical event.  However, since numerous specialties are only 
represented by a small number of physicians, this data does not lend itself to robust 
statistical analysis.   
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Qualified/Competent 
for Stable Victims of 
Chemical Event       
Specialty #Qualified/Competent #Respondents %Qualified/Competent 
Plastics 1 1 100.00% 
Neuro 4 4 100.00% 
Anesthesia 9 9 100.00% 
Peds 41 44 93.18% 
Surgery 30 33 90.91% 
Physician Assistant 19 22 86.36% 
Ortho 6 7 85.71% 
Ophtho 11 13 84.62% 
EM 5 6 83.33% 
Psych 19 23 82.61% 
PMR 17 21 80.95% 
Internal Medicine 100 131 76.34% 
OBGYN 11 15 73.33% 
Dental 3 5 60.00% 
Derm 6 11 54.55% 
Urology 2 4 50.00% 
ENT 3 6 50.00% 
Radiology 4 9 44.44% 
Pathology 7 17 41.18% 
Podiatry 0 1 0.00% 
Table 41.   Qualified/Competent for Stable Victims of Chemical Events by Specialty 
In the chemical scenario, of those qualified and competent to assess and 
manage stable victims, there is no statistically significant difference between resident, 
attending or PA (P= 0.742), nor by medical or surgical specialty (P=0.409), nor by 
gender (P=0.950), nor by paid or voluntary status (P=0.917), nor by decade from 
graduation (P=0.103), nor by whether or not physicians were full-time or part-time 
(P=0.144). There is a statistically significant difference between those who have BLS 
(P=0.000), have ACLS (P=0.000), or have ATLS (P=0.000) and some CBRNE training 
(P=0.006). There is a tendency towards statistical significance between board certified 
and non board certified attendings (p=0.070). 
Of the 50 who indicate that they are not qualified or competent to manage 
stable victims of a chemical event, 36 or 72% indicate a willingness to learn. Fourteen or 
28% indicate that they are not willing to learn. Examining respondents’ willingness to 
learn to treat stable patients from a chemical event in detail, there was statistically 
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significant differences by decade from graduation (P = 0.022).  There is no statistically 
significant different between medical or surgical specialties (P=0.767), nor by resident, 
attending, or PA (P=0.408), nor by gender (P = 0.496), nor by BLS training (P=0.235), 
nor by ACLS training (P=0.962), nor by ATLS training (P=0.889), nor by CBRNE 
training (P=0.178), nor by whether or not an attending is Board Certified (P=0.218), nor 
by paid or voluntary status (P = 0.889), nor by part-time or full-time status (P=0.514). 
Of the 36 who indicate a willingness to learn to manage stable victims of 
chemical events, 35 indicate a specialty (see Table 41).  There is a wide range of 
percentages amongst the specialties who are willing to learn.  Since numerous specialties 
are only represented by a small number of physicians, this data does not lend itself to 
robust statistical analysis.   
Physicians seem to be less willing to learn skills required to respond to a 
chemical event than those required to respond to an explosive event.  This research does 
not explain why this case may be, but numerous hypotheses are possible. Perhaps this 
reluctance is due to concerns about their own health, but this theory is pure speculation 













Not Qualified Nor Competent 
But Willing To Learn to manage 
stable victims of chemical events         
By specialty #Willing To Learn #Respondents %Willing To Learn 
Radiology 3 3 100.00% 
Physician Assistant 1 1 100.00% 
EM 1 1 100.00% 
Urology 1 1 100.00% 
ENT 1 1 100.00% 
Surgery 2 2 100.00% 
Peds 3 3 100.00% 
Internal Medicine 13 16 81.25% 
Pathology 6 8 75.00% 
OBGYN 1 2 50.00% 
Psych 1 2 50.00% 
Derm 1 3 33.33% 
PMR 1 4 25.00% 
Podiatry 0 1 0.00% 
Dental 0 1 0.00% 
Table 42.   Not Qualified/Competent for Stable Victims of Chemical Events but Willing 
to Learn 
(3) Comparison between Stable and Unstable Chemical Patients.  
Physicians feel more qualified and competent responding to stable chemical patients 
rather than unstable patients (80% as compared to 62%).  This result is expected because 
stable patients allow clinicians to approach each patient methodically and there is time to 
research answers. Unstable patients require stronger clinical acumen and experience to 
deal with rapidly fluctuating signs and symptoms in an immediate time frame and require 
strong knowledge of medication dosing, effects, procedures and familiarity with 
equipment.                    
 
 145













Figure 20.   Chemical Events  -Qualified & Competent 
As is to be expected, physicians feel more qualified and competent 
responding to stable patients rather than unstable patients (Table 42). The residents 
differentiate less between the stable and the unstable patients than the attendings did. The 
differences are most notable in the physician’s assistants.   
Attendings may be less confident in their skills since they are farther from 
their Emergency Medicine training and may have been focused on specialized 
knowledge. Physician Assistants usually work under the supervision of an attending and 








































































Figure 21.   Chemical Events –Qualified & Competent by Title & Hospital 
Interestingly, respondents are more willing to learn the skills to treat the 
unstable victims than the stable victims.  Again, physicians would recognize the 
imperative to help the unstable patient to the best of their ability but would feel that the 
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Figure 22.   Chemical Events-Willingness To Learn for Stable and Unstable 
(4) Physician Willingness to Respond.  In assessing a physician’s 
willingness to respond to unstable patients from a chemical attack, only 231 physicians 
(out of 425) respond to this question giving only a 54.4% response rate for this question.  
As half of the sample refuse to answer this question, the results are suspect.  Of those 
who do answer the question, 76.62% respond that they would be willing to respond.  
Table 43 shows that of the 177 who indicate their willingness to respond, 131 judge 
themselves qualified and competent. Presumably the remaining 46 are eager to learn.  All 
but one person who feels qualified and competent to respond was willing to respond.  Of 
those who do not feel qualified and competent to respond, roughly half would be willing 
to help by whatever means they could offer. Of the 54 who are not willing to respond, 53 
judge themselves not qualified and competent.  It is unclear if they are willing to learn.   
Examining physicians’ willingness to respond to treat unstable patients 
from a chemical event in detail, there is no statistically significant difference between 
resident, attending or PA (P= 0.332), nor by medical or surgical specialty (P=0.695), nor 
by gender (P=0.635), nor by paid or voluntary status (P=0.401), nor by decade from 
graduation (P=0.174), nor by whether or not physicians are full-time or part-time 
(P=0.994), nor by whether or not an attending is board certified (P=0.159). There is a 
statistically significant difference between those who have BLS (P=0.000), have ACLS 
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(P=0.000), or have ATLS (P=0.000) and some CBRNE training (P=0.014). These results 
highlight the need to distinguish between physician willingness to respond and physician 
ability to respond as they do seem to capture two very different facets of the question. 
 






No Yes Total 
No 53 46 99 
Yes 1 131 132 
Total 54 177 231 
Table 43.   Willing to Respond vs. Qualified/Competent to Respond   
d. Comparison between Explosive and Chemical Responses 
 
































































Figure 23.   Chemical Events –Qualified & Competent by Title & Hospital 
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Within their individual category, Residents and PAs judge themselves to 
be more qualified and competent to handle unstable explosive victims than unstable 
chemical victims, and least qualified and competent for unstable chemical victims of all 
the scenarios.  Attendings are almost equally qualified and competent for either unstable 
scenario, perhaps reflecting more confidence and clinical acumen.  Respondents at both 
hospitals self-assess themselves to be more qualified and competent for unstable 
explosive victims than unstable chemical victims. These findings perhaps reveal concern 
for clinicians’ own health.  
Across groups, the residents are more qualified and competent than 
attendings for the victims of the unstable explosive scenario, but equally qualified and 
competent as the attendings for the unstable chemical scenario. The PAs self-assess 
themselves to be decidedly less qualified and competent for both unstable scenarios but 
judge themselves more qualified and competent than both attendings and residents for the 
stable scenarios. Hospital B respondents feel more qualified and competent for all 
scenarios than Hospital A, perhaps reflecting a difference in their patient population and 
clinical experience and the higher percentage of residents.  
Willingness to learn is highest for unstable explosive where the need is 
great and the personal risk to the practitioner is low. There is less willingness for stable 
explosive victims where the clinician response time could be slower and patients could 
safely await the arrival of experienced clinicians. There is least willingness for unstable 
chemical patients, perhaps reflecting concern for their personal safety.  Also, blunt and 
penetrating trauma is more common in trauma centers, and may be less intimidating than 
the chemical exposures which are much less frequent particularly in the urban 
environment. 
4.   Logit Analysis     
Having explored which potential explanatory variables are statistically different 
between individuals who answered yes or no to the ability to respond in various 
scenarios, this paper now examines whether it is possible to develop a predictive model 
for these responses.  Since the independent variable is binary, a logistic (logit) model is 
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most appropriate.  The best model is developed for each question and then the best 
overall model for all four response scenarios is developed.  To measure and compare the 
logit models, this research examines the goodness of fit test using Pearson’s chi-squared 
test, the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz’s Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC), the area under the ROC curve (which provides a measure of predictive 
power), and the percent correctly classified.  Models that failed the goodness of fit test 
were eliminated.  To choose the best individual model I choose the model that has the 
lowest AIC score (tolerance ≤ 1.0) and for those where I judge the AIC to be equivalent, I 
choose the model with the lowest BIC score. To choose the best overall model, I choose 
the model with the lowest BIC score to choose the most parsimonious model. 
Throughout this section, I use the following explanatory variables. 
 ACLS–a yes/no indicator for whether physicians have had ACLS training 
 ATLS–a yes/no indicator for whether physicians have had ATLS training 
 BLS–a yes/no indicator for whether physicians have had BLS training 
 duration–the number of years since graduation from medical school 
 FTorPT–a yes/no indicator for whether physicians are full-time or part-
time 
 Hosp–an indicator for Hospital A and Hospital B 
 HospStand–an indicator that is the cross product of whether the 
physician is a resident, attending, or physician’s assistant and 
whether the physician is at Hospital A or Hospital B 
 NoCBRNE–a yes/no indicator for whether physicians have had 
any CBRNE training 
 ResAttPA–an indicator variable for whether the physician is a 
resident, attending, or physician’s assistant 
 Status–an indicator that is the cross product of whether the 
physician is a resident, attending, or physician’s assistant and 
whether the physician is full-time or part-time.   
a. Explosive Scenario 
(1) Unstable Explosive Patients.  There are several models that 
are almost equivalent in performance to the best model as can be seen in Table 44.  Using 
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our decision criteria, the model that best fit the responses to physician’s assessment of 
whether they feel qualified and competent to respond to an unstable victim is based on 
whether or not the physician has any CBRNE training, has BLS training, has ACLS 
training, has ATLS training, is a resident, attending or physician’s assistant, and the 
duration since medical school graduation.   
 
Explanatory variables 
included in the model 








ACLS; ATLS; duration; 
ResAttPA 
0.25 .81 75.9% 371.5 413.8
Status; NoCBRNE; 
BLS; ACLS; ATLS; 
duration 
0.11 .81 74.5% 373.8 423.8
FTorPT; NoCBRNE; 
BLS; ACLS; ATLS; 
duration; Hosp 
0.25 .80 73.6% 374.5 416.8
NoCBRNE; BLS; 
ACLS; ATLS; duration 
**  
0.25 .80 74.2% 377.1 411.6
NoCBRNE; BLS; 
ACLS; ATLS; duration; 
Hosp  
.013 .81 72.5% 376.3 414.7
(note:  highlighted model is the best one for unstable, explosive patients,  
** model is the best performing model across all four response scenarios) 
Table 44.   Model Comparison Question 1-Unstable Explosive 
 Statistics 
xi: logit  Q1ans  NoCBRNE i.BLS i.ACLS i.ATLS  duration i.ResAttPA 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        345 
                                                    LR chi2(10)     =     106.60 
                                                     Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -174.7467              Pseudo R2       =     0.2337 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
              Q1ans |      Coef.         Std. Err.      z       P>|z|        [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     NoCBRNE |   -.4074708   .2770702    -1.47   0.141    -.9505184     .1355768 
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         _IBLS_2 |   -.1706457   .3920403    -0.44   0.663    -.9390306     .5977391 
         _IBLS_3 |   -.7571116   .4562252    -1.66   0.097    -1.651296     .1370734 
      _IACLS_2 |  -1.674533    .3623407    -4.62   0.000    -2.384707    -.9643579 
      _IACLS_3 |   -.2900811   .4410639    -0.66   0.511     -1.15455      .5743882 
      _IATLS_2 |  -2.169537    .6518303    -3.33   0.001    -3.447101    -.891973 
      _IATLS_3 |  -1.185525    .8148265    -1.45   0.146    -2.782556     .4115052 
          duration |     .0011589   .0155252     0.07   0.940      -.02927       .0315878 
_IResAttPA_2 |   -.831605     .3668091    -2.27   0.023    -1.550538    -.1126725 
_IResAttPA_3 |  -1.314766    .5312608    -2.47   0.013    -2.356018    -.2735144 
              _cons |   3.896427    .6783945     5.74   0.000     2.566798     5.226056 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 45.   Logistic Regression Question 1- Unstable Explosive Patients     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             Q1ans |   Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z        P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     NoCBRNE |    .6653309   .1843434    -1.47   0.141     .3865406    1.145197 
         _IBLS_2 |    .8431202   .3305371   -0.44   0.663     .3910067    1.818004 
         _IBLS_3 |    .4690192   .2139784   -1.66   0.097     .1918011    1.146912 
      _IACLS_2 |    .1873957   .0679011   -4.62   0.000     .0921159     .3812279 
      _IACLS_3 |    .7482029   .3300053   -0.66   0.511     .3151992    1.776044 
      _IATLS_2 |    .1142305   .0744589   -3.33   0.001     .0318378     .4098463 
      _IATLS_3 |    .3055856   .2489992   -1.45   0.146     .0618801    1.509088 
          duration |  1.00116       .0155432     0.07   0.940     .9711542   1.032092 
_IResAttPA_2 |   .43535       .1596903    -2.27   0.023     .2121339     .8934432 
_IResAttPA_3 |   .2685371   .1426632    -2.47   0.013     .0947969     .7607014 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




NoCBRNE = 0 have had some CBRNE training, NoCBRNE = 1 have not had any 
CBRNE training.  Therefore, someone who has had some CBRNE training is more likely 
to respond than someone who has not had any training.  The odds of responding are 1.5 
(1/.665) times greater for those who have had some training.  This variable is not 
statistically significant. 
 
BLS = 1 currently certified, BLS = 2 never certified, BLS = 3 once certified 
Therefore, someone who was once certified is much less likely to respond than someone 
who is currently certified.  The odds of responding are 2.1 (1/.469) times greater for those 
who have had current training over those whose training is not current and it is not 
statistically significant.  The odds of responding are 1.2 (1/.843) times greater for those 
who have had current training over those who have never had and it is not statistically 
significant response. 
 
ACLS = 1 currently certified, ACLS = 2 never certified, ACLS = 3 once certified 
Therefore, someone who was never certified is much less likely to respond than someone 
who is currently certified.  The odds of responding are 5.3 (1/.187) times greater for those 
who have had current training and it is statistically significant.  In addition, those who 
were once certified are also less likely to respond than someone who is currently 
certified.  The odds of responding are 1.3 (1/.7480) times greater for those who have had 
current training and but this variable is not statistically significant. 
 
ATLS = 1 currently certified, ATLS = 2 never certified, ATLS = 3 once certified 
Therefore, someone who was never certified is much less likely to respond than someone 
who is currently certified.  The odds of responding are 8.8 (1/.114) times greater for those 
who have had current training and it is statistically significant.  In addition, those who 
were once certified are also less likely to respond than someone who is currently 
certified.  The odds of responding are 3.3 (1/.306) times greater for those who have had 
current training and but this variable is not statistically significant. 
Duration = number of years out of medical school.  This variable is not significant and 
the odds ratio is approximately one. 
 154
ResAttPA = 1 Resident, ResAttPA = 2 Attending, ResAttPA = 3 Physician’s Assistant 
Therefore, an attending physician is less likely to respond than a resident.  The odds of 
responding are 2.3 (1/.435) times greater for residents and it is statistically significant.  A 
physician’s assistant is less likely to respond than a resident.  The odds of responding are 
3.7 (1/.269) times greater for residents and it is statistically significant.   
 Classification Ability of the Logistic Model  
I next calculated how well the model was able to classify 
physicians as to whether or not they would feel qualified and competent to respond to 
unstable victims of an explosive event.  I compare the model predictions with the actual 
results obtained from the survey to calculate the model’s sensitivity, specificity, positive 
and negative predictive value, and the percent correctly classified. 
             -------- True -------- 
Classified |         D            ~D  |      Total 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
     +     |       179            46  |        225 
     -     |        37            83  |        120 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
   Total   |       216           129  |        345 
 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as Q1ans != 0 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   82.87% 
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   64.34% 
Positive predictive value        Pr( D| +)   79.56% 
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   69.17% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
False + rate for true ~D         Pr( +|~D)  35.66% 
False - rate for true D          Pr( -| D)    17.13% 
False + rate for classified +    Pr(~D| +)  20.44% 
 155
False - rate for classified -    Pr( D| -)    30.83% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Correctly classified                        75.94% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Table 47.   Model Fit Question 1- Unstable Explosive Patients    
(2) Stable Explosive Patients.  There are several models that 
are almost equivalent in performance to the best model as can be seen in Table 48.  Using 
our decision criteria, the model that best fit the responses to physician’s assessment of 
whether they feel qualified and competent to respond to a stable victim is based on 
whether or not the physician has any CBRNE training, has BLS training, has ACLS 
training, has ATLS training, is located at hospital A or hospital B, and the duration since 
medical school graduation 
 
Explanatory variables 
included in the model 







NoCBRNE; BLS; ACLS; 
ATLS; duration ** 
0.10 .79 78.7% 279.0 308.7 
FTorPT; NoCBRNE; BLS; 
ACLS; ATLS; duration; Hosp 
0.18 .79 81.4% 279.1 316.2 
NoCBRNE; BLS; ACLS; 
ATLS; duration; Hosp 
0.12 .79 81.4% 277.3 310.7 
NoCBRNE; BLS; ACLS; 
ATLS; duration; HospStand 
0.15 .80 81.2% 276.9 321.0 
(note:  highlighted model is the best one for stable, explosive patients,  
** model is the best performing model across all four response scenarios) 
Table 48.   Model Comparison Question 3- Stable Explosive Patients 
 Statistics 
xi:logit  Q3ans  NoCBRNE i.BLS i.ACLS i.ATLS duration i.Hosp 
Logistic regression                              Number of obs   =        301 
                                                      LR chi2(8)      =      62.35 
                                                   Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -129.64705            Pseudo R2       =     0.1938 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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           Q3ans |      Coef.           Std. Err.      z        P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   NoCBRNE |   -.9103098    .3509841    -2.59    0.009    -1.598226   -.2223936 
       _IBLS_2 |   -.58465       .4240387    -1.38    0.168    -1.415751    .2464505 
       _IBLS_3 |    .0047276   .5181053     0.01     0.993     -1.01074    1.020195 
    _IACLS_2 |  -1.288383    .4620783    -2.79    0.005     -2.19404   -.3827257 
    _IACLS_3 |    -.7764694  .5554945    -1.40    0.162    -1.865219    .3122797 
    _IATLS_2 |  -1.404883    .8116718    -1.73    0.083     -2.99573    .1859646 
        duration |   -.0325341   .0139682    -2.33    0.020    -.0599113    -.005157 
     _IHosp_2 |    .6714362    .3491302     1.92    0.054    -.0128464    1.355719 
           _cons |   4.11553       .8130802     5.06    0.000     2.521923    5.709138 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 49.   Logistic Regression Question 3 - Stable Explosive Patients  63 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Q3ans |   Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z       P>|z|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 NoCBRNE |   .4023995    .1412358    -2.59   0.009     .202255      .8006002 
     _IBLS_2 |   .5573009   .2363171    -1.38   0.168     .2427433    1.279476 
     _IBLS_3 |  1.004739    .5205605     0.01   0.993     .3639495    2.773736 
  _IACLS_2 |   .2757164   .1274026    -2.79   0.005     .1114656      .6819999 
  _IACLS_3 |   .4600273   .2555426    -1.40   0.162     .1548624    1.366537 
  _IATLS_2 |   .2453958   .1991808    -1.73   0.083     .0500001    1.20438 
      duration |   .9679894   .0135211    -2.33   0.020     .9418481      .9948563 
   _IHosp_2 |  1.957046    .6832638      1.92   0.054     .9872357    3.879548 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




NoCBRNE = 0 have had some CBRNE training, NoCBRNE = 1 have not had any 
CBRNE training.  Therefore, someone who has had some CBRNE training is more likely 
to respond than someone who has not had any training.  The odds of responding are 2.5 
(1/.402) times greater for those who have had some training.  This variable is statistically 
significant. 
 
BLS = 1 currently certified, BLS = 2 never certified, BLS = 3 once certified 
Therefore, someone who was never certified is less likely to respond than someone who 
is currently certified.  The odds of responding are 1.7 (1/.557) times greater for those who 
have had current training but this variable is not statistically significant.  In addition, 
there is no difference in likelihood of response between those who were once certified 
and those who are currently certified (OR~1) and this variable is not statistically 
significant. 
 
ACLS = 1 currently certified, ACLS = 2 never certified, ACLS = 3 once certified 
Therefore, someone who was never certified is much less likely to respond than someone 
who is currently certified.  The odds of responding are 3.6 (1/.276) times greater for those 
who have had current training and it is statistically significant.  In addition, those who 
were once certified are also less likely to respond than someone who is currently 
certified.  The odds of responding are 2.2(1/.460) times greater for those who have had 
current training and but this variable is not statistically significant. 
 
ATLS = 1 currently certified, ATLS = 2 never certified, ATLS = 3 once certified 
Therefore, someone who was never certified is much less likely to respond than someone 
who is currently certified.  The odds of responding are 4.07 (1/.245) times greater for 
those who have had current training and this variable is not statistically significant.  Note: 
IATLS = 3 predicts success perfectly (i.e., all who were once certified feel qualified and 
competent to respond to stable victims) so this variable was dropped and 27 observations 




Duration = number of years out of medical school.  This variable is significant (P=0.020) 
and every year further removed from medical graduation makes the person less likely to 
respond. 
Hosp_1 = Hospital A, Hosp_2 = Hospital B 
Therefore, physicians at hospital A are half (0.51) as likely as physicians from Hospital B  
to respond..  These odds of response are tending towards statistical significance (P=0.54).   
 Classification Ability of the Logistic Model  
I next calculate how well the model is able to classify physicians as 
to whether or not they would feel qualified and competent to respond to stable victims of 
an explosive event.  I compare the model predictions with the actual results obtained 
from the survey to calculate the model’s sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative 
predictive value, and the percent correctly classified. 
              -------- True -------- 
Classified |         D            ~D  |      Total 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
     +     |       222            45  |        267 
     -     |        11            23  |         34 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
   Total   |       233            68  |        301 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as Q3ans != 0 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   95.28% 
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   33.82% 
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   83.15% 
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   67.65% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   66.18% 
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)    4.72% 
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   16.85% 
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False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   32.35% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Correctly classified                        81.40% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Table 51.   Model Fit Question 3 - Stable Explosive Patients 
b. Chemical Scenario 
(1) Unstable Chemical Patients.  There are several models that 
are almost equivalent in performance to the best model as can be seen in Table 52.  Using 
our decision criteria, the model that best fit the responses to physician’s assessment of 
whether they feel qualified and competent to respond to an unstable victim is based on 
whether or not the physician has any CBRNE training, has BLS training, has ACLS 
training, has ATLS training, is a resident, attending or physician’s assistant, and the 
duration since medical school graduation.   
 
Explanatory variables 
included in the model 








BLS; ACLS; ATLS; 
duration 
0.08 .80 72.8% 371.0 409.3
NoCBRNE; BLS; 
ACLS; ATLS; duration 
** 
0.09 .80 72.5% 372.3 406.8
NoCBRNE; BLS; 
ACLS; ATLS; duration; 
ResAttPA 
0.09 .81 75.2% 367.5 409.5
FTorPT; NoCBRNE; 
BLS; ACLS; ATLS; 
duration; ResAttPA  
0.06 .81 74.0% 368.8 414.7
(note:  highlighted model is the best one for unstable, chemical patients,  
** model is the best performing model across all four response scenarios) 






xi: logit  Q5ans  NoCBRNE i.BLS i.ACLS i.ATLS  duration i.ResAttPA 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        338 
                                                    LR chi2(10)     =     102.98 
                                                    Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -172.74528                        Pseudo R2       =     0.2296 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              Q5ans |      Coef.        Std. Err.       z      P>|z|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      NoCBRNE |  -.5531956     .2780881    -1.99   0.047    -1.098238   -.0081529 
         _IBLS_2 |   -.3935312    .3984343    -0.99   0.323    -1.174448    .3873857 
         _IBLS_3 |   -.7334209    .4585733    -1.60   0.110    -1.632208    .1653662 
      _IACLS_2 |  -1.396097     .3621947    -3.85   0.000    -2.105986   -.6862085 
      _IACLS_3 |    -.1473394   .4413449    -0.33   0.738    -1.01236      .7176808 
      _IATLS_2 |   -2.259406     .6535209    -3.46   0.001    -3.540283  -.9785281 
      _IATLS_3 |   -.9907545    .8388342    -1.18   0.238    -2.634839    .6533302 
          duration |    .0168683    .0159718     1.06    0.291    -.0144358    .0481724 
_IResAttPA_2 |   -.9758841    .3745638    -2.61   0.009    -1.710016   -.2417526 
_IResAttPA_3 |   -.9647497    .5362553    -1.80   0.072    -2.015791    .0862913 
              _cons |   3.744164     .6802093      5.50   0.000     2.410979     5.07735 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 53.   Logistic Regression Question 5 - Unstable Chemical Patients 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              Q5ans |  Odds Ratio   Std. Err.       z        P>|z|        [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      NoCBRNE |   .5751091    .159931      -1.99   0.047      .333458    .9918803 
         _IBLS_2 |    .6746703    .2688118    -0.99   0.323     .3089894    1.473125 
         _IBLS_3 |    .4802633    .2202359    -1.60   0.110     .1954974    1.179825 
      _IACLS_2 |    .2475613    .0896654    -3.85   0.000     .1217256    .5034814 
      _IACLS_3 |    .8630011    .3808811    -0.33   0.738     .3633606    2.049674 
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      _IATLS_2 |     .1044125   .0682358    -3.46   0.001     .0290051    .3758639 
      _IATLS_3 |     .3712964   .3114561    -1.18   0.238     .0717305    1.921931 
          duration |   1.017011     .0162435     1.06   0.291     .9856679    1.049352 
_IResAttPA_2 |    .376859     .1411577    -2.61   0.009      .180863    .7852504 
_IResAttPA_3 |    .3810786   .2043554     1.80    0.072      .133215    1.090124 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 54.   Logistic Odds Ratios Question 5 - Unstable Chemical Patients 
NoCBRNE = 0 have had some CBRNE training, NoCBRNE = 1 have not had any 
CBRNE training.  Therefore, someone who has had some CBRNE training is more likely 
to respond than someone who has not had any training.  The odds of responding are 1.7 
(1/.575) times greater for those who have had some training.  This result is statistically 
significant. 
 
BLS = 1 currently certified, BLS = 2 never certified, BLS = 3 once certified 
Therefore, someone who was once certified is much less likely to respond than someone 
who is currently certified.  The odds of responding are 1.5 (1/.675) times greater for those 
who have had current training over those who have never had training but this variable is 
not statistically significant.  The odds of responding are 2.1 (1/.480) times greater for 
those who have had current training over those whose training is not current but this 
variable is also not statistically significant. 
 
ACLS = 1 currently certified, ACLS = 2 never certified, ACLS = 3 once certified 
Therefore, someone who was never certified is much less likely to respond than someone 
who is currently certified.  The odds of responding are 4.0 (1/.248) times greater for those 
who have had current training and it is statistically significant.  In addition, those who 
were once certified are also less likely to respond than someone who is currently 
certified.  The odds of responding are 1.2 (1/.863) times greater for those who have had 
current training and but this variable is not statistically significant. 
ATLS = 1 currently certified, ATLS = 2 never certified, ATLS = 3 once certified 
Therefore, someone who was never certified is much less likely to respond than someone 
who is currently certified.  The odds of responding are 9.6 (1/.104) times greater for those 
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who have had current training and it is statistically significant.  In addition, those who 
were once certified are also less likely to respond than someone who is currently 
certified.  The odds of responding are 2.7 (1/.371) times greater for those who have had 
current training and but this variable is not statistically significant. 
 
Duration = number of years out of medical school.  This variable is not significant and 
the odds ratio is approximately one. 
 
ResAttPA = 1 Resident, ResAttPA = 2 Attending, ResAttPA = 3 Physician’s Assistant 
Therefore, an attending physician is less likely to respond than a resident.  The odds of 
responding are 2.7 (1/.377) times greater for residents and it is statistically significant.  A 
physician’s assistant is less likely to respond than a resident.  The odds of responding are 
2.6 (1/.381) times greater for residents and this result is tending towards statistical 
significance (P=0.072).   
 Classification Ability of the Logistic Model  
I next calculate how well the model is able to classify physicians as 
to whether or not they would feel qualified and competent to respond to unstable victims 
of a chemical event.  I compare the model predictions with the actual results obtained 
from the survey to calculate the model’s sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative 
predictive value, and the percent correctly classified. 
              -------- True -------- 
Classified |         D            ~D  |      Total 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
     +     |       176            50  |        226 
     -     |        34            78  |        112 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
   Total   |       210           128  |        338 
 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as Q5ans != 0 
-------------------------------------------------- 
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Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   83.81% 
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   60.94% 
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   77.88% 
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   69.64% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   39.06% 
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)   16.19% 
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   22.12% 
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   30.36% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Correctly classified                        75.15% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Table 55.   Model Fit Question 5 - Unstable Chemical Patients 
(2) Stable Chemical Patients. There are several models that are 
almost equivalent in performance to the best model as can be seen in Table 56.  Using our 
decision criteria, the model that best fit the responses to physician’s assessment of 
whether they feel qualified and competent to respond to an stable victim is based on 
whether or not the physician has BLS training, has ACLS training, has ATLS training, 
and the duration since medical school graduation.   
Explanatory variables 









No CBRNE; BLS; ACLS; 
ATLS; duration ** 
0.35 .80 80.1% 261.3 290.9 
No CBRNE; BLS; ACLS; 
ATLS; duration; Hosp 
0.15 .80 83.8% 260.2 293.4 
BLS; ACLS; ATLS; duration 0.20 .79 81.1% 260.8 286.7 
BLS; ACLS; ATLS; 
duration; Hosp  
0.11 .80 81.8% 260.1 289.6 
(note:  highlighted model is the best one for stable, chemical patients,  
** model is the best performing model across all four response scenarios) 
Table 56.   Model Fit Question 5 - Unstable Chemical Patients 
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 Statistics 
Logistic regression                             Number of obs   =        297 
                                                   LR chi2(6)      =      57.48 
                                                   Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -123.41345             Pseudo R2       =     0.1889 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Q7ans |      Coef.         Std. Err.       z      P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   _IBLS_2 |  -1.063144   .4125407    -2.58   0.010    -1.871709   -.2545789 
   _IBLS_3 |  -.2803167   .5008941    -0.56   0.576    -1.262051    .7014176 
_IACLS_2 |  -1.569371   .5010724    -3.13   0.002    -2.551455   -.5872868 
_IACLS_3 |  -1.241896   .6014198    -2.06   0.039    -2.420657   -.0631349 
_IATLS_2 |  -.9735121   .8312102    -1.17   0.242    -2.602654      .65563 
    duration |  -.0347304   .0142954    -2.43   0.015     -.0627488    -.006712 
        _cons |   3.987253   .7928104     5.03    0.000    2.433373    5.541133 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 57.   Logistic Regression Question 7 - Stable Chemical Patients 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Q7ans | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   _IBLS_2 |   .3453683   .1424785    -2.58   0.010     .1538605      .7752429 
   _IBLS_3 |   .7555444   .3784477    -0.56   0.576     .2830728    2.016609 
_IACLS_2 |   .2081762   .1043113    -3.13   0.002     .0779682      .5558333 
_IACLS_3 |   .2888361   .1737117    -2.06   0.039     .0888632      .9388168 
_IATLS_2 |   .377754     .313993      -1.17   0.242     .0740767    1.926356 
    duration |   .9658658   .0138074    -2.43   0.015     .9391793      .9933105 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




BLS = 1 currently certified, BLS = 2 never certified, BLS = 3 once certified 
Therefore, someone who was never certified is less likely to respond than someone who 
is currently certified.  The odds of responding are 2.9 (1/.345) times greater for those who 
have had current training and this result is statistically significant.  The odds of 
responding are 1.3 (1/.756) times greater for those who have had current training over 
those whose training is not current but this variable is not statistically significant. 
 
ACLS = 1 currently certified, ACLS = 2 never certified, ACLS = 3 once certified 
Therefore, someone who was never certified is much less likely to respond than someone 
who is currently certified.  The odds of responding are 4.8 (1/.208) times greater for those 
who have had current training and it is statistically significant.  In addition, those who 
were once certified are also less likely to respond than someone who is currently 
certified.  The odds of responding are 3.5 (1/.288) times greater for those who have had 
current training and this variable is statistically significant as well. 
 
ATLS = 1 currently certified, ATLS = 2 never certified, ATLS = 3 once certified 
Therefore, someone who was never certified is less likely to respond than someone who 
is currently certified.  The odds of responding are 2.6 (1/.378) times greater for those who 
have current training but this variable is not statistically significant.  Note: IATLS = 3 
predicts success perfectly (i.e., all who were once certified felt qualified and competent to 
respond to stable victims) so this variable was dropped and 25 observations were not 
used. 
Duration = number of years out of medical school.  This variable is significant (P=0.015) 
and every year further removed from medical graduation make the person less likely to 
respond. 
 Classification Ability of the Logistic Model  
I next calculate how well the model is able to classify physicians as 
to whether or not they would feel qualified and competent to respond to stable victims of 
a chemical event.  I compare the model predictions with the actual results obtained from 
the survey to calculate the model’s sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative 
predictive value, and the percent correctly classified. 
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              -------- True -------- 
Classified |         D            ~D  |      Total 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
     +     |       226            47  |        273 
     -     |         9            15  |         24 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
   Total   |       235            62  |        297 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as Q7ans != 0 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   96.17% 
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   24.19% 
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   82.78% 
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   62.50% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   75.81% 
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)    3.83% 
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   17.22% 
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   37.50% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Correctly classified                        81.14% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Table 59.   Model Fit Question 7 - Stable Chemical Patients  
c. Overall Model and Summary 
In looking for a global model that works well for all four questions, I 
focus on the most parsimonious model as determined by the BIC score.  Every question 
could obtain better AIC scores by including an additional variable in the model (though 
not the same variable).  However, one model provides the best BIC score in three out of  
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the four questions (Questions 1, 3, and 5).  In the fourth question (Question 7) a simpler 
model is better; however, the chosen model scored third in BIC and is close in absolute 
terms of BIC value. 
The overall predictor model that best fits the responses to physician’s 
assessment of whether they feel qualified and competent to respond in each of the four 
cases is based on whether or not the physician has any CBRNE training, has BLS 
training, has ACLS training, has ATLS training, and the duration since medical school 
graduation.   
For the individual questions, additional information relating either to the 
hospital of service or the physician’s standing as a resident, attending or physician’s 
assistant could provide additional accuracy.  This finding is most likely related to the fact 
that in the crosstab assessments, the number of full-time and part-time individuals is 
statistically different between those who judge themselves qualified and competent and 
those who do not.  However, when creating the models, those that include the variable FT 
or PT have higher (worse) AIC and BIC values than those that do not.  Therefore, this 
variable is not included in the final models.  Further analysis shows that the number of 
full-time and part-time employees tend toward statistically significant differences 
between the hospitals (p=0.06) and is statistically different between residents, attendings, 
and Physician’s assistants (p=0.000).  Neither of these latter two variables is individually 
significantly different between those who judge themselves qualified and competent and 
those who do not.  Additionally, the number of residents, attendings, and physician’s 
assistants tend toward statistically significant differences between the hospitals 
(p=0.066).   Additional interaction variables are developed and tested in the logit models–
the first, a classification by full-time or part-time and standing (resident, attending, or 
PA); the second, a classification by hospital and standing; and the third, a classification of 
hospital and fulltime or part-time, and the fourth, a classification by hospital, full-time or 
part-time, and standing–but none of these variables improve all of the logit models.  The 
cross between hospital and standing produces a good model for Question 3 and the cross 
between standing and fulltime/part-time produces a good model for Question 1.  I tested  
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for multicollinearity in Stata between the variables (FTorPT, Hosp, ResAttPA) and did 
not find any using collin.  Therefore, while there is likely confounding between these 
variables, the exact nature of the relationship is unclear.   
Finally, even though duration (time since graduation) is not statistically 
significant in all of the logistic regressions, its inclusion did greatly improve model 
goodness of fit, AIC, BIC, and the percent correctly classified. 
The overall results show that the information needed to best predict 
physician’s self-reported assessment of qualification and competency for all four 
scenarios is based on their training histories (BLS, ACLS, ATLS, and CBRNE) and time 
since graduation. 
5.   Summary Results of the Likert Questions  
Several statements are presented and the respondents are asked to rate their beliefs 
about the statement on a scale from 1 to 5 where score 1 was “Strongly Agree” and score 
5 was “Strongly Disagree.” There were four broad categories of statements, including the 
roles of the clinician in disaster response, barriers to participating in either a response or 
in training for a response, how training should be implemented and who should 
implement it.  Summaries of the results are presented below.  For more detail on the exact 
responses, please see Appendix D.  
a. The Role of the Clinician in a Disaster 
There were five questions relating to physician’s perception as to their role 
and responsibilities in responding to a natural disaster.  
 “Medical Specialists Have Skills Applicable to a Catastrophic Response 
Team.” The average score for all respondents is 2.18 (Std. Dev.0 .94). 
Residents, Hospital B and female respondents and those who graduated 
between 1980 and 1989 agree with this statement more than their 
counterparts. 
 “Medical Professionals Have an Ethical Responsibility to Respond.”  The 
average score for all respondents is 1.72 (Std. Dev. 0 .78). Residents and 
PAs, Hospital B and those who graduated before 1980 agree with this 
statement more than their counterparts. 
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 “Medical Professionals are Receptive to Additional Training that Enables 
them to Provide Additional Assistance during Catastrophic Events.”  The 
average score for all respondents is 1.88 (Std. Dev. 0 .76). Residents and 
PAs, Hospital B, female and those who graduated between 1990 and 1999 
agree with this statement more than their counterparts. 
 “Medical Specialists are Receptive to Assistance from Other Professionals 
during a Catastrophic Event.”  The average score for all respondents is 
1.76 (Std. Dev. 0.69) with residents, Hospital B, female and those who 
graduated from 1990-1999 agree with this statement more than their 
counterparts. 
 “Training in CBRNE Should be Mandated for all Physician’s/Pas.” The 
average score is 2.48 (Std Dev. 1.16) with Residents, PAs, females, 
Hospital B respondents and those who graduated between 2000 and 2008 
being more agreeable than their counterparts. 
In conclusion, respondents feel that they have clinical skills that could be 
useful in a catastrophic response effort. They feel that they have an ethical responsibility 
to respond and that other clinicians would be receptive to their assistance. They are 
receptive to additional training to enable them to respond. Respondents are neutral about 
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Figure 24.   Likert Graph for Role of the Clinician in a Disaster 
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b. Concerns or Barriers to Participation 
There are six questions designed to assess why physicians may not feel 
comfortable responding to disasters or taking part in trainings to respond to disasters. 
 “I Have Concerns about Risk and Malpractice.” The average score for all 
respondents is 2.25 (Std. Dev. 0.94) with Attendings, Hospital A, female 
and those who graduated between 1990 and 1999 and those who graduated 
before 1980 being more concerned than their counterparts. 
 “Training Costs are a Concern.” The average score for all respondents is 
2.44 (Std. Dev. 0.95) with Attendings, Hospital A, female and graduates 
from 2000-2008 being more concerned than their counterparts. 
Reimbursement for education may be inconsistent at facilities and 
between attendings and residents. 
 “Amount of Training Time is a Concern.” The average score for all 
respondents is 2.28 (Std. Dev. 0.90) Attendings, Hospital A, female and 
those who graduated before 1980 have greater concerns than their 
counterparts.  This concern may be the result of attendings having to 
generate revenue and demonstrate productivity and RVUs. Females may 
have increased family responsibilities. 
 “The Cost of My Time for Training is a Concern.” The average score for 
all respondents is 2.25 (Std. Dev. 0.95). Females and those who graduated 
between 1990 and 1999 and before 1980 have more concern than their 
counterparts. PAs and Hospital B respondents show considerably less 
concern than their counterparts. 
 “I Have Concerns that I Can Learn These Skills.” The average score for all 
respondents is 3.21 (Std. Dev. 1.12). Attendings, PAs, Hospital A, female 
and graduates before 1980 have greater concerns than their counterparts. 
 “I Have Concerns about Retention of These Skills.” The average score for 
all respondents is 2.88 (Std. Dev. 1.14).  PAs, females and those who 
graduated before 1980 and between 2000 and 2008 have greater concerns 
than their counterparts. 
In conclusion, respondents have mild concerns about risk and malpractice. 
They show some concern for the cost of training, the time involved in training and the 
cost for the time in training (lost revenue, CME time). Respondents have fewer concerns 
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Figure 25.   Likert Graph for Concerns and Barriers to Participation  
c. Conditions of Participation 
There are six questions to assess how physicians feel that a training 
program would best be implemented. 
 “Training in CBRNE Should be Mandated for all Physicians/PAs.” The 
average score for all respondents is 2.72 (Std Dev. 1.20). Residents, PAS, 
Hospital B, and females agree more strongly than their counterparts. 
 “CBRNE Training Should be Standardized across all Disciplines.” The 
average score for all respondents is 2.35 (Std. Dev. 1.12) with Residents, 
PAs, Hospital B, females agreeing more strongly than their counterparts. 
 “Retraining in CBRNE Should Occur at Regular Intervals.” The average 
score for all respondents is 2.16 (Std. Dev. 0.95) Residents, PAs, Hospital 
B, females and those who graduated since 1990 feel more strongly than 
their counterparts. 
 “CBRNE Training Should be a Requirement for Medical Board 
Credentialing/Re-credentialing.” The average score for all respondents is 
3.12 (Std. Dev. 1.23).Residents, PAS, Hospital B, and females agree more 
strongly than their counterparts. 
 “CBRNE Training Should be a Requirement for a State Medical License.” 
The average score for all respondents is 3.22 (Std. Dev. 1.22). Hospital B 
and females agree more strongly than their counterparts. Those who 
graduated before 1999 disagree. 
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 “CBRNE Training Should be a Requirement for Board 
Certification/Recertification.” The average response for all respondents is 
3.19 (Std. Dev. 1.23). Attendings and PAs, Hospital A, males and those 
who graduated before 1999 disagree more than their counterparts. 
In conclusion, while clinicians tend to agreed that CBRNE training should 
be standardized and offered on a regular basis, they tend to disagree that CBRNE should 
be mandated or made a requirement for state medical licensure, for Medical Board 
















































Figure 26.   Likert Graph for Conditions for Participation  
d. Training Preferences 
There are seven questions to assess whom physicians thought should best 
conduct training programs. 
 “Postgraduate CBRNE Response Training Should be Conducted by the 
Hospital.” The average score for all respondents is 2.18 (Std. Dev. 0.93). 
Residents and PAs, Hospital B, females and those who graduated between 
2000 and 2008 agree more strongly than their counterparts. 
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 “Postgraduate CBRNE Response Training Should be Conducted by the 
Department of Health.” The average score for all respondents is 2.49 (Std. 
Dev. 0.97). Residents, Hospital B, females and those who graduated 
between 2000 and 2008 agree more strongly than their counterparts. 
 “Postgraduate CBRNE Response Training Should be Conducted by the 
Medical Society.” The average score for all respondents is 2.78 (Std. Dev.  
0.98). Hospital B and females feel more strongly than their counterparts. 
 “Postgraduate CBRNE Response Training Should be Conducted by the 
CDC.” The average response for all respondents is 2.54 (Std. Dev. 0.96). 
Hospital B, females and those who graduated from 2000-2008 feel more 
strongly than their counterparts. 
 “Postgraduate CBRNE Response Training Should be Conducted by 
Private Organizations such as the American Heart Association.” The 
average score is 2.68 (Std. Dev. 0.96). Those who graduated before 1980 
disagree the most with their counterparts 
 “Postgraduate CBRNE Response Training Should be Conducted by a 
National Specialty Society such as the American College of Physicians.” 
The average score for all respondents is 2.69 (Std. Dev. 0.95). Those who 
graduated before 1980 disagree more than their counterparts. 
 “Postgraduate CBRNE Response Training should be Conducted by the 
U.S. military.” The average score for all respondents is 2.48 (Std. Dev. 
0.99). Those who graduated before 1980 disagree more than their 
counterparts with this statement. 
In conclusion, clinicians tend to prefer that training be conducted by their 
hospital. They tend to less agreement with the Medical Society, private organization and 
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Figure 27.   Likert Graph for Training Preferences 
e. Open Ended Questions 
At the end of the survey, physicians and physician assistants are asked a 
series of open-ended questions where they could provide additional input if they so 
desired. Approximately half of the physicians chose to respond. 
Physicians are asked what subject matter for CBRNE training they would 
like to receive. The responses are centered on structured algorithmic training such as 
courses similar to ACLS and ATLS. Many respond with various combinations of the 
subject matter (i.e., Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or Explosive) or all of 
them. Responses include, “all that is available,” “ACLS,” “ATLS,” “emergency medicine 
residency,” and “emergency care management.” Many physicians indicate that they 
would be very interested in additional training. Several indicate that this topic is very 
interesting to them. They want to participate and would like to learn more. A few indicate 
that they are not interested. 
The physicians are asked specifically what type of training they feel they 
would want to prepare to assess and manage victims of explosive and chemical events. 
The responses cover a wide range of opinions. Scenarios, simulations, drills, and 
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practical, hands-on course similar to the life support courses are the most common 
responses. Some indicate that the practice aspect of this response should be incorporated 
into regular hospital disaster drills and simulations as well as during regular Continuing 
Medical Education (CME) or Grand Rounds. Others speak to the need to standardize 
training while others call for the development of guidelines and manuals. More than half 
of those who give an opinion indicate that field training and simulations or drills would 
be valuable. Approximately one-third indicate that classroom training is valuable. Less 
than a quarter indicate that they want on-line or tele-conferencing training. In summary, 
those who respond have very differing ideas and there is no consensus. This question 
represents an area for further research. 
Physicians are also asked to provide ideas for what they feel would be 
conditions for the training to be successful. The main themes from these responses are 
that the training should be voluntary, should be started early in medical school and should 
be conducted in the hospital where it could begin at orientation and continue on a regular 
basis at conferences and drills. Some suggest that this education needs to be promoted to 
gain greater acceptance by the medical community. Several speak to the need for 
enthusiastic, effective and qualified instructors. 
Participants at both hospitals were asked what barriers to CBRNE training 
they envision. Many say training should be voluntary; not mandated. A few are 
concerned that specialists and non-ED physicians would be able to learn the material and 
required skills. Some speak about sustainability and retention of this knowledge and the 
skills. However, the majority of respondents voice concerns about time for training and 
express concerns about the cost of training both in money (absolute cost, lost revenue) 
and time (personal time vs. hospital time, using or losing dedicated CME hours to this 
training, convenient scheduling and location, arranging coverage for patients during these 
activities). Several indicate that time should be provided during the workday by the 
hospital and that the hospital should absorb the costs of training. A few respondents 
indicate concerns about having malpractice liability should they be called to respond. In 
summary, the main concerns seem to center around the logistical issues surrounding time 
and money. 
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6.   Chapter Summary and Discussion 
At the outset, this thesis sought to determine if non-EM and Trauma clinicians 
had knowledge and procedural skills from current or previous experience that could be 
enhanced to allow these clinicians to assist EM and Trauma clinicians under a tiered 
supervision system in the assessment and stabilization of victims of explosive or 
chemical events in the initial “Golden Hour” when rapid intervention may positively 
affect patient outcome and may enhance the hospital response to a mass casualty event. 
This tiered supervision system is already familiar to most physician graduates of training 
programs and especially Emergency Medicine physicians. One of the hallmarks of the 
Emergency Medicine Residency Training program is graduated responsibility, whereby 
the Post Graduate Year I resident (PGYI) is supervised by the PGY II resident, who takes 
direction from the chief resident, who in turn is supervised by an Attending Physician. 
This model allows the attendings management and procedural skill expertise to extend to 
many patients at once and serves as a force multiplier. The attending steps in to assist if 
they detect any difficulty or delay. 
This thesis identifies a limited exposure in two hospitals to the didactics of 
CBRNE. When each scenario is presented and each piece of the resuscitation is explored, 
clinicians have skills or familiarity with skills that could be exploited in the early 
management of these victims. Clinicians who indicate that they do not have the skills but 
still feel qualified and competent may be thinking that in their hospital, other resources 
are at hand to assist them. For example, intubation may be a crucial procedure for these 
patients. Clinicians who cannot intubate may know that they can ventilate and get an 
immediate anesthesia consult in their hospital. 
Skills that might be crucial in the short-term assessment and stabilization of 
victims of explosive or chemical events are airway management (including positioning, 
use of adjuncts, suctioning, use of medications to control secretions and definitive 
intubation.) Also crucial are patient assessment and stabilization, including interpretation 
of vital signs and monitoring, and management of resuscitation fluids for both types of 
victims. For the explosive victim, assessment of internal hemorrhage and the need for and 
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administration of blood and blood products and control of external hemorrhage are 
important skills. Also crucial in a chemical event are the management of seizures. Less 
crucial but helpful skills in any scenario might be the ability to triage at secondary sites, 
the ability to clean and dress a wound, splint, and suture simple lacerations. This plan will 
provide timely assessment of large numbers of patients and management of wounds to 
improve outcome, stabilize fractures, manage pain, and expedite transfer to other 
facilities or alternate care sites. Clinicians with these skills are helpful to move patients 
safely and promptly through the ED and minimize the distraction of these patients from 
the major resuscitation efforts. 
For the unstable victim of the explosive event, at least one CBRNE training made 
the clinician 1.5 times more likely to respond than someone who is not trained. This 
variable was not statistically significant. Current BLS certification makes the clinician 
2.1 times more likely to respond than someone who has remote BLS training. This 
variable was not statistically significant. The difference between those who are currently 
trained versus those who were never trained is not statistically significant. Those who 
have had training know it is harder than those who have never had training. Current 
ACLS training makes the clinician 5.3 times more likely to respond than those who have 
never been certified, and this variable is statistically significant. Current ACLS 
certification makes the clinician 1.3 times more likely than someone who was once 
certified, and this variable is not statistically significant. Current ATLS certification 
makes the clinician 8.8 times more likely to respond than someone who was never 
certified in ATLS, and this variable is statistically significant. Current ATLS certification 
makes the clinician 3.3 times more likely to respond than someone who was once 
certified, and this variable is not statistically significant. Years from medical school 
graduation is not statistically significant. Resident physicians are 2.3 times more likely to 
respond than attendings and 3.7 times more likely to respond than Pas.  Both findings are 
statistically significant. 
For stable explosive victims, any CBRNE training makes the clinician 2.5 times 
more likely to respond that those who receive no training. This variable is statistically 
significant. Current BLS training makes the clinician 1.7 times more likely to respond 
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than someone who was never certified and there is no difference in likelihood to respond 
than someone with remote training. Neither variable were statistically significant. Current 
ACLS training makes the clinician 3.6 times more likely to respond than someone who 
was never certified. This variable is statistically significant. Current ACLS training 
makes the clinician 2.2 times more likely to respond than someone who was once 
certified. This variable is not statistically significant. ATLS certification makes the 
clinician equally likely to respond than someone who was once certified, and this variable 
is not statistically significant. ATLS certification makes the clinician 4.03 times more 
likely to respond than someone who was never certified, and this variable is not 
statistically significant. More recent medical school graduates are more likely to respond 
and this variable is statistically significant. Hospital B clinicians are 1.9 times more likely 
to respond and this tends toward significance (P=0.054). 
For unstable chemical event victims, any CBRNE training makes the clinician 1.7 
times more likely to respond, and this variable is statistically significant. Current BLS 
certification makes the clinician 1.5 times more likely to respond than someone who was 
never certified and 2.1 times more likely than someone who was once certified. Neither is 
statistically significant. Current ACLS makes the clinician 4.0 times more likely to 
respond than someone who was never certified, and this variable is statistically 
significant. Current ACLS certification makes the clinician 1.2 times more likely to 
respond than someone who was once certified, and this variable is not statistically 
significant. Current ATLS certification makes the clinician 9.6 times more likely to 
respond than someone who was never certified, and this variable is statistically 
significant.  However, current ATLS certification makes the clinician only 2.7 times 
more likely than someone who was once certified, and this variable is not statistically 
significant. Number of years since medical school is not statistically significant. 
Residents are 2.7 times more likely to respond than attendings and this variable is 
statistically significant. Residents are 2.64 times more likely than PAs to respond, and 
this variable tends toward statistical significance (P=0.072). 
For stable chemical victims, current BLS certification makes the clinician 2.9 
times more likely to respond than someone who was never certified, and this variable is 
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statistically significant. Current BLS certification makes the clinician 1.3 times more 
likely to respond than someone who was once certified, and this variable is not 
statistically significant. Current ACLS certification makes the clinician 4.8 times more 
likely to respond than someone who was never certified, and 3.5 times more likely than 
someone who was once certified. Both results are statistically significant. Current ATLS 
certification makes the clinician 2.6 times more likely to respond than someone who was 
never certified, but this variable is not statistically significant. Years from medical school 
graduation is statistically significant. For each year away from medical school 
graduation, the clinician is less likely to respond. 
 
Conclusion Model Summary     
     
Unstable Victim of Explosive Event     
    More likely to respond if:   P= 
         Current ACLS Certification compared to never certified 5.3x  0.000 
         Current ATLS Certification compared to never certified 8.8x  0.001 
         Residents compared to attending 2.3x  0.023 
         Residents compared to Physician Assistant 3.7x  0.013 
Stable Victim of Explosive Event     
    More likely to respond if:     
         Any CBRNE compared to none 2.5x  0.009 
         Current ACLS certification compared to never certified 3.6x  0.005 
         More recent medical school graduates  **  0.020 
         Hospital B respondents 1.9x  0.054 
Unstable Victim of Chemical Event     
    More likely to respond if:     
         Any CBRNE training compared to none 1.7x  0.047 
         Current ACLS certification compared to never certified 4.0x  0.000 
         Current ATLS certification compared to never certified 9.6x  0.001 
         Residents compared to attending 2.7x  0.009 
         Residents compared to Physician Assistant 2.64x  0.072 
Stable Victims of Chemical Event     
    More likely to respond if:     
         Current BLS certification compared to never certified 2.9x  0.010 
         Current ACLS certification compared to never certified 4.8x  0.002 
         Current ACLS certified compared to once certified 3.5x  0.039 
         More recent medical school graduates  *  0.015 
* This decreases incrementally each year. 
Table 60.   Conclusion Model Summary 
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In an overall sense, the best model to predict the number of physicians who are 
likely to self-assess themselves as being qualified and competent to respond to victims in 
each of the four scenarios-unstable explosive victims, stable explosive victims, unstable 
chemical victims, stable chemical victims is based on whether or not the physician has 
current Life Support training (BLS, ACLS, ATLS), some CBRNE training and the 
duration since medical school graduation. While duration (time since graduation) is not 
statistically significant in all of the logistic regressions, its inclusion does greatly improve 
goodness-of-fit and the percent of physicians who are correctly classified as to whether 
they feel they are qualified and competent. This result is important because it highlights 
the fact that the best predictor of a physician’s response in an emergency event is their 
training history, far outweighing all other considerations.  
Many clinicians resist, delay and reason against required Life Support training.  
They use arguments against “cookbook medicine.” They indicate that they do not need 
the training/retraining, that they already have the training by virtue of their Board 
certification, and that these courses are just money-making enterprises sponsored by 
organizations that operate outside of the hospital arena and do not relate to them. Yet 
these qualifications are the exact trainings that are present in those who self-assess 
themselves qualified and competent. 
The model offers challenges to the healthcare community to encourage and 
motivate training in Life Support.  The house of medicine must decide if this training can 
be done with modifications for special situations of the current widely-available courses 
to provide a framework for approaching and managing the victims of scenarios such as 
are studied in this thesis. Alternatives may include promotion of the newer but less 
available Basic Disaster Life Support Course, and/or the Advanced Disaster Life Support 
Course developed by the University of Georgia in conjunction with the American 
Medical Association.  
Alternatively, each Board of Medical Specialty could offer training and 
competency testing and certification in the management of victims of CBRNE events and 
perhaps offer an added qualification to Board certification as an incentive. This proposal 
could provide powerful motivation for physicians, and leverage for improving the 
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preparedness of all physicians. The ABMS would have to actively participate to ensure 
that the individual boards are not stove-piped and integration between specialties.  
Integration is needed in a hospital for a successfully prepared team to administer an 
effective response. 
The model supports that those qualified and competent have some CBRNE 
training although there are more variations in training for these subjects and less 
availability and less requirements for training. Training currently exists for all 
responders. Some training is quite basic and some is quite technical and specialized. 
Choosing relevant and physician-specific training will be crucial to ensure physician 
interest and participation. In addition, the model shows that the qualified and competent 
are the more recent medical school graduates.  That data suggests that exposure to the 
didactics of the CBRNE agents and the overview of response should begin in medical 
school and continue into residency. 
This information is useful to planning and oversight agencies responsible for 
improving healthcare preparedness and response especially as it relates to curriculum 
development and to federal funding agencies to allocate scarce preparedness dollars most 
appropriately. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare response is one crucial step in the continuum of emergency response. 
All hospitals are required to have well-rehearsed disaster response plans. The plans are 
often based on traditional responders performing traditional response one patient at a time 
supplementing staff from a distance. These plans are insufficient for a mass casualty 
event such as an explosive or chemical event where time of response is a crucial factor in 
a successful response. Barbera and McIntyre,241 the Arizona Chapter of the American 
College of Emergency Physicians242 and others have identified the lack of capacity.  The 
Society of Academic Emergency Medicine has questioned the adequacy of surge 
capability.243 
The medical community must take preparedness for victims of explosive and 
chemical events to a new level as suggested by the AMA.244  All practitioners should be 
able to care for CBRNE victims.  The medical community must look at the scenarios and 
the time frame of response.  They must strategize together to build alliances and foster 
willingness on the part of practitioners in a horizontally and vertically integrated response 
plan. Integration in healthcare response involves all the steps that take the victim to 
definitive care as safely and expeditiously as possible. The continuum begins with first 
responders–especially EMS–moves to the ED, the OR and the ICU, and perhaps transfers 
to tertiary care hospitals. Integration between departments and providers within a hospital 
                                                 
241 J. Barbera, A. Macintyre, and C. DeAtley, Ambulances to Nowhere: America’s Critical Shortfall in 
Medical Preparedness for Catastrophic Terrorism (BCSIA Discussion Paper 2001-15, ESDP Discussion 
Paper ESDP2001-07 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 14. 
242 Arizona College of Emergency Physicians, Position Statement on the Critical State of Emergency 
Care in Arizona (Phoenix, AZ: Arizona College of Emergency Physicians, 2000), 
http://www.azceorg/er_crowding/position.pdf (accessed January 12, 2007). 
243 Sally Phillips, ”Current Status of Surge Research,” Academic Emergency Medicine 13, no. 11 
(November 2006): 1103. 
244 American Medical Association, Physician Obligation in Disaster Preparedness and Response, 
Policy of American Medical Association, E-9,067 Issued December 2004, Adopted June 2004, 1, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=resultLinkanddoc=policyfiles/HnE/E- (accessed 
June 23, 2007).  
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is equally important for a well-timed escalation of surge capability. Enhanced integration 
may require that providers step out of traditional roles.  They must incorporate their 
talents in an improved, coordinated response that is appropriate for the realities of this 
decade, and give consideration to lessons learned and best practices developed from the 
experience of other countries and the United States military.  
This research explores whether there are qualified and competent physician 
resources within a hospital that, when configured differently, could make this happen. 
Rather than building a response effort that relies on outside professional assistance that 
may never respond in the appropriate time frame, and rather than committing precious 
federal dollars to many projects that may never provide an improved response capability, 
this research looks at the current capabilities in terms of numbers of clinicians and 
abilities present within two hospitals. It provides a snapshot view of clinician 
background, training, abilities, willingness to learn and comments. It assesses clinician-
perceived preparedness and willingness to learn to participate in a response effort for the 
two scenarios of explosive and chemical events. By deconstructing the response effort for 
these two scenarios into individual required tasks and querying clinicians about ability for 
each task, it is clear that organization of these clinicians around these tasks and rethinking 
the response framework along different lines of authority could improve a hospital 
response for the scenarios of an explosive or chemical event where time of response is a 
crucial factor in a successful outcome for the greatest number of patients. 
Medical leadership must take a step back and create a transformation of 
healthcare preparedness and response such that physicians are educated and trained. 
B.  REVIEW OF SURVEY FINDINGS 
1. Demographics  
The survey was completed by 401 physicians representing 19 specialties and 24 
physician assistants at two hospitals. There was a response rate of 43.10%. Males 
represent 60.90%. Resident physicians represent 52.24%, attending physicians 42.12% 
and PAs 5.65% of the total. Of the 179 attending physicians, 79.89% are board certified, 
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12.29 % are board eligible, and 7.82% do not respond to the question. Fifty percent 
graduated within the past 10 years. Two hundred ninety-three respondents identify 
themselves as trained in medical specialties and 95 identify themselves as trained in 
surgical specialties.  The remainder identify themselves as physician assistants or do not 
provide a primary specialty code.  Ninety percent of the physicians are employed in full-
time positions; 10% in part-time positions.  Many of those physicians who are part-time 
at a hospital are likely to have multiple appointments in different hospitals.   
2. Training 
The results of training are interesting in that 18.35% have never been certified in 
Basic Life Support, 36.47% have never been certified in Advanced Cardiac Life Support 
and 78.12% have never been certified in Advanced Trauma Life Support. Yet, these 
courses provide a framework of rapid emergency response, including teaching procedures 
necessary to manage victims of these two scenarios and many respondents indicate that 
they want additional similar training. Only 42.59% have any training in CBRNE. 
3. Scenarios 
a. Explosive Scenario 
For the unstable victim of an explosive, 62.88% indicate that they are 
qualified and competent to evaluate and stabilize them. There is a statistically significant 
difference in perception of qualified and competent if the respondent is BLS, ACLS or 
ATLS certified or have any CBRNE training. For those who judge themselves neither 
qualified nor competent for an unstable explosive victim, 87.62% indicate that they are 
willing to learn. There is a statistically significant difference in willingness between 
resident, attending and PA; year of graduation; board certification status; and part- or 
full-time employment.  
For stable victims of explosive events, 78.33% indicate that they are 
qualified and competent to manage stable explosive victims. Of the 57 who indicate that 
they are neither qualified nor competent, 82.46% indicate a willingness to learn. There is 
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a tendency toward statistical significance by year of graduation and a statistical difference 
exists for those with current BLS, ACLS, ATLS certification or any CBRNE training. For 
those who are neither qualified nor competent for stable victims but willing to learn to 
manage victims of explosive events, there is a statistically significant difference between 
resident, attending and PA; by decade of graduation; by attending board certification 
status; and a tendency for statistical significance for full-time as compared to part-time 
physicians. 
b. Chemical Scenario 
For unstable victims of chemical events, 61.54% indicate that they are 
qualified and competent for unstable victims of a chemical event. There is a statistical 
significance for those who are qualified and competent if they are currently BLS, ACLS, 
ATLS certified and have some CBRNE training. For those who are neither qualified nor 
competent, 76.52% indicate a willingness to learn. There is statistical significance if they 
are more recent graduates or full-time. 
For stable chemical victims, 80.05% indicate that they are qualified and 
competent to manage these victims. There is statistical significance for those who are 
currently certified in BLS, ACLS, ATLS and have any CBRNE training. For those who 
are neither qualified nor competent, 72% indicate a willingness to learn. There is 
statistical significance for more recent graduates. 
In a multivariate logit analysis, the explanatory variables included in the 
best model to predict the likelihood of physician’s perceived ability to respond in any/all 
of these four scenarios are: whether or not physicians had BLS, ACLS., ATLS, CBRNE 
training and the number of years since medical school graduation.  This model has the 
best goodness of fit and predictive ability across all four scenarios.  The most important 
factors affecting a physician’s perceived ability to respond are their levels of training and 
the relative recentness of that training.  
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C. RISK PERCEPTION MODIFIERS  
Physicians learn by training and develop confidence by experience. Yet there is 
no standardized curriculum and only 42.59% have some CBRNE training. Few U.S. 
physicians have practical experience with these types of events. Responses about needed 
training are very diverse, reflecting the different ways individuals learn. Some 
respondents express concern about their ability to learn the skills and to retain them. 
Many respondents do not respond to questions about what type of training they would 
like to have, perhaps reflecting their inexperience with the topics. Some want frequent 
retraining; one wants a specialty residency. Of those who voice a choice, many request 
algorithmic courses that they are familiar with such as ACLS, ATLS and CBRNE 
training. 







Table 61.   Physician Choices for Training  
D.  RESPONSE BARRIERS AND ENABLERS  
Several clinicians express concerns about malpractice and liability coverage. 
Recent pediatric literature raises issues around these matters during Hurricane Katrina 
response.245 
Respondents indicate that ease of access to training, the cost of training, the 
amount of time it takes to train, the ability to take the time, which would require alternate 
coverage for their position and patients, putting responsibilities on hold and the loss of 
revenue for that training period are all of concern. The regularity of the training is a  
 
                                                 
245 Committee on Pediatric Emergency Medicine, Committee on Medical Liability and the Task Force 
on Terrorism, “The Pediatrician and Disaster Preparedness,” Pediatrics 117 (2006): 563-564. 
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concern. They want convenient scheduling. Some are concerned that this training would 
interfere with their ability to take other continuing medical education. A few specifically 
request competent, credible faculty. 
Respondents are less enthusiastic about mandated training or requiring training 
for hospital medical staff credentialing, for state medical licensure or for specialty board 
certification. As a group, they are more enthusiastic to have training given by their 
hospital than by any other outside or professional agency, perhaps reflecting their 
concerns about convenience and cost. Residents are more likely to want training than 
attendings or PAs. Since they are all graduates, they do not call for training in medical 
school, although some did have it in medical school. 
E.  MOTIVATORS AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE  
No respondents offer any solid comments about motivators. This shortcoming 
offers a challenge for future research. Yet many are clear that they do not want training 
mandated or required for any step along their career path such as licensure, medical board 
credentialing, and board certification. Most indicate that they want training integrated 
into their day-to-day lifelong learning. 
Several clinicians voice surprise and intrigue at the survey. They never pictured 
themselves as part of an initial response team. They never sought any related training. 
They never thought that there would be a need for their skills outside of their specialty. 
They did not know if they would be allowed to help. Individual physicians and 
organizations representing physicians and hospitals have witnessed Oklahoma City, the 
collapse of the World Trade Towers and the London and Madrid bombings and know that 
physicians and hospitals have cared for all those mass casualty victims in a short period 
of time. However, cognitive dissonance prevents them from believing that they will ever 
need to respond. 
There are limited organized efforts to improve individual hospital surge capability 
and regional hospital surge capability at a national or professional level. Successes in 
improving capability come from local grassroots communities of practices where like-
minded professionals strategize to improve preparedness in their community. The rest of 
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the medical community is unaware of the imperative, have other priorities, are otherwise 
occupied, or are disturbingly disinterested. At the hospitals surveyed, some did not want 
to complete the survey. Some do not want any more information. 
F.  SUMMARY 
This study in two hospitals shows interest and ability on the part of these 
clinicians. Many comment during the survey process that this topic is important and they 
would like to know more. A standardized, compact, inexpensive, well-publicized and 
easily accessible curriculum with some incentive to pursue education and training by 
clinicians of all specialties would go a long way to raising the level of discussion in the 
medical community. Disaster planning could then move to a more comprehensive, 
interdisciplinary approach that does not rely solely on Emergency Department and 
Trauma physicians. This strategy will improve hospital preparedness to handle mass-
casualty events.  
All hospitals can review this research in light of their own institution. While the 
numbers will be different for each institution, the research suggests that building blocks 
of a response effort are present in every hospital and in many departments to improve and 
ensure enhanced surge capability to manage terrorist or natural mass casualty events. 
These qualified and capable individuals, and those willing to be educated, need to 
integrate and leverage into a coordinated, multi-specialty framework to strengthen 
hospital preparedness and resiliency for improved patient outcomes.  
Hospital preparedness and response can and must be strengthened, but it may not 
be in the control of the individual hospital to accomplish it. The impetus may have to 
come from the larger organized medical community of professional organizations that 
can improve and encourage training in WMD, beginning in medical school and 
continuing into residency and through life-long learning in the postgraduate years. It can 
empower specialties to cross traditional lines of authority to build a canvas across 




there is ability and willingness. While not currently structured or promoted, a new 





V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.  STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS AND 
RESPONSE 
The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands 
bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and 
try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another.246 
FDR 1932  
1. The Challenge 
The challenge facing the U.S. medical community is to develop a mass-casualty 
surge capability and resiliency. Medical response capability is an important component of 
Homeland Security preparedness. The times demand a new strategy for improving surge 
capability to meet the needs of patient care in the event of an explosive or chemical event 
in which the timeline for intervention is a crucial parameter in the effectiveness of the 
response and the outcome of the victims. It is a component of a trust compact with the 
American public. 
The U.S. medical community must accept that acts of terrorism are a new reality 
for their practice. The American College of Surgeons’ Board of Governors states, “The 
threats posed by Acts of Civilian Terrorism (ACT) require a new level of preparedness 
and a new level of knowledge by surgeons.”247 This applies to all practitioners. HSPD 21 
supports initiatives to develop disaster medical capability.248 The U.S. medical 
community can initiate change by accepting studies that indicate a rate limiting factors in 
medical response is the number of trained clinicians.  They can accept data that all 
                                                 
246 James MacGregor Burns, Transforming Leadership (Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2003), 
22. 
247 Statement on Unconventional Acts of Civilian Terrorism: A Report from the Board of Governors, 
American College of Surgeons 2001, http://www.facs.org/civiliandisasters/statement.html (accessed 
December 9, 2006).  
248 Foundation of American Sciences, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-21.htm (accessed 
October 30, 2008). 
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response is local, and that alternatives such as DMAT teams or Medical Reserve Corps 
will not be in place for hours to days.  Acknowledging the serious consequences of these 
explosive or chemical agents, the U.S. medical community has a responsibility to 
strategize to build a framework that improves the ability of healthcare to respond.  
Hospitals cannot drive preparedness initiatives since they face serious financial 
challenges and constraints, which cause them to re-organize, to right-size and to reinvent 
themselves. They are giving limited attention to preparedness. The leadership to develop 
this discipline must come from the physician community.  
The medical community consists of professionals from many disciplines and 
specialties. This research demonstrates that these professionals, if given the appropriate 
challenge in the appropriate framework and opportunities for education, have indicated 
their ability to respond. It indicates a level of interest for participation by many 
physicians from a wide cross section of specialties.  
Medical leadership must define the body of knowledge and then determine the 
most effective training methods to guarantee the competencies are achieved. Further 
study must determine how best to disseminate the information and maintain the skills. 
Building the framework of response can be done by developing and integrating 
communities of practice within the medicine community that will challenge traditional 
disaster planning and will motivate and encourage practitioners to participate. 
The biggest challenge is transforming reluctant organizations to allow physicians 
to participate in cross specialty activities. 
2. The Vision 
In fulfillment of the trust embodied in the healthcare community by the public and 
in fulfillment of the physician’s Hippocratic Oath, a new strategy is necessary to enable 
the healthcare community to care adequately for the population involved in a mass 
casualty event. Emergency Department and Trauma physicians are trained, but in 
insufficient numbers to manage a mass casualty event in the immediate time frame. 
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The vision is that each hospital would be able to call upon physicians immediately 
available within their institutions to mount a massive, effective, efficient and timely 
response to the scenarios of terrorism or other mass casualty events in their community 
whether the hospital is a designated trauma center or not; whether urban, suburban or 
rural.  
Physicians cover these topics in medical school in some form and perhaps in 
rotations during medical school or residency and postgraduate training. Many of the 
management skills and procedures involved in response to WMD relate to others disease 
processes as well. However, physicians have limited knowledge about the intellectual as 
well as the operational aspects of terrorism response. These subjects are minimally 
addressed in some specialty literature.  Most physicians have been comfortable expecting 
that the Emergency Department physician or surgeon will care for these victims, denying 
the massive response that might be necessary. Maybe no one has asked physicians to 
prepare or participate. Maybe it is expected that physicians are all-knowing and are 
prepared to handle any emergency. Perhaps they do not have sufficient insight to 
understand the challenges of a response effort of massive scope. Perhaps physicians 
believe that they are unable to participate since they are limited by their specialty, their 
credentials, their hospital, their department, their malpractice coverage or their regulatory 
agencies. Maybe leadership is denying that these events are possible in their community. 
If dissected into the specific, individual skills necessary to stabilize these patients 
in the “Golden Hour,” many respondents indicate that they have or had the skills. The 
challenge is to refresh these skills into competencies and organize these skills into a 
framework to support and supervise the individual clinician. The non–Emergency 
Department or trauma physician may not have the didactics of trauma and CBRNE 
agents and may not know how to assess these patients, but they may have used the skills 
in other situations. With some education and training, the individual clinician can easily 
learn how the skills fit together in the assessment and management of these victims. 




Department and trauma physicians can guide and support less experienced physicians in a 
graduated responsibility model that will extend the expertise of Emergency Department 
and trauma physicians to many patients. 
This survey of physicians and physician assistants reveals that the majority of 
respondents feel they are qualified and competent with the skills that may be required to 
manage these victims. Others have indicated their willingness to learn. With some 
education, reeducation and reframing, physicians can understand that much of what they 
know and the skills they once mastered can extend to this new imperative. Newer training 
methods such as procedure simulations and online training and interactive activities can 
be very engaging and productive and should be promoted to improve preparedness. 
Why is a resilient system not in place? Whatever the cause, the medical 
community has the building blocks already available waiting for the guidance, 
organization and direction to orient them into a disaster medical capability that will 
improve preparedness and response. This challenge is relatively simple and solvable. It is 
analogous to the patient who has the right medication but does not take it for various 
reasons. He does not get the benefit and may suffer the consequences. Healthcare has the 
building blocks of physician resources, but they are not being applied effectively to 
ensure the benefit. We should not have to experience the consequences. 
Actualization of this vision requires leadership; commitment of mind, money and 
time; standardization; and coordination.  
B.  THE VALUE PROPOSITION 
To earn the trust of the American public, the House of Medicine must reorganize 
itself in a major way. This transformational change should result in a Blue Ocean 
Strategy,249 a value proposition so innovative that it involves a major shift in strategy that 
crosses borders, changes rules and develops a new framework that aligns innovation with 
                                                 
249 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston, MA, 2005), 4. 
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improved usefulness and reasonable cost.250 Concerning disaster medical capability, the 
value is improved surge capability in the immediate time frame in all hospitals at all 
times and improved outcome for more victims as well as restoration of public trust. The 
cost is dollars in a time of limited Homeland Security dollars, time commitment, cost 
factors or the pain and uncertainty of change. 
In this strategy model, other physicians present in the hospital who have been 
reeducated in the medicine and procedures that they once learned could assist in the 
Emergency Department in the initial hour under the supervision of Emergency 
Department and trauma physicians. The Trauma physician can direct triage and direct 
staging while the ED physician can direct stabilization. Each Emergency Department or 
trauma physician could supervise, mentor, and monitor several physicians or physician 
assistants, each of whom could care for a few patients at a time.  
 






















































































































































Figure 28.   Strategy Canvas   
                                                 
250 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston, MA, 2005), 13. 
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This strategy offers several significant and unique advantages to overall 
preparedness.  This tiered response immediately leverages the abilities of the Emergency 
Department physicians and trauma surgeon allowing many more patients to be evaluated, 
stabilized and managed in the immediate time frame. It improves a hospital’s self-
sufficiency, which is important for both urban as well as rural hospitals. Hospitals can 
then integrate their trained physicians into their response model. It obviates concerns 
about diverting patients to trauma hospitals since experiences in Japan,251 Madrid252 and 
other countries show that the system of diversion becomes overwhelmed. It minimizes 
the cost of assembling, training, transporting and putting up response teams. It allows for 
integration of newer theories about trauma management such as the field forward 
hospitals of the military, which have yet to become part of civilian response. It is reliable, 
rapid, and well-rehearsed. 
Current strategies for disaster planning exclude much talent. This research 
examines the decisive issue of whether non–Emergency Department or non-trauma 
physicians possess skills, abilities or experiences relevant to the assessment and 
stabilization of victims of chemical or explosive mass casualty events and whether they 
would be willing to train to participate in a response. The answer is that a majority feel 
qualified and competent. Others are willing to learn.  
C.  BUILDING A FRAMEWORK 
This strategy to improve medical surge capability is rather simple and intuitive. 
The framework uses physicians immediately available in a tiered graduated response 
model with Emergency Department physicians and surgeons assessing and directing 
management that is carried out by other clinicians. Instead of building more DMATs or 
larger MRCs and metropolitan region response teams, this strategy relies on the  
 
                                                 
251 T. Okumura, and K. Suzukiet al., “The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack: Disaster Management, Part 2: 
Hospital Response,” Academic Emergency Medicine 5, no. 6 (1998): 618-624. 
252 J. P. Gutierrez de Cebellos, F. Turegano Fuentes, D. Perez, D. Diaz, M. Sanz Sanchez, C. Martin 
Llorente, J. E. Guerrero Sanz, “Casualties Treated at Closest Hospital in the Madrid March 11 Terrorist 
Bombings,” Critical Care Medicine, (1 Suppl) (January 31, 2005): S107-12, 107. 
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willingness and abilities of physicians immediately available. It requires the cross 
training of all willing participants. The U.S. military and the Israeli medical community 
have been cross training their medical corps for years.  
The physician response to Hurricane Katrina, the World Trade Center bombings, 
Oklahoma City bombings, the Avianca Plane crash and other disasters speaks to the skills 
possessed by physicians, some of whom are specialists not involved in trauma, and their 
willingness to respond in an emergency. This research confirms that likelihood. For the 
immediate events, it would be most helpful if physicians have CBRNE training and 
disaster training regardless of their departments and specialties. 
In disaster events, regulations, privileges and policies all go by the wayside in an 
attempt to save a life. As we seek to build a disaster medical capability, some of these 
artificial barriers must be reconsidered and redeveloped in advance. In terms of disaster 
response, policies should specifically allow and encourage clinicians to prepare in teams 
and respond in teams to save many lives. Such a new construct may shift organizational 
alliances and cross traditional lines of authority, affiliation and certification. In actuality, 
it simply requires a new mindset, and ongoing training and competencies for clinicians.  
Physician certification organizations, hospital regulatory agencies, specialty 
organizations, DHHS and DHS should authorize and encourage some paper changes in 
regulations, privileges and policies. 
Constructing the framework starts with DHS and DHHS to provide leadership, 
direction and ownership. In consultation with the ABMS and with the support of its 
individual Boards, ACGME and its RRCs and the AAMC, they must develop a model 
that leverages those resources already present in a hospital along guidelines determined 
and promulgated by them. They must decide on the clinical and operational training 
requirements for physicians willing to participate in response efforts. They must 
determine who will provide education and training, how they will offer it, and determine 
what standards prepare a clinician to be a responder. They must strategize to provide the 




major disruption in the day-to-day practice of medicine. They must strategize to create a 
win-win situation for the practitioner and the hospital in an era of limited dollars and 
limited time availability.  
Supported by their licensing and regulatory bodies, hospitals and networks must 
set the training and certification standards.  They must build internally upon the model of 
a tiered response with Emergency Department and trauma physicians supervising other 
trained clinicians to be a force multiplier in increasing the number of patients that can be 
cared for in the immediate time frame. Fostering an interdepartmental, interdisciplinary, 
collaborative response team supported by policy accomplishes this goal. The licensing 
and regulatory bodies and the ABMS must support and promote a different construct that 
applies different privileges and credentials in a disaster response. Hospitals move into 
HEICS with its own table of organization during a disaster. The Chief Executive Officer 
is often not the Incident Commander. In this construct, clinicians may move into a 
different table of organization during a disaster so that all participants answer to one 
Chief.  
Hospitals and networks must also support participation in the Regional Response 
Committees (RRC), which will leverage community resources in an integrated response 
model for the transfer of patients or resources. The RRC serves as a community of 
interest further encouraging practitioner participation and professional growth in 
emergency preparedness.  
1. Funding and Manpower 
Federal resources can best be spent developing and rolling out a curriculum for 
physicians that is flexible, frequent, relevant and inexpensive such as teleconference and 
on-line. The curriculum can start in medical school and continue through residency, and 
become part of lifelong learning. Homeland Security dollars can develop technology for 
computer and other simulations that will develop and enhance the technical, management 




qualification for the individual physician and Pay-for-Performance (P4P) financial 
incentives for hospitals can encourage participation.  The return on investment, by 
leveraging those physicians already in place, is huge. 
Scarce dollars must be distributed wisely by informed agencies and funding 
sources to educate the largest numbers of professionals in the most effective way. 
Hopefully this thesis and the model will guide their thinking and provide a building block 
for further research.  
2. Transforming Organizations 
Transforming reluctant organizations requires trust and strong, effective 
leadership. 
a. Transformational Leadership 
We hope that this report marks the beginning of a truly transformational 
state of preparedness throughout all levels of our nation. Yet with 
collective determination, unity of effort and effective organizational 
change, the true legacy of Katrina can be that of a catalyst that triggered a 
real and lasting improvement to our national preparedness.253 
The challenges posed by meeting the goals, objectives and initiatives 
outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security,254 as well as the challenges 
posed in the Homeland Security Presidential Directives, require significant effort to 
prepare, respond and recover from attacks at the federal, state and local levels. 
Medical leaders must develop new thinking about how best to handle new 
challenges using evidence-based outcomes. Current disaster planning and drills are based 
on the concept of providing the best care to one patient and replicating it for large 
numbers. In mass casualty scenarios, the numbers of potential victims are suddenly 
massive.  
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The success of this metamorphosis relies on transformational leadership. 
Important characteristics of this leadership include: 
 Credibility and knowledge 




 Culture of creativity 
 Collaboration 
 Commitment to excellence 
 Communication 
 Sense of Time 
The transactional leader will get the job done usually through a reward 
system or through a superior-inferior manager/employee working relationship. The 
transformational leader recognizes the urgency, establishes a powerful guiding coalition, 
creates a strategy, communicates a vision, empowers others to act on the vision, plans for 
and creates short term wins, consolidates improvements, produces still more change and 
institutionalizes new approaches. He or she will advance changes so comprehensive and 
pervasive that it fosters change in depth and breadth. This accelerated revolution 
introduces new sources of power, new structures and new cultures.255 A key component 
of this transformation is trust. 
b. Trust 
Executives tempted to take shortcuts should remember the dictum of 
Confucius that good government needs weapons, food and trust. If the 
ruler cannot hold onto all three, he should give up weapons first and food 
next. Trust should be guarded to the end because “without trust, we cannot 
stand.256 
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256 Steven M. R. Covey, The Speed of Trust (Free Press, NY: NY, 2006), 272. 
 201
An important issue for Homeland Security is how to develop the 
commitment necessary to make a major transformational change in healthcare to address 
the nation’s preparedness in 2009. To make medical preparedness real, trust has to be 
developed at many levels. 
The House of Medicine must secure its credibility by demonstrating 
integrity, intent, capabilities and results. This social contract begins with the five waves 
of trust as defined by Stephen Covey.257 
The first wave, self trust,258 involves seeing the need for change in how 
healthcare providers and institutions prepare; speaking the need for change to their 
colleagues and their regulators; and embracing a behavioral shift to reflect the change by 
providing leadership and mentorship. Physicians must believe that they can improve 
response and that their response can improve outcomes. 
The second wave of trust is the relationship trust.259 Covey describes it as 
consistent behavior evidenced by talking straight, demonstrating respect, creating 
transparency, righting wrongs, showing loyalty, delivering results, getting better, 
confronting reality, clarifying expectations and practicing accountability.260 These 
relationships develop around the communities of interest and respect that are developing 
at the ground level of healthcare with regard to preparedness. Non-traditional alliances 
and reporting mechanisms that perhaps threaten traditional leadership are included. 
Participants challenge each other with their interests and their knowledge.  This ground 
swell of interest becomes tipping point leadership. Fundamental change occurs when 
beliefs and energies of a critical mass of people create a sweeping movement toward an 
idea. Examples include interagency collaboration such as regional preparedness 
committees, and non-traditional leadership such as the leadership provided from the 
Greater New York Hospital Association, which, in a reversal of traditional roles, guides 
hospitals and regulatory agencies toward preparedness. Since hospitals plan as part of 
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regional preparedness organizations, they develop more interdisciplinary and interagency 
collaboration, strengthen the community response, share the burden and achieve local 
economies of scale. It requires reaching outside the hospital to network and university 
affiliates and other partners to grow the community of interest. It also requires looking 
within the hospital to empower others to join the team.  
The final three waves improve shareholder trust. In this case, the 
shareholders include the hospital, the practitioner and the public. 
The third wave, organizational trust, is necessary to effect organizational 
change. According to Covey, low trust results from redundancy, bureaucracy, politics, 
disengagement, turnover, and fraud. High trust results in increased value, accelerated 
growth, enhanced innovation, improved collaboration, strong partnering, better execution 
and heightened loyalty.261 Practitioners and hospitals must trust and partner with each 
other to create this new reality without negatively impacting current patient care, 
physician productivity, or revenues of either the practitioner or the institution.  The 
relationship between physicians and other healthcare providers must become 
collaborative and self-advancing. Both sides face huge risk if they fail as Hurricane 
Katrina proves. Departments can develop more interdisciplinary collaboration, 
strengthening hospital response, sharing the burden and achieving economies of scale. 
The fourth wave is the market trust where brand matters.262 The 
healthcare industry must redirect effort to build domestic preparedness capability and 
resiliency and encourage their clinicians to participate. Heightened preparedness has been 
present for years in Israel and in the U.S. military, but U.S. hospital practices have yet to 
fully absorb them. However, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department 
of Health and Human Services, in conjunction with the American Board of Medical 
Specialties, should advance the overriding structure of this organizational change to 
ensure uniformity, accountability and critical mass participation to achieve the tipping 
point.  
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The fifth wave is societal trust.263 Only when healthcare achieves this 
level of preparedness will the public rightfully have trust. Once appointed, a national 
preparedness spokesperson must be a non-political, trusted, credible and identifiable face 
to the public, similar to Marcus Welby. This spokesperson should be the single voice that 
all Americans can turn to for advice and guidance in time of a disaster. Having such a 
person before Hurricane Katrina to order evacuation might have saved lives. In an 
explosive or chemical event, it can be crucial to keeping the worried well from adding to 
the surge. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Organizational Hurdles 
Kim and Mauborgne describe tipping point leadership as an approach that 
manages the key organizational hurdles of change including cognitive resistance, 
resource limitations, motivational weakness and political barriers. Tipping point 
leadership ignores the conventional wisdom that change is dependent on resources and 
time and instead focuses on points of disproportionate influence. It focuses on areas with 
uncontested space rather than competing for the same limited resources and time.264 
a. Cognitive Resistance 
Preparedness still seems abstract and remote. Engaging healthcare 
professionals, including physicians, nursing and administrators, to understand that the 
current preparation is not acceptable and accept the need for change is a cognitive hurdle. 
Even physicians who deal with critical emergencies every day feel they are doing well 
and that their preparedness is sufficient, yet most have never dealt with a mass casualty 
event where systems become overwhelmed.  
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The civilian medical community is not as adequately prepared as the 
military medical community for disaster medical response. These CBRNE terrorism 
threats are new to the United States homeland. Physicians and PAs receive limited 
training and few have exposure to managing CBRNE agents. However, they have or have 
had skills and knowledge necessary to stabilize victims of these agents. In the research 
many voice some concerns about time and money but indicate a willingness to participate 
and prepare. Some clearly never thought of their ability or responsibility to respond, but 
when reframed into skills they have or had and could easily relearn, many indicate 
interest. 
Even physician literature perpetuates the cognitive dissonance. The 
literature about response to the Tokyo Sarin release,265 and the Oklahoma City,266 
Madrid267 and London268 bombings is only published in literature that surgeons or 
Emergency Medicine physicians read. There is some literature in military literature.269 
Other physicians would not be exposed to that literature. The American Medical 
Association first published a bimonthly journal called “Disaster Medicine and Public 
Health Preparedness” in June 2007.270 However, the cost and the limited time availability 
for reading may preclude this journal and others from being widely read. 
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Clinicians know that to practice across professional and subspecialty lines 
incurs jeopardy with licensing and hospital medical boards, and jeopardizes their medical 
liability coverage. Most follow the rules. Concerning disaster medical capability and 
response, the rules need to be reassessed and rewritten. Once the clinicians are apprised 
of the new rules, this research indicates they will willingly participate. 
Communication could be used effectively to sensitize the hospital 
community to the need for a different strategy. Putting key physician leaders face-to-face 
with operational problems during drills will enlist their support. New ways to drill these 
scenarios would hopefully emphasize the imperative. This change is an issue of 
leadership and knowledge. 
b. Resource Limitations 
In tipping point leadership, one reaches the goal by applying limited 
resources in a targeted strategy. 
Hospitals operate on razor-thin margins and often have no resources or 
infrastructure to develop or support a preparedness program other than what they have 
received from HRSA. The Federal Government cannot provide resources to almost 5000 
hospitals to develop and support these programs. Resiliency is not improved by granting 
money to facilities that may not know where best to invest the limited money or use it 
differently hospital to hospital.  Granting money to build more DMATs and MRCs that 
will not always be available in time or substance does not improve it either. 
This research confirms that clinicians are present within a hospital that 
self- assess themselves to be qualified and competent. It confirms that they are willing. 
The return on investment for this strategy of leveraging physician 
resources at hand can be huge. Rather than each hospital striking out to determine its path 
at significant cost, the training and credentialing requirements are set at the   
DHS/DHHHS/ABMS level after analyzing and negotiating with their respective 
agencies. Education can be offered nationally while on site training and drill participation 
occurs at the local level.   
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To be successful, CBRNE training should begin in medical school, be 
emphasized throughout residency and be a required part of the Board certification and 
recertification curriculum for all specialties. Much of what is needed to improve 
healthcare preparedness already exists in terms of military curriculum and training. 
Simulations already exist for laparoscopic and robotic surgery. Computer games and 
computer or model simulations funded by the government, guided by the medical 
specialties and developed by public-private technology partnerships could advance these 
goals.  
Hospitals and physicians should incur no financial burden since the 
commitment of time and interest will be borne by the physicians and the hospitals. State 
Health departments and other regulatory agencies might be encouraged to review, reduce 
or remove other repetitive, onerous requirements or to extend the length of the 
certification periods in favor of garnering time and interest in education and training to 
improve healthcare preparedness.  
c. Motivational Weakness 
New information in medicine is published every day. Physicians are 
challenged to stay abreast of developments in their own specialty and changes in other 
fields of medicine daily. The massive volume of information conflicts with available 
time. This discrepancy is compounded by responsibilities to teach, conduct research and 
manage busy practices. 
Physicians are often mandated for many courses some of which are 
repetitive, redundant, and add little useful information. These courses compete for 
available time for reading. Requirements by regulatory agencies such as JCAHO, CMS or 
state health departments often become a disincentive.   
This hurdle will challenge individual physicians and hospitals.  
Overcoming the motivational hurdle requires national medical leadership to successfully 
identify and speak to the need for change, and provide a framework for how it can be 
accomplished with minimal financial impact on the clinician or their practice. They must 
encourage the development of communities of practice across specialties and voluntary 
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participation. Training must be convenient, challenging, and engaging.  Faculty must be 
competent and effective teachers. There should be an incentive system for those who do 
participate.  
Key influencers such as the specialty college leadership can frame the 
challenge, provide information and build communities of practice through courses and 
simulations at national and regional meetings.  They can establish interest sections at 
these colleges devoted to hospital preparedness. Hospital networks and regional 
preparedness councils and regional hospital associations may also promote communities 
of practice. 
Physicians understand the “why” of this initiative—the GWOT has moved 
onto home soil. This research reveals an interest in learning more about the “what”—the 
CBRNE agents and the response. Homeland Security and medical leadership must 
strategize to standardize the “how.” The respondents raise many valid issues to be 
resolved on a national level prior to finalizing and implementing a strategy.  
Physicians by nature are a competitive group. Singling out the right key 
influencers and motivators, highlighting them in public forums such as conferences and 
journals, and using them to frame the response in terms of knowledge and skills that 
many physicians have will be most useful. If physicians think they can contribute to 
preparedness and realize they are being asked to prepare, many will accept the challenge. 
If colleagues receive a badge of qualification, other physicians will be challenged to 
compete. If the challenge is broken down to the least common denominator, physicians 
will see what they need to do and the challenge will be doable rather than all-
encompassing. Once physicians exert the leadership, mid-level providers such as 
physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and nursing profession could follow the 
guidance of their physicians. 
Physician investment in the strategy will partly come from altruism. But 
there should be a win-win opportunity for them as well. Physicians do respect their 
specialty board and the corresponding trade representative agency, for example the 
American Board of Surgery and the American College of Surgeons. Each specialty board 
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is a member of the American Board of Medical Specialties. In a win-win situation, a 
certificate or “added qualification” designation from the specialty board or the American 
Boards of Medical Specialties could encourage and reward successful participants. This 
incentive could also bridge the competition between specialties and foster cross specialty 
cooperation and respect.  
Hospitals have incentives to engage their leadership and transform their 
organization to one that promotes an interdisciplinary disaster response.  Hospital 
Medical Boards could strive to have a certain percentage of their staff certified. This 
certification could be one of the core measures that regulatory agencies such as JCAHO 
monitor. More positively, hospitals could be financially rewarded for promoting 
participation in preparedness efforts under the CMS Pay-for-Performance (P4P) projects.  
In this study, many physicians and physician assistants express interest in 
training. The program can be successful if conducted on a professional basis with 
competent, experienced faculty; is voluntary, convenient, challenging and stimulating; 
and provides the participant with an incentive, whether it is personal satisfaction that they 
are part of the nation’s response to the Global War on Terror or an “added qualification.”  
d. Political Hurdles 
This blue ocean strategy crosses many lines of authority and traditional 
alliances and will result in new communities of practice and changing allegiances beyond 
departmental, hospital or specialty divisions. It does not wait for approval from 
regulatory agencies. It challenges them to build a framework that meets their 
requirements and concerns but, most importantly, meets the needs of the public. It will 
raise many concerns from powerful vested interests that will resist this new strategy. It 
will raise issues about time, cost, competencies, patient safety, liability, licensing 
concerns and sustainability.  
The House of Medicine is a stove-piped profession. Intellectual arrogance 
and financial protectionism exist. For example, Emergency Medicine competes with 
Cardiology and Radiology for the reimbursement for EKG and radiological interpretation 
of studies done in an Emergency Department, respectively. It is usually settled by 
 209
medical board policy. Hand surgery is variously done by surgeons, hand surgeon 
specialists, orthopedists or plastic surgeons, depending on hospital protocol and physician 
availability. Departments and divisions guard their turf very determinedly. Hospital 
leadership will have pro and con reasons for participation. Members of the ABMS and 
the ACGME will also have pro and con reasons. 
For financial, regulatory, professional, personal and control reasons, there 
will be non-participators and non-supporters of this strategy. As the strategy develops, all 
participants from the continuum of medical training (LCME, ACGME, ABMS, hospital 
associations, DHS, DHHS, major state licensing boards, the insurance industry, the major 
physician trade organizations, such as the AMA, and specialty colleges) must participate 
in developing this strategy. The focus must stay on achieving the goal by building 
powerful alliances of willing participants and lobbyists who understand the plotting, 
intrigue and politics to overcome the barriers. The more likely change becomes, the more 
fiercely and vocally these negative influencers—both internal and external—will fight to 
protect their positions.  Some might support one part of the concept and reject another. 
My interview with the hospital association representative indicates that they would 
support the concept as long as no cost was involved for their hospital members. Potential 
supporters include professionals who recognize the challenge such as the Schools of 
Public Health who are involved in studying and challenging preparedness. Additional 
supporters include the military where cross training has been successful and medical 
professionals from Israel where response involves all hospital employees. Potential 
advisors include counterparts from Tokyo, London and Madrid since the literature 
published after those events does not include all that needs to be told.  
There will be pushback from those organizations, agencies and individuals 
who seek to make a profit from medical education. There will be resistance from some 
physicians if the project is not clearly and completely defined and framed for them at the 
outset. Some of the medical trade groups have previously come out against specific 
education requirements since they seek to increase membership and generate revenues 
from those physicians who oppose mandates or feel oppressed. These organizations will 
have to be identified early and co-opted to be early adopters.  
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Discussions will be needed within the medical, hospital and legal 
communities and with the public about liability coverage and altered standards of care, 
and at what point and with whose authority does the emergency medicine community 
switch to this disaster mode. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The U.S. Government, especially the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Department of Health and Human Services, has oversight for the care and well-being of 
all Americans. However, all disasters are local and initially so is all response. At the local 
level, hospitals need to improve their preparedness and strengthen their ability to care for 
victims of a mass casualty event happening in their backyard, regardless of their trauma 
status. It is shortsighted to think that EMS can and will divert to the designated hospitals 
as has been the experience in Tokyo, London and other catastrophes.  
The research of this thesis shows that hospitals hold physician and physician 
assistant resources within their institutions around the clock that have cognitive and 
technical skills useful in response to a disaster. They have indicated their willingness to 
train to participate in a response effort. They are immediately available, currently 
credentialed and well-experienced in the systems and operations of a particular hospital, 
making them immediately functional and useful. 
Many opportunities exist along the career continuum of a physician or physician 
assistant for training and demonstration of competency to strengthen their preparedness 
and skills. Courses need to develop and provide a focused approach to the assessment and 
management of patients who are victims of several different scenarios that are possible in 
a terrorist or other attack. Newer technologies should be promoted. 
The value proposition offered here is that each hospital will significantly improve 
its preparedness and be better positioned to manage the public trust of healthcare. The 
value is improved surge capability that is available almost immediately. By shifting the 
focus and redefining the problem, it simplifies the response for all U.S. hospitals around 
the country. It obviates the need to have metropolitan response teams ready in every  
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town. It shifts the focus from outside teams who would be delayed in these scenarios to a 
ready made, fully operational and functional in-house team. It would be most productive 
to work with the team one drilled with regularly. 
The window of opportunity to successfully impact the outcome of victims of the 
explosive and chemical scenarios is different from the response time for bioterrorism or 
even most radiation exposure. Looking at the timeline for response mandates a new 
solution. While the cost of training and maintaining those skills at the local level is 
significant, the value at the local level is vastly improved for these two scenarios. Shifting 
the focus of the physician manpower to the local level, the federal government can focus 
on the more global issues and a longer term response. It will provide a higher level of 
local preparedness and give comfort to the public. 
One of the six critical mission areas of The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security is emergency preparedness and response. One of the initiatives under this area is 
preparation of health care providers for catastrophic terrorism. HSPD 21 calls for an 
enhanced disaster medical capability. Financial resources are limited at all levels. Current 
response plans would not be operational in the time frame necessary to positively impact 
victims of an explosive or chemical event. This thesis offers a simple strategy of using 
physicians immediately at hand in any hospital to expand the initial response in the 
“Golden Hour” in a model of graduated responsibility to improve response capability. 
The research of this thesis supports that many physicians have or had skills that could be 
leveraged to provide that response. The medical community has the building blocks 
already available and resources yet to be leveraged to provide life-saving assistance in the 
first hours of need. It requires guidance, organization and direction to orient the 
profession into a disaster medical capability that will improve preparedness and response. 
This challenge is analogous to the patient who has the right medication but does not take 
it for various reasons. He does not get the benefit and may suffer the consequences. 
Healthcare has the building blocks of physician resources, but they are not being applied 
effectively to ensure the benefit. We should not have to experience the consequences.  
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APPENDIX A.  A SURVEY OF PHYSICIANS (ATTENDINGS & 
RESIDENTS) AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS ON THEIR 
PREPAREDNESS & WILLINGNESS TO EVALUATE AND 
STABILIZE VICTIMS OF MASS CASUALTY EVENTS 
National Preparedness Response requires trained, willing and available 
practitioners. 
This survey is designed to measure clinician perception of their own preparedness and 
willingness to participate in response to a natural or terrorist event.  
. 
Demographics  (Check all that apply)                      
Male___________ Female________________ 
Your specialty: 
Primary: ______________________  Board Certified Y_____   N_____  BE_____ 
Secondary: ____________________  Board Certified Y_____   N_____  BE_____ 
 
Your status (choose all that apply) 
 
Attending               Resident            PGY level            Physician Assistant_____ 
Paid Hospital Staff Full time__________ 
Voluntary Staff      Part time__________  
Current Position: (choose one) Clinical     ____ Academic  ____  Administrative______ 
                
Year of Medical School or PA Program graduation__________________ 
 
Your predominant hospital: 
Urban ___________    Suburban  _______________   Rural______________ 
Hospital A   ________________          Hospital B______________________  
 
Training (Check all that apply) 
   
        currently certified never certified once certified 
BLS    
ACLS    
PALS    
ATLS    
 
Have you ever taken Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (CBRNE) 

















Chemical        
Biological        
Radiological        
Nuclear        
Explosive        
 
SCENARIO I-Explosion 
Your Emergency Department receives notification that there has been an explosion on a 
nearby train. Hundreds of victims will be distributed to nearby EDs. While your 
responsibilities may or may not involve the ED today, you are in the hospital when the 
patients begin arriving.  Soon the number of patients overwhelms the ED staff resources 
and an urgent request for assistance is initiated. Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. Do you think you are qualified and competent today to work alongside 
ED and Trauma Attendings to assess and stabilize victims with unstable 
vital signs or an unstable airway? Yes________ No________ 
a. If yes, move to question  #2  
b. If no, please  answer the following questions: 
i. Do you think that with additional advance training, you 
could learn to perform assessment & stabilization during a 
catastrophic event? Yes________ No________ 





2. Today: Can you Yes________ No________ 
3. Manage an Airway   Yes ________ No_______ 
1. Intubate                                        ___              ___ 
2. Manage resuscitation fluids         ___              ___ 
3. Assess need for blood                  ___              ___ 
4. Transfuse Packed RBCs              ___              ___ 
5. Control external hemorrhage       ___              ___ 
4. Do you think you are qualified to work with ED and Trauma Attendings 
to assess and stabilize urgent but stable victims? Yes____ No____ 
      If yes, move to question #4 
a. If no, please answer the following questions 
i. Do you think that with additional advance training, you 
could learn to assess and treat stable patients (simple 
fractures, burns, simple lacerations) during a catastrophic 
event? Yes________ No________ 
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5. Today can you  Yes________ No________ 
a. Triage? ___ ___ 
b. Clean and dress a wound? ___  ___ 
c. Repair simple lacerations?  ___ ___ 
d. Order and Interpret x rays?  ___  ___ 
e. Splint?   ___ ___ 
 
SCENARIO II–Chemical Exposure 
Your Emergency Department receives notification that an unknown liquid has been 
dispersed at a local high school. Hundreds of victims are complaining of difficulty 
breathing and some are seizing. Large numbers of patients will be distributed to nearby 
EDs. While your responsibilities may or may not involve the ED today, you are in the 
hospital. Assume that all involved have been decontaminated at the scene.  Please answer 
the following questions: 
1. Do you think you are qualified and competent today to work alongside 
ED and Trauma Attendings to assess and stabilize victims with unstable 
vital signs or an unstable airway?  Yes________ No________ 
a. If yes, move to question  #2  
b. If no, please  answer the following questions: 
i. Do you think that with additional advance training, you 
could learn to perform assessment & stabilization during a 
catastrophic event?  Yes________ No________ 




2. Today: Can you Yes________ No________ 
a. Manage an Airway                      ___                ___ 
b. Intubate                                        ___               ___ 
c. Manage seizures                           ___               ___ 
3. Do you think you are qualified to work with ED and Trauma Attendings 
to assess and stabilize urgent but stable victims? Yes______ No_______ 
a. If yes, move to question #4 
b. If no, please answer the following questions 
i. Do you think that with additional advance training, you 
could learn to assess and treat stable patients (difficulty 
breathing, nausea, vomiting, irritated eyes, and hysteria) 
during a catastrophic event? Yes________ No________ 
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4. Would you be willing to respond to the request for help to assess and 
stabilize victims with unstable vital signs or unstable airways? 
Yes________ No________  
 






Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Medical specialists have skills applicable 
to a catastrophic response team 
     
Medical professionals have an ethical 
responsibility to respond 
     
Medical professionals are receptive to 
additional training that enable them to 
provide additional assistance during 
catastrophic events 
     
Medical specialists are receptive to 
assistance from other professionals during 
a catastrophic event 
     
Training in CBRNE should be mandated 
for all physicians/PAs 
     
I have concerns about risk and malpractice      
Training costs are a concern      
Amount of training time is a concern      
The cost of my time for training is a 
concern 
     
I have concerns that I can learn these skills      
I have concern about retention of these 
skills 
     
Training in CBRNE should be mandated 
for all physicians/PAs  
     
CBRNE training should be standardized 
across all disciplines 
     
Retraining in CBRNE should occur at 
regular intervals 
     
CBRNE training should be a requirement 
for 
     
    Medical Board 
credentialing/recredentialing 
     






Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
    Board certification/recertification      
Post graduate CBRNE Response Training 
should be conducted by 
     
                Hospital      
                Department of Health      
                Medical Society      
                CDC      
                Private organizations 
(ie.American                                                   
Heart Association) 
     
                National Specialty Society(ACP)      
                U. S. Military      
  

























Thank you for participating in this survey. Your time is valuable. So too is your input into 
National Preparedness. Thanks.                     
 
      Joan McInerney, MD 
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APPENDIX B.  LETTER OF INTRODUCTION OF SURVEY TO 
PHYSICIANS/PAS AT HOSPITAL A 
April 26, 2007 
 
 
To all my colleagues at (Hospital A): 
 
 
I am asking you to give 10 minutes of your valuable time to complete a survey titled: 
 
A Survey of Physicians (Attendings & Residents) and Physician Assistants on Their 
Preparedness & Willingness to Evaluate and Stabilize Victims of Mass Casualty 
Events 
 
This is a research project that has been approved by the IRB at (Hospital A). It is research 
for my thesis for a Master’s degree program through the Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security of the Department of Homeland Security. 
 
It is an opportunity for clinicians to contribute valuable input to the Department of 
Homeland Security on physician or PA preparedness and willingness to participate in 2 
particular scenarios-one a chemical event, the other a blast event should there be a natural 
or terrorist event. 
 
The survey is anonymous. 
 
Thank you for your contribution. 
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APPENDIX C.  LETTER OF INTRODUCTION OF SURVEY TO 
PHYSICIANS/PAS AT HOSPITAL B 
        April 26, 2007 
 
To all my colleagues at (Hospital B): 
 
I am asking you to give 10 minutes of your valuable time to complete a survey titled: 
 
A Survey of Physicians (Attendings & Residents) and Physician Assistants on Their 
Preparedness & Willingness to Evaluate and Stabilize Victims of Mass Casualty 
Events 
 
This is a research project that has been approved by the IRB at (Hospital B). It is research 
for my thesis for a Master’s degree program through the Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security of the Department of Homeland Security. 
 
It is an opportunity for clinicians to contribute valuable input to the Department of 
Homeland Security on physician or PA preparedness and willingness to participate in 2 
particular scenarios-one a chemical event, the other a blast event should there be a natural 
or terrorist event. 
 
The survey is anonymous. 
 
Thank you for your contribution. 
 
 
      Joan McInerney, MD, FACEP 
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APPENDIX D.  RESPONSES TO OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS 
Responses to question “What type of CBRNE training would you like or wish you 
had?” 
Training for CBRNE should be all that is available.  
Do not wish any training.  
I cannot tell because it’s the first time I heard of CBRNE. 
Emergency care and emergency preparedness training. 






I wish I could have had it in medical school. I would definitely like to attend one if I am 
offered in the hospital. 
ATLS. 
Primary trauma care/Disaster management. 
First aid, chemical & biological injuries/explosion. 
Chemical exposures. 




Biological exposure and chemical exposure. 
Biological, explosive. 
CBRNE. 
I have had only one chemical lecture in school. I would like all the rest of it. 
I would like one course that covers all topics. 
I am only a first year. I need a lot of training skills. 














More explosive training. 
I’d like to learn more than explosives. 
Biological, chemical. 
?. 






Efficient enough to be capable of contributing to a disaster. 
Efficient in skills required. 
Hard to define. 
Chemical/Biological. 
Chemical, biological. 
Basic to advanced. 
Chem/Bio. 
Much of this is covered in ACLS/BLS. More specific training. 




I would like to have CBRNE training in how to respond to a terrorist event such as 
chemical or biological. 
Much of this is covered in ACLS/BLS. More specific training in management of 
fractures/splinting, burns, controlling bleeding would be useful. ACLS which covers 
codes and airway management should be mandatory. 
Nuclear & explosive. 
Training modeled after ACLS. 
All- CBRNE training is appropriate given the daily threats of terrorism and disasters. It 
should be mandatory training to meet disasters. 
All-very interesting. 
CBRNE trainings are helpful in case of emergencies-explosion, exposure to chemical or 
radiological. 
All. 
All that is available. 
Use of detox equipment, intensive training in use of antidotes for specific toxins. A 
response team concept- a dedicated small group eg 5-6 persons who work through the 
training process together and become familiar with the emergency response as a 
“platoon” concept. 
 
Responses to question “What ideas for successful CRNE training can you offer?” 
Should be mandated. 
Request retraining opportunities. 
Request a residency in CBRNE. 
Have it as part of standard hospital training like fire drills. Make it available at different 
hours of the day so that everyone can participate, not just medical staff but support staff 
also. 
Increase awareness among people. 
None. 
Training videos/seminars; essential that manuals be made available for guidelines in the 
event of a disaster. 
Exposure to basic principles early in training/career. 
More time for demonstration of required skills. 
To be compulsory provided by hospital. 
It must be routine training or else it will not be remembered. 
Make it part of orientation and should be paid for. 




Conduct CBRNE at hospital/Make it easier to go to the classes etc. If people have to 
travel long distance in traffic, it is a deterrent. 
Regular interval training available after working hours or on weekends or organized 
educational leave for training or some level of or complete (if possible) on-line, video or 
computer-based home study. 
Practice Scenarios. 
Chemical scenarios. 
Brief, recurrent refresher course. 
Don’t know. 
Certification test, actual simulation. 
Expand emergency medicine residencies. 
Training program/hospital should provide the training free of charge. 
3 day course. 
Clinical scenarios. 
Drills with actual scenarios. 
Grand Rounds. 
On-line learning. 
Case scenarios with practice management. 
Enough common sense. 
No cost for physicians/enthusiastic, interested teachers. 
Good training. 
I am willing to train and participate. 
Willing to learn. 
It should be offered but not mandated. Physicians go into specialties and that is the area 
in which they want to focus. So maybe according to specialty interest, it can be offered, 
like ID people should be offered training in biological, etc. 
Clinical scenarios. 
On-line or limited time frame. 
Should be offered but not mandated for physicians. 
Airway management workshops across the board to all physicians involved in patient 
care. 
I hope the training course can offer some videotape/DVD to cover the topics. 
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Airway Management workshops across the board to all physicians involved in patient 
care. Basics of resuscitation (fluid management, blood transfusions, wound care). 
Offer training programs/courses during Department conference/teaching hours. 
Training should be conducted during departmental conference time. 
More informative. 
If taught to physicians, it must be taught by physicians. 







Field training.   
Scenarios. 
It is important to have this training in today’s world because of complex scenarios and 


























Scenarios & drills. 




















Classroom conferences and practical training. 



















More video presentations. 
All. 




Field training/simulation/drills/Classroom conferences. 
Field training/simulation/drills/classroom conferences. 
Field training/simulation/drills/classroom conferences. 







Field training/classroom conferences. 




















Field training/simulation/drills/classroom conferences. 
Classroom conferences. 
Field training/simulation/drills/classroom conferences/teleconferencing. 
Field training/classroom conferences. 
Field training. 
Field training/simulation/drills/classroom conferences. 
Field training. 
Classroom/simulations/drills. 







It could be mandated & started in med school. There should be re-training by hospital 
every year. The sooner the better. 
My idea is to recruit committed persons (those who want to do the job, not to get a title). 
Field training. 
Field training/simulation/drills. 
CBRNE training should be voluntary. 
 
Responses to question “What barriers to CBRNE training do you envision?” 
Concerned about costs. 
Concerned about retention. 
Concerned about time requirements. 
Resources. 
Time and money constraints. 
Getting off from residency training. 
Fees/Getting paid for time. 
If it is costly, afraid this institution would not pay for it. 
Time concerns; peoples’ acceptance. 
City vs. rural scenarios; job description (ER vs FP). 
Funding/Time management. 
Cost of training. 
It might not be as essential as ACLS training/Though might be a barrier to make it 
necessary before joining a health profession. 
Cost. 
Cost/time. 
Some physicians are not comfortable in emergency situations. It is almost like a 
specialty. 
Good training, time and cost. 





Time limitations and limited availability of coverage for the person training. 
Cost. 
Time. 
I would never have the time. 
Time constraints. 
Time. 




Time to train. 
Time available. 











Should be guided by experts. 
It is difficult for doctors not specialized in Primary Care or ER to want to train or help 









Cost and willing/qualified instructors. 
Time factor. 
Time factor. 
Lack of interest. 
I think the major barrier is time. If hospital can provide the physician some time to take 
the trainings, most physicians would be happy to receive the training. 
Time commitment from busy practices. Cost issues for large scale training. Interest level 
may not be high for every physician. 
Many of these skills are difficult to retain if not regularly practiced. Also, though most 
would want to help, people are wary of the liability issue of assisting when the type of 
situation is beyond their scope of expertise. Regular credentialing in ACLS & BLS 
should be mandatory so that practitioners can retain these skills. 
Time commitment. 
Time off to get certified and cost of certification. 
Communication & practice. 
Retention. 
It will be difficult to compel practicing physicians to participate in training. 
None. 
Confidence that I would be able to actively participate efficiently in a real life situation. 
Time & money. 
Lack of time. 
Time & funding. 
Difficult to retain. 
Time. 
Cost/lack of trained staff. 
Time during normal working hours. Comprehension & training. It should be practical. 
Work schedule. 
Not having enough time. 
Time allotment for training. 
Not enough time. 
Scheduling to be off. 
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Busy schedule. 
The time involved for that kind of training. The malpractice issues for specialties that 
don’t deal with emergencies. 
Time. 
Time constraints. 
Time for training. 
No courses have been offered even though I have an interest. 
Time and place of training. 
No time during residency to take courses. 
Knowledge. 









No previous experience. 
Cost/manpower/resources. 
Governing Body to organize training. 
Time. 
Waste of time. 
Time. 
I am not interested in the least. 
Time. 
Time related. 
Time is very limited. 
Time & money. 
Time & money. 




Time & expense. 
Fear/lack of initial interest/laziness. 
Bureaucrats who like to see their resume or paycheck expand… 
Availability. 
Fear of another attack. 
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